



Daily Report

Central Eurasia

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Shumeyko Re-elected CIS Interparliamentary Assembly Chairman

LD1402200995 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1744 GMT 14 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, Feb 14 (INTERFAX)—Chairman of the Federation Council of Russia's Federal Assembly Vladimir Shumeyko has been re-elected chairman of CIS Interparliamentary Assembly for yet another year. He has been in charge of the CIS body since February 8, 1994. Shumeyko got unanimous support at a closed session of the Interparliamentary Assembly in St. Petersburg Tuesday [14 February].

Attending the session were the leaders and members of the parliaments of Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, and Tajikistan. An Uzbek parliamentary delegation did not arrive in St. Petersburg. A Ukrainian parliamentary team is attending the session as an observer.

The Interparliamentary Assembly keeps together the parliaments of all former USSR republics but the Baltic countries, Turkmenistan, and Ukraine.

Before Shumeyko, the assembly was led by Ruslan Khasbulatov, chairman of Russia's Parliament at the time.

CIS IPA Chairman Reports on 'Secret' Session Decision

LD1402180595 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1539 GMT 14 Feb 95

[By ITAR-TASS parliamentary correspondent Lyudmila Yermakova]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] St. Petersburg February 14 TASS—Participants in today's secret session of the CIS interparliamentary assembly (IPA) made decision on an important issue referring to convention on IPA, Vladimir Shumeyko, chairman of the IPA Council, told ITAR-TASS in an exclusive interview on Tuesday [14 February].

According to the opening clause of the document, IPA is recognized as a body of interstate cooperation; therefore, the status of the assembly has been made equal to that of the CIS Council of Heads of State and the CIS Council of Premiers, said Shumeyko.

The next stage in IPA evolution may consist in acquiring a status of "parliamentary, rather than interparliamentary, assembly which will make more binding decisions to be fulfilled by all participants", Shumeyko believes.

The third (and, probably, final) stage in IPA evolution will culminate in emergence of a Commonwealth of Independent States with a single parliament; its members will be elected directly—the way it is done in European Parliament, he said.

But that is a thing to come. IPA members are aware nowadays that it is only economic integration which may lead to a closer cooperation; therefore, it is clear that, as a Russian saying goes, "You should not run in front of the locomotive". "It is not members of parliament who determine policy", Shumeyko said.

Shumeyko was re-elected on Tuesday to the post of the IPA Council's chairman. In this connection, he told ITAR-TASS that he will try to make use of his colleagues' confidence in order to "draw (CIS member-) states closer to each other in the economic field".

Official Outlines CIS Military Integration Plans

LD1402201495 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1744 GMT 14 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, Feb 14 (INTERFAX)—CIS military integration will start with the formation of a chiefs of staff committee and four regional collective security zones in the Commonwealth, said Lieutenant-General Leonid Ivashov, secretary of the CIS Defense Ministers Council.

He told an Interfax interviewer Tuesday that in all, four military regions were planned to be set up on CIS territory. Western, Eastern, Central Asian, and Caucasus zones will unite nine CIS participant-states to be cooperated with irregularly by Ukraine, Moldova, and Turkmenistan.

According to Ivashov, the Western Zone is reserved for Belarus "as the key element", and for the Kaliningrad and Smolensk regions of Russia. "Ukraine and Moldova will be in touch with them, if needed," Ivashov explained.

The Caucasus zone will include Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, and the North Caucasus Republics within the Russian Federation.

The Central Asian zone is reserved for Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. The three republics will cooperate "with Turkmenistan on some elements."

Kazakhstan, Russia, and part of Kyrgyzstan will belong to the Eastern Zone.

Ivashov stressed that no special groupings would be set up within these zones, nor would army units be transferred there. "Everything will be done, depending on what is available in these zones," he said.

It is assumed that if one of the states belonging to a zone is attacked, the rest will help it to repulse the aggression. A planning body will determine what force and means are necessary to curb the attack.

"The Coalition Defense Forces will train jointly and will have common combat-readiness standards for troops and headquarters," Ivashov reported, adding that joint exercises are planned to be carried out as well.

He announced that these proposals would be submitted to CIS heads of state at the end of 1995.

ITAR-TASS Carries Press Review for 15 Feb

*LD1502072295 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
0517 GMT 15 Feb 95*

[“Press Review”—ITAR-TASS headline]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow February 15 TASS—Today's Russian newspapers continue to give an extensive coverage to the Chechen conflict. The Army newspaper KRASNAYA ZVEZDA front-pages an interview with Major-General Ivan Babichev, commander of the western army group in Chechnya.

Asked about Gudermes, the second largest city in Chechnya where Dudayev's troops retreated from Grozny, the general said: “There is now strife going between Chechen ringleaders in Gudermes. Time will show whether we shall have to fight there or not. This is also true of other towns and villages”.

The same daily runs a report by its correspondent from Grozny about the struggle between troops and enemy snipers inflicting a considerable loss on federal forces.

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA singles out a problem of food supplies to the Army and Navy in a front-page material entitled “It Is More Difficult To Feed Soldiers According to Rations. However, Appetites of Bureaucrats Are Growing”.

the ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA newspaper calls attention to plans for restoring the economy and social sphere in the chechen Republic in a special issue “Chechnya”. The newspaper prints interviews with Russian Agriculture and Food Minister Aleksandr Nazarchuk and Chairman of the Russian Geology Committee Viktor Orlov.

The daily also runs several decrees and instructions by the Russian president in connection with the state of the union message to be delivered at the Russian legislature on February 16.

The KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA newspaper features an article dealing with moral problems of adaptation of servicemen participating in the Chechen conflict. The daily reminds its readers in this connection of the six anniversary of Soviet troops' withdrawal from Afghanistan, which is marked today.

In an article “Second Bullet”, the newspaper examines this problem, putting the following question: “How shall we meet boys returning from the Chechen war? As we did from the Afghan?”

The IZVESTIYA newspaper front-pages a speculative article entitled “New Export Rules Open New Opportunities for Corruption”, examining consequences of a repeal of export duties and abolition of the institute of special exporters, which will come into force from January 1, 1996.

“According to some estimates,” the newspaper writes, “not so much a questionable budget for this year as foreign economic regulations may turn to be the stumbling block in negotiations with international finance organisations.”

Under the headline “Bodyguards of President Lukashenka Master Experience of Russian Secret Services”, IZVESTIYA carries an article describing the security system of Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka.

The newspaper also carries an article by its Washington correspondent, claiming that “the Kremlin's protests will not prevent NATO from expanding”.

The RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA newspaper runs an article by reporter Vladimir Mezentsev who conducts an independent investigation into the death of Otari Kvantrishvili, one of godfathers of the Russian mafia.

The PRAVDA newspaper prints ideas of Oleg Shenin, chairman of the council the reformed Communist Party of the Soviet Union in an article headlined “From Dictatorship of the Post to Authority of Thought”.

The NOVAYA YEZHEDNEVNAYA GAZETA newspaper devotes one of its pages to an analytical material about the fate of the nuclear submarine Komsomolets which sank in the Norwegian Sea on April 7, 1989. Its author is retired Vice-Admiral Yevgeniy Chernov, former commander of a submarine flotilla which included the Komsomolets.

FBI Concerned at Russian 'Mafia' Computer Hacking, Fraud

*MM1502122295 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
15 Feb 95 p 3*

[Report by Aleksandr Shalnev: "Our Mafia Is the Most Computerized in the World"]

[FBIS Translated Text] London—Russian computer experts are so skilled at extracting secrets from U.S. and West European corporations that the FBI has now raised the question of pooling the efforts of the police and intelligence services in the countries concerned in order to put an end to this practice.

FBI Director Louis Freeh toured Western Europe to discuss a possible program for counteracting the computer experts from Russia who serve the interests of our mafia. Among other things, he visited the British Isles where he met with the director general of MI-5, the British counterintelligence agency. They discussed setting up the exchange of intelligence information on operations by Russian mafiosi, who possess sufficient financial and human potential to penetrate the holy of holies of the biggest multinational corporations—their computer files.

According to the FBI's information, London's SUNDAY TIMES reported, our specialists have no particular difficulty in breaking almost any electronic codes and obtaining access to commercial secrets. Using the same computer technology, banking transactions are carried out, as a result of which tens of millions of dollars are removed from corporations' accounts in the blink of an eye and transferred to offshore accounts used by the mafia. According to some estimates, every month at least 1,000 of these transactions take place, and neither the FBI nor the other special services are at all capable of tracing them at the moment.

What the special services can do, however, is to assess the losses. The approximate figure is half a trillion dollars—that is how much the Russian and East European mafias are making.

Rybkin Discusses NATO, Chechnya With Claes, Swaelen

*LD1402214395 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 1434 GMT 14 Feb 95*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Aleksandr Mineyev]

[FBIS Translated Text] Brussels, 14 Feb—NATO understands the need to take account of the size and importance of Russia in constructing relations with it, Iven Rybkin, chairman of Russia's State Duma, told the ITAR-TASS correspondent today after his meeting with Willy Claes, secretary general of the North Atlantic alliance. He recalled that two components of the cooperation program have been drawn up between Russia

and NATO: one is within the framework of the "Partnership for Peace" and the second he described as "a program of openness, trust, and cooperation." The launch of these two programs is not far away," the chairman of the State Duma stressed.

Given the size of Russia, which extends over one sixth of the earth, its potential and specific features should certainly be taken into account, I. Rybkin said, describing the contents of his conversation with W. Claes. "If one is to speak about cooperation with NATO," he noted, "then it is desirable that this cooperation, just like the acceptance of new members into the alliance, should begin from the East. Perhaps, the parameters of cooperation with Russia should be laid out in a special treaty just as at one time the framework of NATO's relations with France were. At that time it was done on France's initiative but today this could be done as a display of goodwill by NATO. Naturally, with complete understanding of each other's problems."

The Chechen theme could not be avoided today in I. Rybkin's conversations with Willy Claes and Frank Swaelen, chairman of the Belgian Senate who is also chairman of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE]. As is known, members of the OSCE parliamentary Assembly condemn Russia's actions in this republic for "disproportionate use of military force" and "mass violations of human rights." W. Claes also expressed a view that as far as human rights are concerned the Chechen events cannot be regarded as Russia's purely internal affair. "In conversations with my Belgian interlocutors and with the NATO Secretary General I said—and I think I was understood correctly—that there will, possibly, be other episodes like Falklands, New Caledonia, Cyprus, Northern Ireland, and Chechnya in the life of the world and European community, which Russia cannot imagine itself not being part of. But we should understand each other's problems," Rybkin noted.

In his conversation with F. Swaelen, during which Rybkin as one of the deputy chairmen of the OSCE presented to this organization the Russian view of the causes and circumstances of the Chechen events, he stressed that if, for instance, the European Community had accepted Russia as its member back in the beginning of 1990's and took an active part in monitoring the development of the Chechen events, the tragedy could have been avoided.

Chernomyrdin, Meciar Discuss Trade, NATO Expansion

*MK1402111095 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY
in Russian 14 Feb 95 p 4*

[Report by Dmitriy Krivtsov: "Viktor Chernomyrdin's Visit to Slovakia. There's One Step From Economy to Policy—Via Pipeline"]

[FBIS Translated Text] This is Viktor Chernomyrdin's first ever official visit to Slovakia. The itinerary includes

the signing of a package of agreements, meetings with politicians and entrepreneurs. In a word, everything indicates the usual trappings of both sides' mutual interest. But the premier appears to intend to digress from the traditional economic questions so close to him. Shortly before the visit, Russian Ambassador to Bratislava Sergey Yastrzhembskiy made a rather curious statement: in his discussions with local leaders, Chernomyrdin will touch upon a purely political problem—Slovakia's hopes for joining NATO.

To hear Yastrzhembskiy tell it, Bratislava's desire to become a member of NATO cannot but cause Russia's anxiety. Along with the economic issues, this question too will be examined in the course of the visit. The premier is likely, in the same way as Andrey Kozyrev and Boris Yeltsin did, to try to persuade the Slovak leadership not to be in too much of a hurry to join the North Atlantic alliance. The likely aftermath of this step is some cooling in relations, and the economist-premier will surely have a number of trump cards up his sleeve because Slovakia's interest in supplies of Russian energy resources is rather great. Persuading his Slovak counterpart, however, will not be simple matter for Chernomyrdin because Vladimir Meciar sees Slovakia's joining NATO as the cabinet's priority task. At the same time, Yastrzhembskiy stated, this problem should not cloud the course of the talks. The question of NATO expansion, in his words, will be discussed outside the scope of the itinerary as it were, meaning perhaps an unofficial nature of discussions. KOMMERSANT-DAILY has come to learn that the premiers are going to talk one-on-one, even without interpreters. Thus, if Chernomyrdin manages to sway Bratislava's stance on joining NATO—at least until yet another move by Slovak diplomacy on the question of the alliance's expansion—it will remain a secret.

The main thing at the talks is economics. Vice Premier Yuriy Yarov visited Bratislava the other day for a scheduled sitting of an intergovernment commission on economic cooperation. Shortly before the premier's visit, Bratislava was visited also by Russian entrepreneurs. Already at this stage, the republic is expanding direct links with a number of Russian regions whereas in the coming few days it has been planned to discuss prospects of cooperation in the sphere of local air transportation and production of aircraft engines.

As for the problems of bilateral economic relations, they have long been known. First, in the wake of the "polite divorce" of the Czech Republic and Slovakia, the \$5 billion Russian debt to the former federation was divided 2 to 1, and the sides were leaning toward the possibility of having it repayed with deliveries of Russian goods and arms. Talking recently with your KOMMERSANT-DAILY correspondent, Slovakia's ambassador to Moscow Roman Paldan voiced his own views on that matter: the list of goods to be supplied to repay the debt should be corrected in particular to include only raw material supplies for the manufacture of such products in the republic that Russia is interested in buying.

The Russia-Slovakia commodity turnover is now quite comparable with that between Russia and India, for example. True, the Slovaks are unhappy about its imbalance: Russian exports are way above Slovak exports. The Russians, too, have problems: the structure of deliveries remains, unfortunately, lopsided—nearly 80 percent are energy resources. Each year Slovakia gets Russian oil worth \$500 million and nearly 5.75 billion cubic meters of gas annually. Besides, more than two-thirds of Russian gas supplied to Western Europe is piped across Slovakia. Bratislava benefits in no small way from this: the payment for transit (\$350 million) earns the treasury more hard currency than do the republic's entire exports (\$250 to \$270 million).

A no less important aspect of bilateral relations is the cooperation in the sphere of nuclear engineering. In Mr. Paldan's view, Russian goods concede only to Japanese goods on the world market, while being much cheaper. All these things taken together determine Bratislava's readiness to continue cooperation in this area. Slovakia today is among the biggest importers of Russian nuclear fuel: 40 million tonnes a year worth \$200 million. Besides, according to Mr. Paldan, an intergovernment commission has already drafted an agreement on Russia's participation in the completion of the nuclear electric power station project in Mochovcy. Yesterday, the Russian premier promised to grant Bratislava a \$150 million credit toward the implementation of this project. It has been planned in the course of the talks to look at the question of Russian participation in reconstruction of the operating nuclear station in Jaslovsky Bohunicy.

Chernomyrdin Outlines Basis for Building Relations

*LD1402141395 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1320 GMT 14 Feb 95*

[By ITAR-TASS special correspondents Gennadiy Yezhov and Valeriy Rzhnevskiy]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Bratislava February 14 TASS— "Russia will build its relations with all countries only on mutually beneficial terms and conditions. We are open to such cooperation," Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin told representatives of the Slovak business community here today.

Chernomyrdin made this statement after outlining prospects for potential economic interaction between Russian and Slovak partners and analysing the state of bilateral relations.

The Russian premier stressed that the Russian and Slovak economies are facing many tasks and problems in common and called the agreements signed on Monday "a breakthrough into the future".

Chernomyrdin said a series of new major projects is being prepared. These projects will find their reflection in the creation of a joint enterprise which will refine

Russian oil on the basis of the Slovnaft plant in Bratislava and a trade house which will sell Russian natural gas.

The Russian premier said inter-regional ties were becoming one of the most important directions of economic cooperation between Russia and Slovakia.

The meeting heard that a new bank had been established to specialise in Russian-Slovak transactions. More than 50 percent of Bratislava's Devin Bank's charter capital belongs to Russian commercial structures, ITAR-TASS learned.

Slovak businessmen asked the Russian premier and his Slovak counterpart Vladimir Meciar a few "stinging" questions. They asked the two prime ministers to protect them against bureaucratic hurdles in Russia and in Slovakia as they form a serious obstacle to trade and economic contacts between partners in the two countries. Chernomyrdin said he had taken note of the complaints and promised "to look into the problem".

Asked about Russia's debt to Slovakia, Chernomyrdin gave an exhaustive answer and added jokingly that "it is customary not to remind friends about debts too often".

In conclusion, Chernomyrdin reiterated that Russia was open to mutually beneficial cooperation with all country.

Christopher: U.S Interest in Russian Reforms Remains Intact

LD1502132995 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1303 GMT 15 Feb 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Mikhail Mzareulov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Washington February 15 TASS—The Chechen conflict raises issues concerning Russia's commitment to democratic processes, economic reform and international standards of conduct, said U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher here on Tuesday [14 February].

Speaking at hearings in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he confirmed U.S. deep concern over tragic losses in Chechnya, overdue use of force and eroding influence of the conflict on democracy in Russia.

According to the secretary, the U.S. makes such a strong accent, therefore, on putting an end to the conflict and instantly calls for starting a process of reconciliation which will confirm Russia's commitment to democracy and will take into account the opinion of Chechen people.

Democratic Russia is of vital importance for security in Europe and stability in the world, Christopher continued.

An unstable Russia which will return to a dictatorship or where chaos will rain, will be a direct threat to its neighbours and will be again a strategic threat to the United States.

No matter how tragic the situation in Chechnya is, he noted, the U.S. fundamental interest remains unchanged: it consists of rendering assistance to Russian reformers.

The United States should persistently continue to support people and organisations working for the sake of reforms in Russia precisely due to the fact that the future of reforms is not guaranteed there, the secretary said.

Cuts in aid will be detrimental to advocates of democracy in Russia, precisely those who are most critical of the Chechen operation, the secretary stressed.

Estonian Parliamentary Stance on Chechnya Criticized

LD1402152695 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1425 GMT 14 Feb 95

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondent Vladimir Taranov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow February 14 TASS—Another statement on Chechen situation was adopted by the Estonian state assembly, parliament, on February 13 despite the protest launched by the Russian Foreign Ministry to the Estonian ambassador in Moscow.

This time the Estonian deputies fully ignored basic principles of the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] and the Russian-Estonian Treaty on fundamentals of interstate relations, and took the path of open interference in Russia's internal affairs, head of the Russian Foreign Ministry's Information and Press Department Grigoriy Karasin told a briefing here today.

The document's recommendations to the Estonian Government "to support with its actions the Chechen people's striving to use the right to self-determination and recognize the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria as soon as possible" are estimated by Moscow as an encouragement of separatist phenomena in Russia and an attempt to undermine the basis of Russian statehood, said Karasin.

The Russian Foreign Ministry states that all the responsibility for the provocative action of the Estonian Government, which will have the most negative consequences for Russian-Estonian relations, will fully rest on the Estonian side. Moscow hopes that the international community and international organizations will worthily react to the irresponsible actions of Tallinn, stressed Karasin.

A protest has been launched to the Estonian ambassador in Moscow in connection with the Estonian parliament's discussion of the document and the Russian ambassador in Tallinn was instructed today to visit the Estonian foreign minister for a demarche, he noted.

Kozyrev Gives News Conference; Rejects Estonian Position

LD1402120595 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1142 GMT 14 Feb 95

[By ITAR-TASS special correspondents Nikolay Vukolov and Yuriy Kozlov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Stockholm February 14 TASS—The military operation in Chechnya is close to its end. It is now time to restore law and order in that republic and prepare for free and fair general elections at the end of this year, Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev said at a press conference in Stockholm today.

The visiting Russian minister said humanitarian aid to the inhabitants of Chechnya was now acquiring a special importance, as was interaction in this sphere with all institutes of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe. "There is no alternative to the political settlement of the Chechnya problem," the minister said.

As concerns the Estonian parliament resolution calling for the recognition of Chechnya as a sovereign state, the Russian minister said intervention in internal affairs of other countries was not among traditions of the Baltic states.

"We hope that the Estonian parliament will find time for ratifying the agreement on army pensioners. This, in our view, will be a more productive action," Kozyrev said.

Further on News Conference

LD1402161595 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1521 GMT 14 Feb 95

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature: Reports by our diplomatic correspondents Aleksandr Korzun, Igor Porshnev, Yevgeniy Terekhov, and others]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] STOCKHOLM, Feb 14 (Interfax)—Russia's Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev believes that now there is "a good chance for gaining a political settlement, which has no alternative, in Chechnya." As Interfax's special correspondent reports, he said so in Stockholm on Tuesday at a news conference following talks with his Swedish counterpart Lena Helm-Wallen.

According to Kozyrev, "Moscow is interested in having free and fair elections conducted in Chechnya by the end of this year."

He said he hopes that the "Chechen fighters will observe the ceasefire, which will create conditions for giving aid to the local population."

"The main obstacle to establishing peace in Chechnya is the presence of criminal structures resorting to armed revolt, with which no state can put up," Kozyrev pointed out.

As he said, "the sooner these armed units disarm and begin to cooperate with the Russian authorities, the quicker the road toward restoring a normal life in the Republic of Chechnya will be opened."

Monday evening, before his departure for Stockholm, Andrey Kozyrev said in answer to Interfax's question: "Russia does not intervene in the affairs of other countries, while Estonia tries to grossly and clumsily interfere in our internal affairs to the accompaniment of discourse on Russian imperialism."

This can only be deplored, he said.

In Stockholm Kozyrev also mentioned this topic. "Interference in the affairs of other countries is not in the traditions of Baltic states," he told a news conference.

He said he hopes that "Estonia's parliament will find time to ratify the agreement concerning Russian military retirees." "It would be much more interesting for Russia and more productive for Estonia," he said.

For her part, Lena Helm-Wallen said that the Swedish government finds it very important to conduct its dialogue with Russia even when military actions Stockholm criticizes are taking place in Russia.

With reference to the Estonian parliament's resolution concerning Chechnya Helm-Wallen said she does not think that this is a major issue now.

Kozyrev also said that Sweden's Prime Minister Ingvar Karlsson will pay an official visit to Russia in April or May.

According to him, "a visit to Stockholm by Russia's Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin is also on the agenda."

In answer to a question from Interfax Kozyrev deplored violations of the agreement on a temporary ceasefire in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

"To disrupt the truce would be catastrophic," he pointed out. "Now we are trying to persuade the parties involved in the conflict to strictly observe the ceasefire agreement," he stressed.

With reference to the Russian-Swedish relationship Kozyrev said that Russia appreciates Stockholm's aid in resolving problems connected with the accommodation of Russian servicemen withdrawn from the Baltic countries.

"We proceed from the assumption that Sweden's joining the European Union will be conducive to strengthening business activity between our countries, in the area of investment too," Kozyrev pointed out.

Kozyrev Meets UK's Hurd, Plans To Visit Yugoslavia

LD1502004195 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 2333 GMT 14 Feb 95

[By ITAR-TASS special correspondents Nikolay Vukolov and Yuriy Kozlov]

[FBIS Translated Text] Stockholm, 15 Feb—Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev plans to visit Yugoslavia in the near future in the context of the efforts being undertaken within the framework of the Contact Group seeking a settlement of the situation in that region. The ITAR-TASS correspondents learned from informed sources that Kozyrev told British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd this during their meeting, which took place here late on Tuesday evening.

Both ministers expressed satisfaction with the results of the Paris meeting of the Contact Group seeking a settlement in Bosnia. At the meeting unanimous support was expressed for France's initiative on holding an international conference in the French capital with the participation of representatives of the three former Yugoslav republics of Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina with the aim of achieving their mutual recognition of each other.

Asks Hurd for 'More Tangible Support'

LD1502092395 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
0851 GMT 15 Feb 95

[By ITAR-TASS Correspondents Nikolay Vukolov and Yuriy Kozlov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Stockholm February 15—Moscow is committed to its reform policy and vows that reforms will stay on course despite the Chechnya war. At the same time, it wants the West to provide more tangible support of Russia's reform efforts. Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrey Kozyrev told his British counterpart Douglas Hurd.

During their meeting in Stockholm late on Tuesday [14 February], both ministers stressed the importance of participation of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe in providing humanitarian aid to the Chechnya population.

Hurd said London regarded three key factors as of special importance for continuing the Russian reform process: securing the freedom of the press, more active market reforms, and the holding of parliamentary and presidential elections in Russia as scheduled.

Relations between Russia and NATO were another subject of discussion. In Brussels last December, Russia refused to sign a programme of individual cooperation with the North Atlantic alliance although it is well aware of the objective need for good relations with the alliance. Both ministers agreed, however, that relations between Russia and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation must be built with due account taken of the role Russia has to play in European affairs.

The two ministers expressed satisfaction with the results of the recent meeting in Paris of the Contact Group for the Bosnian settlement which resulted in a unanimous approval and support of the French initiative calling for a conference in Paris of representatives of three former Yugoslav republics—Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina—aiming to secure their mutual recognition.

Kozyrev announced he was planning a visit to Yugoslavia soon in order to make the Contact Group push for the settlement in the region more effective, informed sources told TASS.

UK's Hurd Sees 'Real Damage' to Russian Ties After Chechnya

LD1502130695 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1150 GMT 15 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] STOCKHOLM, Feb 15 (Interfax)—Events in Chechnya have inflicted "a real damage" to Russia's relations with the outer world, in particular, with the West, a source close to the British minister reported to journalists that British Foreign Minister Douglas Hurd declared this in the course of his meeting with head of Russian Foreign Ministry Andrey Kozyrev in Stockholm Tuesday evening.

"There exists a threat of undermining of Russia's relations with the European Community and NATO on a wide spectrum of issues," the source said referring to Hurd's statement.

The source also said that Douglas Hurd believes that it would be uneasy to preserve "irreproachable partnership relations" between Russia and Western countries "as both parties would like to do."

At the meeting Kozyrev reported, to quote the source, that "a movement for imparting civilized nature to the actions of the Russian authorities in Chechnya has started and will be continued and there will be no bombardments there."

According to the source, Kozyrev declared that "Russia's government is searching for political ways to establish political dialogue with Chechnya." At the same time Kozyrev pointed out that "the Chechen opposition is separated."

The source reported that Kozyrev and Hurd agreed to the need to continue close contacts on issues related to Chechnya.

Having confirmed Boris Yeltsin's and Russian government's adherence to the course of democratic reforms, Kozyrev declared that the West should continue rendering support to Russia in its movement along this course.

Hurd indicated, the source said, that "he pays great attention to the upcoming message of the Russian president to the parliament "expecting proves to adherence of the Russian government to democratic reforms." [sentence as received]

Moscow on U.S. Concerns Over Russian-Iranian Nuclear Deal

NC1402121595 Moscow Voice of Russia World Service
in Persian 1600 GMT 13 Feb 95

[Commentary by Aleksandr (Kushnir)]

[FBIS Translated Text] The United States has once again expressed its concern over the (?imminent) sale of Russian-made nuclear reactors to Iran. White House Chief of Staff Leon Panetta said on Sunday February 12 on NBC's Meet the Press program that this (?transaction is

contrary) to U.S. policy of [words indistinct] terrorism. Radio Moscow commentator Aleksandr (Kushnir) writes in relation to this:

Russia and Iran have reached agreements on cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. On the basis of these agreements, on 7 January an agreement on completing the construction of Block One of the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant was signed in Tehran. It should be noted that a German company had started construction on the Bushehr Power Plant but later on refrained from carrying out its commitments.

According to what Russian Energy Minister Viktor Mikhailov told us, Russia and Iran have also agreed to cooperate in the training of about 300 experts who will operate the nuclear power plant, [word indistinct], and training students and [word indistinct] in Russian universities.

Is there [words indistinct] that the Russian-Iranian agreement in the field of nuclear energy is solely peaceful in nature? When signing the agreement on assisting Iran in the construction of its nuclear power plant, Russia was aware of the fact that Iran is a member of the International Atomic Energy Organization and that all its nuclear activities are under the control of this organization. Moreover, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty clearly states that nuclear countries should help other countries in the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

Definitely the negative approach of the United States is something that concerns America itself. As for Russia, one can (?confidently) say that the sale of Russian-made nuclear reactors to Iran fully conforms to international law and does not threaten the security of anyone.

Mamedov, Iranian Envoy Oppose 'Double Standards' in NPT

LD1402194895 Moscow *ITAR-TASS in English*
1756 GMT 14 Feb 95

[By *ITAR-TASS* diplomatic correspondent]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow February 14 TASS—Russia and Iran oppose double standards in the implementation of the treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear arms, stressed a meeting of Deputy Russian Foreign Minister Georgiy Mamedov and Iranian ambassador to Moscow Mehdi Safari.

The meeting discussed preparations for a conference of states- participants in the Non-Proliferation Treaty [NPT] scheduled for April-May 1995, head of the Russian Foreign Ministry's Information and Press Department Grigoriy Karasin told a briefing here today.

In the words of the Russian side, the Non-Proliferation Treaty is a time-verified document that has become the core of the global security system. The meeting urged the need to avoid double standards in the implementation of

Article 4 of the treaty on provision of successful international cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy. "Eternal and unconditional prolongation would help increase efficiency of the treaty, expand its universal character, boost the reduction and elimination of nuclear arsenals and consolidate international stability," said Karasin.

U.S. 'Double Standards' Criticized

MM1402163195 Moscow *IZVESTIYA in Russian*
15 Feb 95 p 3

[Report by Vladimir Nadein: "Washington Irritated by Moscow-Tehran Nuclear Deal"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Washington—The United States is sharply protesting the planned deal to sell Russian nuclear reactors to Iran for its power stations. The Congress is considering the question of possibly cutting back U.S. programs of aid for Russia. U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, who usually takes a particularly sympathetic view of the situation in Russia, deemed it necessary to state his "profound disquiet at Russia's actions in concluding the contract with Iran. We have repeatedly voiced our alarm to Russian officials, including at the highest level. I must also say that it is not entirely clear how Iran intends to pay for this."

The deputy secretary of state's last sentence is destined to calm emotions in the U.S. capital itself where Senator John McCain is particularly active. It was he who was behind a proposal that has become law: The U.S. Government is obliged to introduce economic sanctions and suspend aid to any country that helps Iran or Iraq obtain nuclear weapons.

THE WASHINGTON POST, describing in detail the profound indignation that has gripped all strata of the U.S. Government in connection with the Russian-Iranian deal, nonetheless points to the fact that Russia's shipment of reactors for Iran's power stations does not violate any of the provisions of the document controlling the proliferation of nuclear weapons and technology. As a country without nuclear weapons, according to the provisions of the very same Non-proliferation Treaty, Iran has the right to acquire equipment and nuclear technologies for peaceful purposes.

The irony of the situation is that Russia is intending to supply its southern neighbor with exactly the same kind of reactors that America promised North Korea as a result of the so-called nuclear deal. According to all U.S. laws the DPRK is no less of a "bad state" than Iran. And there are also laws on North Korea. However, the deal with the DPRK will nonetheless go ahead since, as the White House asserts, Pyongyang is already in possession of the secret of plutonium production and the liquid-fuel reactors will not bring the Koreans any new knowledge.

Although what we have is double standards in Washington's approach to Russian and U.S. shipments of similar reactors, Moscow will have to clarify and uphold its

position patiently, without irritation. Such is the fate of a country which needs foreign aid. Such is the stance of a country which has elicited by no means friendly talk following events in Chechnya.

The contract to supply four reactors is worth nigh on \$8 billion. According to U.S. calculations, Iran does not have that kind of money although this country still remains the world's second exporter of crude oil (after Saudi Arabia).

U.S. Concern Over Russia-Iran Nuclear Agreement Reported

*LD1502111895 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1051 GMT 15 Feb 95*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Mikhail Mzareulov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Washington February 15 TASS—The United States did not get a satisfactory response from Russia in connection with the concern voiced by Washington in respect of Russian-Iranian agreement on building Russian nuclear reactors in Iran.

This is what US Secretary of State Warren Christopher told participants in Tuesday's hearings in the Senate Committee for International Affairs.

The US Administration persists in raising the issue in the hope of a better outcome for the United States, Christopher said. In particular, the United States discusses with Russia what the latter's ties with Iran in the nuclear field will be like, and other aspects of supplying arms to Tehran, he added.

Christopher pointed out, that the United States touched upon this problem repeatedly.

We began raising the issue, because we believed that Russian-Iranian nuclear cooperation was not a wise undertaking in view of many elements of Tehran's policy, including undermining of the peace-making process (in the Middle East), patronage of terrorists throughout the world, and its poor human rights record. In our opinion, Iran is not a suitable partner for nuclear cooperation, Christopher said.

Foreign Ministry Comments

*LD1402170595 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
15 Feb 95 p 3*

[Report by Konstantin Eggert: "Smolensk Square Surprised at the Reaction"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Apart from the United States, Israel has also reacted with great pain to the contract on the supply of a nuclear reactor to Iran.

"We believe that this concerns the vitally important interests of our state, and therefore we have repeatedly appealed to the Russian authorities to clarify the state of affairs," Israeli Ambassador in Moscow Aliza Shenhar told IZVESTIYA. "We are being told in reply: The

stepping up of contacts with Iran is of a purely economic nature. I cannot say that this answer reassures us completely." Tehran funds dozens of terrorist organizations of a fundamentalist orientation and openly calls for the destruction of Israel, Ms. Shenhar recalled. Cooperation with such a regime in such a sensitive sphere as the nuclear sphere may be extremely dangerous.

The Russian Foreign Ministry is not uneasy. "Iran has an agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] and the nuclear installations already there have repeatedly been subjected to international checks," that is how an informed diplomat, who wished to remain anonymous, commented on the situation. According to him, in 1993 an IAEA mission checked information deriving from the United States on the military nature of the nuclear developments in Iran, and did not discover anything reprehensible. The level of Iranian technology and developments in the research spheres enables us to conclude that Tehran is simply not capable of making nuclear weapons.

"Washington has double standards, it turns a blind eye to nuclear developments by its strategic allies—Israel and Pakistan, but criticizes Iran," the Russian diplomat believes. Under Article 4 of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, he said, any country that has signed it has the right to civilian research in this sphere, and consequently, there is no reason to refuse the Iranians this right. "According to our information, the low-power reactors in Tehran and Tabriz are used by local universities for agricultural and medical research," the diplomat reported.

He nevertheless complained mildly about the secretiveness of the Ministry of Atomic Energy, noting that the Foreign Ministry does not know all the details of the contract.

Ministry of Atomic Energy officials reported to IZVESTIYA that the contract, signed at the beginning of this January on supplying a 1 million kilowatt nuclear reactor to Iran, does not violate either the letter or the spirit of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

The nuclear reactor which is to be built in Bushehr is not suited to the production of fissile materials. Fuel for it will be supplied from Russia and will be taken back to Russia after use. The value of the contract is not \$8 billion, like the Americans believe, but only \$1 billion.

Official Defends Planned Nuclear Reactor Sale to Iran

*LD1402205695 Moscow Voice of Russia World Service
in English 1510 GMT 14 Feb 95*

[From the "News and Views" program]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] In this edition of "News and Views" we have an exclusive interview granted to the Voice of Russia World Service with the Russian Federation Ministry of Atomic Energy. At the request of the

Voice of Russia World Service, the chief of the department of information and public relations, Georgiy Kaurov, commented on a statement by a U.S. Administration official to the effect that Russia's possible sale of atomic reactors to Iran may sour bilateral ties between the United States and Russia. Georgiy Kaurov.

[Words indistinct] causes consternation, Georgiy Kaurov says. The point is that there is an agreement on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Intensive work to extend the nonproliferation agreement is being carried out at the moment. Russia, like all other participating states in the accord, is making great efforts in this area.

Georgiy Kaurov says that there is one clause in the accord by which no nuclear power can deny other participating countries in the agreement assistance in using nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Georgiy Kaurov quotes the clause: All participants in the accord are (?committed) to facilitate a full exchange of equipment, materials, scientific and technical information on the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and have the right to participate in such exchanges. All participants in the agreement who are in a position to do so are also to cooperate in assisting separately or in conjunction with other states or international organizations further advances in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially on the territories of participating states in the accord possessing no nuclear weapons, taking into account the needs of developing nations in the world.

Georgiy Kaurov stresses that it was precisely on the basis of that clause in the nonproliferation accord that Russia was engaged in its work in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes only in other countries. [sentence as heard].

As is well known, Iran has signed the nonproliferation agreement and is faithfully implementing all duties connected with the agreement. Iran has been subjected to various inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency. All the inspections showed that Iran had fully met all the demands of the nonproliferation accord.

The question arises: Why is the United States, in violation of Clause 4 of the nonproliferation agreement, asking Russia to break off all ties with Iran in the building of an atomic power station? We are sure that the United States lacks understanding here and that its peculiar warning to Moscow has been wrongly addressed. Georgiy Kaurov, chief of the department of information and public relations, Russian Federation Ministry of Atomic Energy, said in conclusion.

Minatom: No Plans To Cancel Iranian Nuclear Power Project

LD1502132595 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1150 GMT 15 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Feb 15 (Interfax)—The Russian nuclear energy ministry (Minatom) has no

plans of renouncing the \$800 million project for a nuclear power plant at the Iranian town of Bushehr or stopping construction work there, Head of the Minatom's Public Relations Department Georgiy Kaurov said.

In an interview with Interfax on Wednesday, he described some fears that Iran could use the facility in military purposes as being out of proportion.

Kaurov said that Russia was guided by "the letter and spirit of the 1988 non-proliferation treaty" [NPT] while striking the deal with Iran. He quoted one of the NPT articles as saying that nuclear states must provide what assistance they can to help other signatories develop their nuclear industry and technologies in peaceful purposes.

As a signatory to the NPT, Iran placed all of its nuclear activity under control by the International Atomic Energy Agency whose commission found no departure from or violation of the treaty by Iran after a visit there last year.

Kaurov said there was no evidence saying that Iran was developing its own nuclear weapons and "therefore, there are no grounds now" for Russia to stop assisting Iran in the development of its peaceful nuclear energy program

The contract for completing the 1,880 MW/h Bushehr plant was signed last month. This provides for installation, adjustment, supply and commissioning of its first power unit by the year 2,000. At the moment, there are 150 Russian construction workers on the site. Their numbers will be increased to 200 before long.

Bushehr Nuclear Reactor To Produce 'Less Plutonium'

LD1502084595 Moscow Voice of Russia World Service
in English 0800 GMT 15 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Under the contract for building nuclear power facilities in Iran, nuclear wastes are to be processed on the territory of Russia. This has been announced by an expert of Russia's Atomic Energy Ministry, Georgiy Kaurov. He stressed that the reactors, which will be built in Iran with the help of Russia, will technologically produce less plutonium than the usual (?channel) ones.

According to the contract, Georgiy Kaurov said, Russia will complete the construction of one power unit with a capacity of 1 million kilowatts in Bushehr [southwestern coast, on Persian Gulf]. Besides, Russian specialists will assemble another 1-million kilowatt unit and two atomic power units with a capacity of 440 megawatts each.

In accordance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, Iran will place the new nuclear installations under the control of the International Atomic Energy Agency and undertake corresponding obligations.

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Political Issues

Filiatov Says Yeltsin Finalized Message to Parliament

LD1402193595 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1851
GMT 14 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow Feb 14 (Interfax)—President Yeltsin has finalized his annual message to parliament, the chief of the presidential staff Sergey Filiatov has said. He believes that the message about 110 typewritten pages long will remain practically unchanged.

About this year's message to parliament Filiatov said that whereas last year President Yeltsin focused on theoretical aspects of new Russian statehood, this time the emphasis will be placed on forming mechanisms to translate those ideas into reality.

Sergey Filiatov said that President Yeltsin would present the message to parliament on February 16 and make a 40-minute speech. The full text of the message will be published in the Russian press on February 18.

Sergey Filiatov did not rule out that the message would contain a number of harsh assessments, including those concerning the methods of the military operation in Chechnya.

Yeltsin State of Federation Speech Previewed

MK1502110495 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 15 Feb 95 pp 1, 2

[Report by Anna Ostapchuk, Yevgeniy Krasnikov in the "President" column: "A Safe Diagnosis—a Useless Prescription. Who Is To Blame? Everyone! What Is To Be Done? Build a Great Russia!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] As an INTERFAX correspondent has found out, President Boris Yeltsin's work day on Tuesday, 14 February, was fully devoted to working on the text of his address to parliament and a speech to a joint session of the two houses. The text of the address, informed sources said, is virtually ready. The more than 120-page document is being given stylistic finishing touches. On 15 February it is to be sent to the printers so that on 16 February it will be placed on the tables of all participants in the joint session. Today the president will give his main attention to working on his speech. It is expected to last some 40 minutes.

Even so, according to NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA's confidential sources, Boris Yeltsin is still hesitant about the need for a public statement itself. These vacillations are due to the fact that he is seeking to appeal to the people, over parliament's head, for a new expression of trust, but cannot come up with a credible formulation for this appeal.

Tomorrow at 1100 in the Kremlin's Marble Hall Boris Yeltsin will deliver his annual message to deputies of

both houses of the Federal Assembly. The presidential message is a truly historic document; one of those which historians of the 21st century will study to try to find out the hidden purpose behind what Yeltsin and his entourage wanted to do with Russia, how to reform it, and along which lines to channel its evolution.

Ever since early January the people of Russia have been anxiously waiting for this statement of intent, hoping that compared with last year's, it will point to some logic in what we have gone through in the past year; why Chechnya suddenly cropped up; why efforts to curb inflation have failed; and why it has proved impossible to achieve civic peace and accord in society—something that was so much spoken about a year ago.

The president, too, has been waiting. For a historic date to come, many events had to coincide: A fragile peace has been established in Chechnya; the Duma (even if just barely) has passed the budget in second reading; and the meeting in Almaty has marked the embodiment of "reintegration trends" with tangible agreements.

The presidential message exists in many variants and versions. It is not ruled out that some last-minute editing will be done today. This is due not to the sluggishness of Kremlin analysts and experts, not even to the free-flowing and unpredictable nature of Russian political life, but to the most acute competition among the influential clans locked in a life-or-death struggle. The document that will be presented in the Kremlin tomorrow will be the result of a balance struck between the protectionist views of the Korzhakov-Barsukov group and the opinion of the liberals who remain in the president's entourage, who are not a little worried by Yeltsin's emerging disagreement with the West and especially with democratic groupings within Russia.

It will be recalled that the recurring theme of the previous message was civic accord; it attempted to put the president beyond the bounds of the democratic camp, and build his image as the father of the whole nation. The more or less open bows toward the views of the patriotic opposition and the "centrists" (it was not accidental that Civic Union complained that the president had stolen its program) were presumably called upon to redeem his former reputation as a radical-democrat, not particularly discriminating about the methods he uses.

The 1995 message largely preserves continuity with last year's. "Strengthening Russia's statehood and territorial integrity" and achieving a "new stability" remain its fundamental points. Now, however, the president will have a far more complex task to deal with. Achieving a compromise between the democrats-Westernizers and those advocating a strong state can lead to a tug-of-war thesis about "the priority of national-state interests coupled with the maximum openness of a Western-type civilization."

On one hand, the document contains statements that the Chechen crisis will in no way reflect on Russia's internal

life. Reforms will be continued decisively (true, "in a new way"); the main task of economic policy is still financial stabilization, based on a tight budget and credit and monetary policy. On the other hand, it declares Russia's inviolable integrity, the need to protect the underprivileged sections of the population, and (according to NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA's sources in the Kremlin) for the first time during Yeltsin's rule he will make a mild criticism of Western policy toward Russia (on the whole, the foreign policy part will be heavily curtailed). Incidentally, here is yet another fine twist (we certainly do not claim to a verbatim presentation): Russia will pursue a policy which will exclude the monopolization of decisionmaking in the world.

The army part of the speech should on the whole also be pleasing to the patriot's soul. The army has proven its defense capability; in 1995 some serious reforms will be undertaken in this sphere of state organization; the Chechen events have shown that the approach to financing the army must be revised. In particular the question of placing the General Staff outside Defense Ministry control may be raised.

It is vital now—after the bills on restoring the populace's bank savings and on pension increases have been vetoed and in the face of an imminent veto of the minimum wage law—to confirm that the president is not only a patriot advocating a strong state and the army's best friend, but also an ex officio defender of all the destitute and the poor. The presidential message is expected to offer a complex of high-priority pledges to raise the living standards of the poorest sections of the population. Moreover, Yeltsin will announce an early promulgation of an edict on the impermissibility of wage arrears to state sector workers.

To be sure, the message also contains an answer to the perennial Russian question: Who is to blame? Everybody is to blame except the president. The government is to blame for failing to carry out the president's wise precepts of last year: It has failed to stabilize the ruble rate, to address the nonpayments and conversion problems, and properly to develop the agro-industrial complex. The deputies, however, are not totally without blame either. They are to blame for delaying the passage of major laws in the most relevant spheres of reform.

On the whole it is fairly likely that the next final "crisis resolution" will be set for 1997. The current year will be proclaimed as the year of concept definition and setting in motion the mechanisms for pulling out of the crisis. A "sub-message" has also been prepared for the West: The exaggeration of political instability in Russia impedes its economic advancement, which in its turn harms the interests of our partners.

The president's message gives considerable attention to interaction between the Center and the regions. A new miracle cure has been prepared to consolidate the Russian state against the "local rebels" and "separatists:" creating a new power system in Russia. Under a new

draft law, which the president is going to mention, the jurisdiction of the local power bodies is to be expanded substantially. The new law is to guarantee them ownership of land and financial resources. Thus the "regional barons" will find themselves between a rock and a hard place (the Center "from the top," and local authorities "from the bottom") and brought to full submission.

Elections are a delicate matter. Boris Yeltsin's democratic associates proposed including "presidential guarantees" of free elections into the message: The president as a guarantor of the Constitution will ensure that free elections, as defined under the Constitution and law, are held in the country within the established time frame. It is not ruled out that this thesis will find its reflection in the document. Yet the idea of "ensuring the election process" can also be brought in: Its pace considerably depends on the legislative branch, and the president will not be rushing it because good, not quick-fix, laws are needed. Furthermore, the election process must not destabilize society. Otherwise the president as a guarantor of stability will have to take steps precluding.... (further, follow the text).

The CIS part could become the crux of the message. The divorce procedure has been completed. The independent states have seen each other's potentials and are interested in closer cooperation. The CIS is being transformed into a mechanism for consistent and long-term dialogue. ("No Chechnya will be able to stop this!")

The message will undoubtedly contain plenty of general phrases and rhetorical expressions, which will allow all sides concerned both to read some pleasant promises and prospects for themselves and to make conclusions about the trends in the evolution of the country and its president.

Baburin on Europe Policy

954F1201B Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 6 Dec 94 p 3

[Speech by Sergey Baburin, chairman of the Russian All-People's Union and State Duma deputy, at the international symposium "Russia Within the Framework of European Partnership and Cooperation": "The Divarication Effect"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On the surface, the process of Russia's infusion with European values is proceeding quite successfully: Multiparty democracy has triumphed, and the transition to market relations has become irreversible. Our compatriots ride around Moscow in Mercedes; they smoke Marlboro, dress in the latest French and Italian fashions, root for Manchester United, and watch the same entertainment programs and advertising on television as citizens of West Europe.

The inner harmony between East and West is becoming almost idyllic, and we have no doubt that this is precisely how the estimable representatives of the current ruling group in Russia present the picture in conversations with

their Western partners. President Yeltsin himself in his triumphal speech to the U.S. Congress last year said to the senators' applause that communism in Russia is finished and therefore the last obstacles to spiritual unity between us have been removed.

In reality, the picture is somewhat different. A huge number of facts testify to the fast degradation of all spheres of Russia's spiritual life: The quality of secondary and higher education is declining; major scientific centers are closing; famous creative collectives are disintegrating; scientific and fine literature publications are dropping. Hundreds of thousands of people have become refugees; millions have become unemployed, losing not only means of sustenance but the very meaning of their existence. What contribution to the formation of common spiritual values can Russia make under these conditions?

And what ideals are being imposed now? First and foremost the spirit of individualism, the cult of violence and money. That is, the ideals that dominated in the West at the beginning of last century, and even then they carried considerable social costs. West European values are increasingly becoming associated in the Russian public conscience with runaway crime, drug addiction, prostitution and pornography, and the unbelievable stratification into a minority of very rich and the majority of very poor.

Naturally in Russia—a country historically built on a different system of values—all this cannot fail to cause a reaction of rejection.

Here are the facts. More than 8 million persons participated in rallies on 27 October 1994—Trade Union Action Day. These figures are quite comparable with the number of participants (about 9 million) in the 7 November 1990 demonstrations when the CPSU was in power.

What is behind the revival of the popularity of communist ideals? Is it only the actions of communist movement leaders? With all due respect for Mr. Zyuganov, I do not believe that he and his colleagues are capable of bringing out into the streets under red banners such huge masses. The fact that people often parade under red banners frequently is evidence not of their adherence to communism but rather to traditional Russian values, which (whether some like it or not) the CPSU expressed better than the current Government of Russia.

Of decisive significance in the masses' fast shift to the left is a government policy that compels people to remember the recent past with nostalgia. Is it not obvious that nothing helps revive the communist idea in Russia more than President B. Yeltsin's actions? Is it not clear that nothing brings national-patriotic and communist forces closer together than keeping A. Kozyrev as minister of foreign affairs?

By ignoring moderate, pragmatic, centrist forces in Russia and continuing to support the bankrupt Yeltsin

regime, the West is practically stimulating the communist and radical-nationalist leaders' move to the forefront.

The West has transcended by far the boundaries of "struggle against communism" and now its actions threaten the existence of Russia itself. Pising Russian nationalism is only a natural defensive reaction of the people's historical past. Tipping the equilibrium in Europe and the world, the humiliation of Russia as a nation will cause a move towards restoration of this equilibrium.

Therefore, instead of a touching spiritual unity between Russian and West Europe, what is happening in front of our very eyes is the emergence of a foundation for future confrontation, distrust, and suspicion. Unfortunately, there are more than enough grounds for it. For instance, Western support for the bloody extermination of the legitimately elected Russian parliament—the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet—in October 1993 seriously undermined faith in Western democratic values.

Neither does the protracted episode of accepting Russia into the Council of Europe inspire trust. At the beginning of 1993 absolutely humiliating—bordering on loss of national sovereignty—demands were made to hold early parliamentary elections and adopt a new constitution. Then, when the Supreme Soviet was pummeled by tank-mounted guns and in violation of the law elections to the Federal Assembly and a vote on the draft of the new constitution were held in December 1993, all this was hailed as democratic, but at the same time nine new conditions were attached to Russia's acceptance to the Council of Europe. We no longer even feel anger or irritation. All this is becoming simply laughable and sad.

We cannot be very enthusiastic over the role of international organizations that are under Western control, in particular the United Nations, which apply double standards in international relations. In defense of what moral values were the wars instigated in Yugoslavia, in which the victims were the Serbs, who are spiritually close to us, and Somalia? And look how differently the United Nations and the CSCE treat Yugoslavia, Latvia, Moldova, and Georgia.

We are compelled to speak of the current problems in relations between Russia and West Europe not out of a desire for confrontation but out of a need to register the huge gap between words and deeds. Other examples. The demarche of the Baltic Assembly, which permitted itself to interfere into Russia's internal affairs by calling for demilitarization of Kaliningrad Oblast, makes us suspect that behind it are far larger West European interests.

Or take the topic of human rights. It is well known that an apartheid regime is developing in a number of Baltic states. One would think that West European public opinion, which took such an active part in the liquidation of apartheid in South Africa (albeit only in its concluding stage) must clearly realize what this all is

fraught with. Nevertheless, the West European community is silent, forcing us to assume that the topic of human rights for it is no more than a tool for achieving certain tactical goals.

It is hard for us to believe in sincerity of our partners in common spiritual values when for more than three years a legitimately elected deputy of the Latvian Republic parliament, Alfred Rubiks, has been held illegally in a Riga jail.

Violations of the rights of our compatriots in the Baltic states give a powerful boost to the rise of Russian nationalism in Russia. The fate of millions of persons who have found themselves in the position of second-class citizens only because they speak Russian is a serious irritant to public opinion.

We are for striving to form common moral values. But this is a long and complex process even for West Europe itself.

Russia is a separate, unique civilization, and attempts to squeeze it onto a Procrustean bed of Western values may produce only the opposite effect—discrediting these values in the eyes of the Russian. What kind of common spiritual values can we talk about when the West encourages destructive trends in all areas of political, economic, and cultural life of our society, when the West attempts to speak to Russia in the language of snobbism and ultimatums!

We hope that the esteemed representatives of the Western community present here will bring the viewpoint of the Russian All-People's Union and the Rossiyskiy Put deputy group to their governments. We are convinced that, unfortunately, the equally esteemed leaders of the Western world will once again ignore our doubts and concerns. Nevertheless, we do not feel resentful or angry. We only deeply regret that for the sake of illusory tactical gains West Europe is missing a chance to establish real rapprochement. Equally regretful is the fact that West Europe has not learned a lesson from the past three centuries of dealing with Russia. There is a lot to learn there. While speaking of the future, we suggest sometimes also looking back into the past.

Korzhakov Career, Security Service Viewed

954F1308A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 10 Feb 95 p 7

[Article by Andrey Zhdankin, correspondent of the weekly ROSSIYA, especially for KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA: "Aleksandr Korzhakov Has Endured Much. The Chief of the President's Guard Even Had To Get the Boss Out of the Bath House"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The alignment of figures on the government Olympus is a favorite topic for the press, the more so since the powers are in a state of crisis. Who is among those "close to the president," who is befriending

whom and against whom, who is in favor with the president and who is out; who has risen a couple of rungs and who has fallen...

In recent months Aleksandr Korzhakov, the Presidential Security Service (SBP) which he heads, and also the Main Guard Administration (GUO, chief—Mikhail Barsukov) have been getting a good deal of attention from the media. The list of complaints against the SBP and GUO is long: The special services are answerable to no one except their leaders and they do whatever they want to; these "janissaries" hear every word that is said in the Kremlin and over government communications lines (even the prime minister is "under surveillance"), and they have forces "capable of waging combat activities."

The one in charge of it all is General Korzhakov. He is the one who, taking advantage of his influence over the president, is turning the country into a "police state"; he is the head of the "war party." Certain publications have even asked the question: "Is General Korzhakov not running the country?"

...He himself thinks that the "hullabaloo surrounding his name has been artificially created," but for a year and a half now political scientists have been including him on the list of the 100 most influential political figures in Russia, and in recent months he has been at the top of it.

The fact that Korzhakov was one of the "attached" personnel or simply the bodyguard of the first secretary of the Moscow CPSU City Committee, B. Yeltsin, tells us little. After all, there were also others who did not abandon their chief when the party anathema was pronounced on him. Why Korzhakov in particular?

Biography: Short Version

The "Notes of the President" give a biographical reference to Korzhakov. "Born in 1950 in Moscow. Graduated from the All-Union Correspondence Legal Institute. After 1970—worker of the Ninth Administration of the USSR KGB. After 1985—deputy chief of the group for guarding B.N. Yeltsin. Retired on a pension in 1989." After that—after he joined Yeltsin—his position is not indicated.

Before meeting Yeltsin, Aleksandr Korzhakov had served in the KGB for 15 years or, to be precise, 17 years, since the Kremlin regiment in which he served his stint in the military was also a part of the committee. What is the Ninth Administration? Yeltsin wrote this: "Communism created the Ninth Administration. A powerful administration that can do anything. The life of a party leader is under its constant gaze, and any caprice is carried out." In order to end up serving in the "Ninth," which provides for the security and comfort of the Soviet leaders, it was necessary to go through a strict selection process. Korzhakov had an irreproachable resume, excellent health, and what are called "personal qualities"—discipline, the ability to keep his mouth shut. The

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worker served in the "Ninth" without complaint and was transferred to the 18th Division.

According to the testimony of Vladimir Medvedev, former chief of the guard for Brezhnev and Gorbachev, the 18th Division was considered to be the cream of the administration. That is where they trained workers of the personal guard; from the simple bodyguards they formed teams to accompany the leaders throughout the country and abroad.

In spite of the prestigious nature of the service, it certainly did not produce dividends on the social-daily living plane right away. Korzhakov waited a long time to obtain an apartment, and his family included two daughters and a Scottish setter. (Now he has an Alsatian.) The situation was rectified after a secret trip to Afghanistan: Babrak Karmal was protected by our people. Upon returning home he found it possible to furnish his apartment and even to buy a Niva.

From Korzhakov's appearance it would be difficult to guess that he is a person of considerable physical strength with excellent reflexes and coordination. It is not because of tennis; this social diversion became popular just recently. Every bodyguard must be a sportsman and a marksman. But Korzhakov stood out even against that background: He played volleyball at almost a professional level (as a reminder of this he had to have cartilage removed from both knees) and he was a champion marksman.

As an illustration: On Gorkiy Street when an "amateur" driver of a private Zhiguli ran into Yeltsin's Volga and rammed into the front door, behind which the future president sat (the country shuddered—an assassination attempt!), Korzhakov was able to pull open the bent and jammed door.

Another door almost played a significant role in domestic history. The president writes about this in "Notes." In December 1992 the rebellious Congress of People's Deputies brought up impeachment. "...After the regular session I returned to my dacha; it was not late. I saw the eyes of my wife and children. I rushed to the bath house. I locked the door. I lay on my back. I closed my eyes. To be honest, I had all kinds of thoughts. Not good... Not good at all."

In the words of one of the people who were there, the situation was extremely dramatic.

"Aleksandr Vasilyevich Korzhakov brought me out of this terrifying condition. He was able to open the bathroom door somehow." "Open" is a very mild verb, which expresses the essence of the matter mildly.

Another observation. Some time ago I had occasion to prepare an interview with him. I recorded his answers on a dictaphone. The two of us were alone when we corrected and "cleaned it up" as well. One of the answers contained the phrase "and it has always been with me since that time" (speaking about a pistol). It was a quite

normal sentence but Korzhakov changed "with me" to "by me." I had to agree: It is more precise this way.

Yeltsin was "dragged" out of the hospital to the party court of law where the "demotion" ceremony was held. On that same day they removed the guard and they demoted Korzhakov down two rungs of the official ladder.

"What happened to him simply shocked me... The entire party-state machine was directed at one person. They had not been that brutal with anybody else."

According to the laws of the "Ninth," a guard must not meet again with his former patron. Korzhakov ignored that precept: He brought Yeltsin to his dacha, his home. The KGB worker would record his chief's statements and transcribe them at home with his wife or in the office.

At the beginning of 1989 the 39-year-old Korzhakov retired on a pension. His last "sin" was especially grave: The major along with two other bodyguards wished the first deputy chairman of the USSR Gosstroy [State Construction Committee] a happy birthday.

After Korzhakov was dismissed he guarded the chairman of the Plastik cooperative for a while. The wages were fantastic for those days—2,000 a month. But money is not everything. And Korzhakov went to 27 Kalinin Avenue, the location of the Committee on Questions of Construction and Architecture of the USSR Supreme Soviet, of which Yeltsin was the chairman. Their destinies proceeded in parallel from then on. At first Korzhakov worked in the reception room and then he began to do his regular work—as a guard. When Yeltsin was elected chairman of the Russian parliament, a security department was formed for the chairman and it was headed by Korzhakov. It is curious that Korzhakov's sponsor in the presidium was Ruslan Khasbulatov.

Service History. Short Version

It is difficult to understand Korzhakov's current "clout" without knowing the history of the service he headed. After breaking with the "Kremlin herd," Yeltsin experienced isolation and strong pressure from the KGB. Contacts were established and conversations were even heard in the bath house. And it was Yeltsin's good fortune that the service was headed by a professional who was familiar with the enemy.

A guard is more than a bodyguard. All aspects of life must be protected. This requires weapons, armored cars, special equipment, and trained people. The KGB had all of this, but no commands to share with the chairman of parliament were to come from Old Square.

The shortage of workers was especially acute at first when there were only enough for a personal guard. After spending a half year in the White House, in the office of the chairman of the Supreme Soviet they discovered an antenna concealed by book cases, which made it possible to hear everything that was said in the office. The cable

went to the other wing, to room 4120, where there was a device with the innocuous sounding name of "Starling." It was put to good use. This was not the only room in the White House that was off limits to the guard.

The attempts to obtain an armored car are another story. Only the "Ninth" and its special-purpose garage (GON) had them, but it could not assign them because they were used very intensively. When they decided to assign one, specialists went through it thoroughly and changed all the radio equipment. They ordered the vehicle from the Gorkiy Automotive Plant [GAZ]. When the GAZ leaders refused, nodding upward significantly, the workers almost went on strike.

After the failure of the State Committee for the State of Emergency, the country acquired another image. The omnipotent KGB was broken down into various structures. The "Ninth" became an independent department, taking in the Kremlin command. The new, "democratic" name is the Guard Service. The guard of the Russian president was included in it as an autonomous subdivision. The previous leadership, after spilling a good deal of blood, was removed. Redkobodnyy became chief of the Service, but not for long. When he left on vacation, he called in frequently to see whether he had been promoted to general. Korzhakov did not like this. Redkobodnyy became a pensioner.

Kremlin commander Mikhail Barsukov became the new chief.

The first president of Russia drew conclusions from the mistakes of past leaders. Mikhail Gorbachev's position, which seemed unshakeable, became ephemeral in 1991 as soon as they turned off his communications, changed the guard, and took away his airplane. Such a thing could hardly happen now: All the services and departments that provide for the president's functioning are under nobody but himself. This includes communications, the Rossiya airline company (the former 235th government air squadron), the former 15th "bunker" KGB administration (which provides for the activity of state organs under wartime conditions; it is in charge of the secret Metro-2 and other strategic facilities), and the Kremlin special services—the GUO and SBP, which have a powerful technical, information, and analytical base. The person in charge of all these structures, since they pertain directly to the president's security, one can say without stretching things, is Aleksandr Korzhakov.

From the president's standpoint, who can be entrusted with this life-guaranteeing sphere if not a person who has repeatedly confirmed not only his fidelity but also his professionalism? The number of people like this near the president can be counted on the fingers of one hand...

Zhirinovskiy Says LDPR Plans To Renationalize Industry

LD1402202695 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1923 GMT 14 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Feb 14 (Interfax)—Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, the leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia [LDPR] and a party group of the same name in the State Duma, objects to all-out privatization because once it takes power, his party will nationalize and hand back everything to the people.

He said so at a news conference of the coordinating council of the Aeroflot-Russian International Airlines trade unions in Moscow Tuesday.

Zhirinovskiy said that the name of an organization, a private company or a collective farm, was unimportant as its personnel worked hard and were paid in time.

He described the numerous joint ventures in various industries, notably civil aviation, as scams that had been launched by Gorbachev for the purpose of destroying Russia's economy and legalizing the movement of hard currency, materials and people abroad. In Zhirinovskiy's view, even training abroad brought no good. In particular, the State Duma Chairman Ivan Rybkin came a different man from the U.S. just like Gorbachev before him from Britain.

Commenting on Aeroflot discontinuing the contacts with Most-bank and starting to deal with Avtovazbank, Zhirinovskiy said that this might serve a good purpose because, he believed, Most as well as Menatep were doomed as they had started helping the anti-presidential forces.

Zhirinovskiy said that Russia as a vast country needed large state-owned airlines operating Russian-made hardware and controlled by a ministry rather than a department, as now. He called on the Aeroflot personnel to keep closer contacts with his party whose parliamentary group included three civil aviation workers.

LDPR Deputy on Duma Faction, Zhirinovskiy

954F1201A Moscow LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA in Russian No 1-2, 13 Jan 95 p 5

[Interview with State Duma Deputy Vyacheslav Marychev by Viktor Gribachev; place and date not given: "A Deputy From the Baltic: Vyacheslav Marychev"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Television viewers often see State Duma Deputy Vyacheslav Antonovich Marychev on the news. Some think of him as sarcastic, some as a loudmouth. It is not my intention to argue with either the former or the latter. Let me just say that everybody knows Deputy Marychev because of his "unordinary behavior," but no more than that.

Let us get acquainted.

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[Gribachev] Vyacheslav Antonovich, please tell us about yourself. I know that a book has been published containing brief biographies of State Duma deputies...

[Marychev] The interest toward me is of a quite peculiar nature, and if I am shown on television, it is with sarcasm and certain prejudice.

I was born in Moscow in September 1939. I have already been a deputy in one of Leningrad's—now St. Petersburg—largest rayons, Vasileostrovskiy.

I started as a worker at the Moscow Imeni Vladimira Ilyicha Lenina plant. I worked as a metalworker, and trolley driver. Because in the past young people wanted to start working as early as possible.

Then I was drafted into the army.

After military service I stayed in Leningrad. First I went to work for the Elektroapparat enterprise group; I actively participated in amateur arts, which is what propelled me into the sphere of culture: I went to study at the conservatory's vocational school and graduated as a "musical comedy actor." I am the only State Duma deputy with such a profession. I am working on some material at home and may still surprise the deputies. Like sing a few arias at a meeting...

[Gribachev] From among those you sang on stage?

[Marychev] I played Rossillion, the romantic lead in "The Merry Widow," and appeared in "Chanita's Kiss..." Many roles. Then I worked in the Leningrad Musical Comedy Theater.

I think it was contact with people that pulled me away from my fascination with the professional stage at the time—I immersed myself entirely in volunteer and political work. Graduated from the Higher Trade Union School of Culture, and with this higher education became deputy director of one of the largest culture palaces.

I began my political activities by immersing in a role that would define my attitude to many subjects. As you may have noticed, there is always a good deal of criticism in what I say.

From the transcript of the State Duma meeting on 28 October 1994.

Chair: "Third microphone, you have the floor."

V.A. Marychev: "I was, of course, quite bewildered by my Communist Party colleague. Why not show her on television? Show her close up, how she sits there, near that chair; and then she will no longer be upset. And she put me on the same plank..."

Chair: "Vyacheslav Antonovich, why not be gentle with a woman."

V.A. Marychev: "She was not at all gentle with me!"

Chair: "You dish it out right and left..."

V.A. Marychev: "She says that I am a Burbulis... What do I and Burbulis have to do with this? Burbulis plundered, while I quite peacefully..."

Several minutes later.

Chair: "Vyacheslav Antonovich, first microphone, please—for an apology."

V.A. Marychev: "I was compared to Burbulis... Well, if you want to think, well, that I am a Burbulis, then I am a Burbulis... And if something I said insulted this wonderful teacher, my apologies to her. This is all."

[Marychev] When Sergey Nikitovich Khrushchev was banned in our country, I always organized a meeting with him. People had to know his opinion about who Khrushchev really was.

When I was meeting with Vitaliy Korotich, people were coming to listen to him in my culture house.

[Gribachev] So, by the measure of those times you were practically a dissident!

[Marychev] Yes. When everybody found fault with Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin—even Anatoliy Sobchak, who was hiding from him—he spoke only here and in the polytechnic institute. I even have the photo.

At the time he was still a deputy of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet; this photo goes back to 1990 or perhaps 1991. He came to me at the time with Kozhakov, a slim young man, and we had sandwiches.

I can say without false modesty that I am an honest person. I had the opportunity to live the way those at the helm live now. Being in contact with "big men" and with a skill of maneuvering and analyzing the situation, had I kept my mouth shut more often I would long ago have been placed in a job in a party oblast committee or other organization, which would automatically entail a normal existence and carefree life.

[Gribachev] What is your life like in Moscow?

[Marychev] Well, I exercise every day. I have not moved into an apartment provided for deputies and live in the Rossiya hotel. I do not belong with the cohort that has already formed in the deputy group.

As to Moscow life, it is difficult and boring. I get up at 0700, walk around the Rossiya, then exercise and perform, so to say, proper water procedures. I have my breakfast at the Duma. I usually leave at 0850, because I have to be the first to get to the Duma—otherwise you cannot get to the microphone there, to express your viewpoint. You have to "saddle" the microphone as early as possible. I come in first, to let the democrats know that Marychev is already here. I go in, write a note that Deputy Marychev has reserved the microphone, indicate the time, and pin it to the microphone. I usually change microphones, but now I have got into the habit of using the first one.

From the transcript of the 16 November 1994 meeting.

Chair: "First microphone."

V.A. Marychev: Ivan Petrovich! All the smart people have already said their word; now it is the fools' turn." (Commotion in the audience).

From the transcript of the same meeting.

Chair: "Fourth microphone."

V.A. Marychev: "Liberal Democratic Party of Russia faction.

"...This city is dear to us all, the city which absolutely all citizens of Russia defended for 900 days. That is why on 27 January we will be commemorating the merging of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts. But today those who defended this city, the blockade survivors, they do not live—they subsist. Sobchak actually is not implementing those constitutional laws and State Duma decrees we all, including you, Ivan Petrovich, adopted. Remember the question of blockade survivors—they are equated to Great Patriotic War veterans, and the question was free medicines for them. But they will not get free medicines, although the State Duma has passed a decree to this effect."

"You have to register your opinion on the most important issues," continues Vyacheslav Marychev. "Ivan Petrovich Rybkin would never make the floor available. I work in the evening on the issues I want to bring up next morning. The ideas come to me from my meetings with constituents. Every Friday I take a 2255 flight to St. Petersburg to meet with constituents.

"The problems that concern my constituents in St. Petersburg are the same as those that concern Muscovites. Still, I think when it comes to housing construction, the situation is better in the capital—Yuriy Luzhkov is much more devoted to Moscow than Anatoliy Sobchak is to St. Petersburg.

"I am a deputy-practitioner. St. Petersburg is currently in upheaval over my decisive actions in moving families of blockade survivors, families with many children, and disabled into nonresidential housing that had been concealed from the population since 1990. It is the housing stock that had been transferred into the category of nonresidential in order to "give" first and second floors in these buildings today to joint enterprises and other commercial structures.

"I discovered how extensive this "nonresidential stock" was. And I dare to move families into this "nonresidential stock." I have already moved 32 families. For all intents and purposes I went against mafiosi structures.

[Gribachev] You said once that you served as senior seaman. I think this corresponds to a corporal, which means that you and I finished our service with the same rank. Remember the movie "The Deputy From the Baltic": Professor Polezhayev speaks to his constituents—soldiers and sailors—and calls them "sirs."

"Sirs"—in the sense of masters of the whole country. Can one call workers and peasants "sirs" today in this particular sense?

[Marychev] Of course not, and you know that perfectly well. They remained "second class citizens" after what happened to the country. And the worst part is that they lost faith in themselves. They no longer understand where they live. One cannot be forced to call one's boss "sir." In the past our peasants or workers put into the word "sir" their respect and appreciation for the person. Can one address Anatoliy Sobchak today as "sir?" No, because he betrayed St. Petersburg, on the sly removed the Lenin monument at the Moscow Station. First he put a granite "Mercedes" in its place, and now he is erecting a monument to Tsar Alexander.

I am frequently on the same flight with him. Well, before Anatoliy Sobchak enters the plane, the lights are turned off in the cabin so he can inconspicuously take his seat in the first row. And when we land, the lights are turned off again and he slips out. No, this is not a person you call "sir."

I am not called "sir," but people light candles for me in church.

[Gribachev] Now our conversation has logically approached politics in its "pure form." "Pure" politics?

[Marychev] In my mind, I always divide opposition into two parts. Opposition as real opposition, which is considered beneficial to the executive authority—the one that is like a prickly ruff to beware. The executive branch should take into account well-meaning and decent oppositionist attitudes and opinions. For instance, when I brought up the question of equating the rights of blockade survivors to those of Great Patriotic War veterans, President Yeltsin immediately issued an edict on 8 January 1994 with the very same wording. This is a victory of oppositionist principles.

[Gribachev] I want to ask you: You are considered an eccentric in the Duma. Well, all right, sarcastic. Sarcasm within reason may get the audience to concentrate on what the speaker is saying. Does this image add "points" to your standing or detract from it?

[Marychev] I will tell you honestly—one of the main tasks was to create a certain image in the State Duma. This is necessary in order to deal with problems. Were I not that Marychev people talk about today, I could not resolve certain problems I am now resolving. It is a strategy.

[Gribachev] Sometimes you rattle those whom you directly address. Does this raise your adrenalin?

[Marychev] Well, after all, my proposals are addressed at people I disagree with. But it is never my purpose to make them bitter. Take Zhirinovskiy, for instance. Most members of the LDPR faction fawn on him. Some time had to pass before making it clear that there are other opinions. I cannot say things Zhirinovskiy says. If I

dared to say even once: "Chubays has to be put on trial! You will look at the clock and eat your meals in Lefortovo!," the question would be raised right away of stripping me of my deputy immunity, and the same Rybkin and the same Zhirinovskiy would vote for this decision. I can say it, but differently. Hence this home-made sarcasm—I calculate everything.

That is why my loudmouth image has done the job—I am well known. It is already difficult for deputies to imagine how it will be without Marychev. I think Ivan Petrovich Rybkin also has a certain respect for me—if he is honest, of course.

[Gribachev] How do you feel about him?

[Marychev] I have great respect for him. He has done a lot to make the Duma a working institution. And I create a climate that forces the adoption of particular decisions. Everything is on the level of contacts and conversations. Charm, perhaps. Deputies understand that I have always been an independent person. When the maitre of our party says that this is the way we are to vote, I vote the way I consider right. Yes, I am an LDPR member, but there are some intricate issues on which it is possible to express a uniform viewpoint.

[Gribachev] So, Vladimir Volfovich votes "for," and you, "against." What next?

[Marychev] At first he got mad, but now he understands. The very system of one person—Zhirinovskiy—putting together the faction list is wrong. At the next elections he will not include me on the list—why would he need me, the way I am... And I do not depend on him, which Zhirinovskiy understands. If I leave him now—and I am toying with the idea—he will have one very caustic opponent in me. I am not going to yell: "You will go to jail yourself!"—I will elegantly take him apart. He understands this.

But I always support him in difficult times, and as long as I am with him, I will be doing that.

...Excerpt from the 18 November meeting transcript.

Chair: "Third microphone, you have the floor."

V.A. Marychev: Ivan Petrovich, I realize that I irritate you, but for Christ's sake, let the ignoramus say a word. All right, Ivan Petrovich? Can I talk?

Chair: Vyacheslav Antonovich, do not waste time.

The author donated the honorarium to the Christ the Savior Cathedral fund.

ZAVTRA on 1995 Politics

954F1201D Moscow ZAVTRA in Russian No 1, Jan 95
p 1

[Unattributed article: "Aleksandr Prokhanov's Word"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Last fall, when one after another untanned and complacent politicians were returning to Moscow, we heralded cataclysms and coups. Friends and foes ridiculed us, despite the fact that the "Kremlin ovule" had already begun to divide, the enmity between the "feudal prince" and the "regional boyars" was rising, the fodder was accumulating for soon-to-come scandals with foreign currency trading, and aircraft with weapons and volunteers from the Caucasus were arriving in Chechnya.

We raised our New Year's Eve champagne glasses while fully aware that at that very moment a night bomber was diving on Grozny, high-explosive shells were tearing to pieces Chechens and Russians alike, and a Ryazan soldier was dying near Tolstoy-Yurt, felled by a sniper bullet. We are entering 1995 to the lezhinka of long-range guns, to the quadrille of human rights advocates' lies, to the hoarse twang of the speeches of ax-brandishing "democrats."

In 1995 we will live in a different Russia, with a different policy, a different "video display," different rhetorics. The rhetoric of catastrophe. Its boundary, already distinguishable in 1994, will run through the deadened outskirts of the North and Far East, through idled giant factories, through blown-up pipelines and communications; it will encompass the entire system of enmity between the regions and Moscow; whatever remains of the military and industry will strain their last reserves and will find their culmination in a mortal battle between two monsters who find that there is not enough room for both of them in the capital and whose fangs, having mauled Russia, are beginning to click and clash, mauling one another.

The new course—"toward a strong state, patriotism, and national roots"—which is increasingly frequently mentioned by moneybags who have sent their families abroad, is the result of that horrible dead end into which our motherland has been pushed by a generation of immoral and cruel liberals trying to avoid retribution. The "Chechen expedition," where corpulent generals, inveterate liars-administrators, and the idealists-patriots who joined them went, is the most graphic manifestation of the "new course." The long host stretched over Chechen roads is accompanied by numerous sutlers ready to divide the clothes of the killed, tax-farmers ready to get rich on burials, God's fools and hysterics divining: some on "Great Russia," others on "human rights." These hysterics are the main support base of the two bitter rivals for power, whose struggle is exhausting the state's last resources.

The "Sakharovites," sprinkled with old-age dandruff and excitedly bristling sideburns, for the umpteenth time denounce Russia, having suddenly discovered its main evil—the "sovereign" Yeltsin with his tanks, Kozhakov, the party past and the menacing imperialistic future—and the "strong state supporters" from Gazprom and Tornado Bank, pulling into their bluish,

constantly tightening fists Tyumen's pipelines, Yakutia's diamonds, and Krasnoyarsk's aluminum, who have returned to "before-the-time" categories in foreign policy. They, both the former and the latter, will not be able to coexist in the Russia of 1995, and the death of one monster will not allow the other to enjoy the fruits of victory.

In this hour of battle, what are the patriots to do, those whom the Gaydars, Shumeykos, and Yavlinskiys hate with a primal reptilian hate, rejoicing at every manifestation of our suffering and torment? The patriots whom the Korzhakovs, Grachevs, and Yeltsins exterminated with tanks a year ago in the middle of Moscow, stuffing morgues and crematoria? Is there any choice?

We, schooled by the experience of failures and defeat, many times deceived and ready to be deceived again, still have open to us the same unchangeable opportunity to support an individual or a political movement capable of formulating and reaffirming the doctrine of national service and building a state, the only one which is worth living and breathing for.

Let us check with a sensitive ear and inquisitive mind all the most tentative, barely perceptible signs of transformation of the current disgusting pro-Western authority into a national one. But we can only make a step toward it no sooner than after this authority admits its terrible sin of destroying the USSR, explains the motives that compelled it into this crime, admits that the strategic task of the future Russia will be the restoration of broken-up territories and the construction of the collapsed continental dome under which people lived safely and prospered. Three oceans surround the natural, God-created bowl, and the Great Russian State was only the human shape of the immense planetary truth, in which the numerous people populating Russia believed, and which they discovered for themselves.

Today, fighting the separatism run amok, whether in the Caucasus or the Volga or the Yakut tundra, the authority must explain its ugly and absurd tanks as the most undesirable and bad part of the new strategy, whereby 30 million Russian thrown out of their motherland and surrendered into slavery to Baltic barons and Asian khans will be returned together with their lands, space launch stations, and ports to the bosom of the motherland.

The authority, attempting to explain its bombing and storming strikes and zinc caskets to its deprived Russian population, soldiers' mothers, new draftees, and officers of the humiliated, trampled-upon military, must immediately resurrect the "Russian factor," make it central in the economic and cultural policy, reject the suppression of Russians in Russia, return to Russians the sense of motherland, the sense of patriotic authority whose concern is not its own wallet and palaces but the birth rate of Russian babies, the health of teenagers and old people, the welfare of the family, justice in the courts, the Russian language, and Russian faces on television. Because today the meaningless and inarticulate words of the rulers addressed to the

people evoke anger, depression, and hate. And no Nevzorov with his artistic luster will give soul to the frightened and corrupt faces of the rulers.

The new course, if it is to be a "course" and if it is to be "new," must immediately formulate a strategy of national revival, which will include people's power, justice, and Russianness.

This course cannot be internalized and expressed by the personae who have bored Russia, whose image is associated among the people with the sense of defeat, trouble, and occupation; it is better to watch the screen's empty glow than these deathly ghosts of Russia's misfortune and tragedy.

Only in this case, when all the aforementioned conditions are fulfilled, will we be able to believe that yes, the process of exorcising the dragon from the Kremlin palaces and cathedrals has begun. Its scaly tail will slither and slide down Moscow pavements and disappear into Luzhkov's hole on Manezhnaya Square, disappearing into the same darkness and bottomlessness it crawled out of.

We paid too high a price for our unblemished, brotherly unity and faith to respond instantly to the bait of Yakovlev or Poptsov and rush toward our moral death.

Stoicism, religious ethics, and altruistic love for the motherland—these are the things I want to wish for ZAVTRA readers in these first days of the menacing year of 1995.

Russia's Choice Welcomes Negotiations on Chechnya

LD1402172295 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1450 GMT 14 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow February 14 TASS—Russia's Choice faction in the State Duma welcomes the beginning of negotiations between representatives of the sides involved in the Chechen conflict, says a statement of the faction signed by its Chairman Yegor Gaydar. The statement was referred to ITAR-TASS on Tuesday [14 February].

Russia's Choice faction notes that it has always been in favour of negotiations for overcoming the crisis in Chechnya, the statement says. The faction urged all the parties involved in the conflict to keep from using power methods of its settlement in future.

Yakovlev Discounts Censorship, Military Role in Chechnya

BR1402161895 Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 13 Feb 95 p 21

[Report on interview with Aleksandr Yakovlev, head of Russian radio and television, by Margarida Bon de Sousa in Sintra; date not given: "Russian Army Acted Badly"; first three paragraphs are DIARIO DE NOTICIAS introduction]

[FBIS Translated Text] His features are undoubtedly Slavic, reminiscent of the great May Day parades on Red Square, swept along by the winds of the country's new political reality.

Five years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Russia is facing new and innumerable challenges, the outcome of which nobody dares predict. Chechnya is one of these challenges. In Sintra, during a break in the meeting of the Secretariat of the Independent Committee on Population and Quality of Life, a group of journalists questioned Yakovlev. The first question was about the alleged government censorship of what is happening in that republic.

"I can guarantee that there is no censorship," he said, in measured tones, in Russian, translated by an interpreter. "There have, in fact, been attempts by the state apparatus to this end, but they led to nothing. For example, at first they did not permit correspondents to cover army operations. The press then began transmitting only President Dudayev's side, which proved more damaging. I decided then to meet with Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, who put pressure on the defense minister and Deputy Defense Minister Shakhmurov, to end the restriction on the movements of journalists. At present, censorship can only be imposed in Russia during a state of emergency.

As for military intervention, Yakovlev felt that no other state would accept having its territorial integrity threatened. "In the first place, it is a Russian territory," he said. "Moreover, Chechnya is a territory where arms are proliferating. It is hard to imagine any other state in the world with a territory equipped with missiles, tanks, and an army, which aspires to independence."

According to him, there were at least 50,000 machine-pistols, 53 tanks, and 25 fighter planes left behind in the republic at the time of the USSR's disintegration. "Since then, more arms have been sent to Chechnya from the Volgograd region," he stated.

The version of Gorbachev's former right-hand man is that there have always been forces in Russia interested in supporting Chechnya's independence movement. "Current Defense Minister Pavel Grachev accused General Chapashnikov, while Chapashnikov says it was Grachev. What I can guarantee you is that the public prosecutor's office is committed to clearing the matter up."

Unsustainable Situation

Nevertheless, Yakovlev does not agree with the actions taken by the Russian Army. "It was not a very intelligent action, and it was not appropriate for the situation. Bombings against civilians cannot be approved, nor can the dispatching of young, ill-prepared soldiers to Grozny." Moscow acknowledged the mistake "by dismissing the coordinators of the military and civilian actions."

However, independent of the methods used, Yakovlev felt that the situation was unsustainable. "The trafficking of drugs and arms, as well as the money-laundering that was going on in that republic could not be allowed to continue much longer."

The events in Chechnya are being followed closely by the other republics with aspirations of independence. "It must be said that there are many mercenaries from other countries, such as Pakistan or Afghanistan, fighting there. It is very important that the conflict not become national or religious."

As for his party, which says it advocates an ideology closely related to that of the Portuguese Socialist Party (PS), Yakovlev revealed that there were already organizing committees in 60 regions of the federation. The constitutional congress is scheduled for the 18th and the first international relations have been established with Portuguese and Austrian counterparts.

Gromov Says Chechnya Like 'Carbon Copy' of Afghanistan

LD1502110695 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1006 GMT 15 Feb 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Sergey Ostanin]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 15 Feb—Colonel General Boris Gromov, former commander of the Soviet contingent in Afghanistan in the final stage, stated today: "The mistakes in Chechnya prove that no one wants to draw on the experience gained in the war in Afghanistan."

Talking to the ITAR-TASS correspondent after laying wreaths at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier on the occasion of the sixth anniversary of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, General Gromov said: "The solution of the Chechnya problem should have been approached in a normal way without repeating the mistakes."

"What happened in Chechnya is like a carbon copy of what happened in Afghanistan," the general thinks.

Boris Gromov regards his recent appointment to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as normal. "In the situation that has taken shape, this is the normal way out of the situation," he said. "The main thing is that I have remained the deputy defense minister."

Says 'We Learned Nothing' From Earlier Wars

MM1502112595 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 15 Feb 95 p 1

[Report by Vasily Ustyuzhanin: "Those Who Six Years Ago Were the Last to Leave Afghanistan. From a KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA Interview with General Gromov"; place and date not given]

[FBIS Translated Text] "In February 1989, when I was the last member of the limited contingent of Soviet forces in Afghanistan to cross the Amu Darya, I could not imagine that that bridge would be the road to new wars, that the country's territory would be pockmarked with "hot" spots, and that the boys who had been through the Afghan hell together would be set against one another as enemies on their own land.

"We learned nothing from that war. Or from the Great Patriotic War, incidentally. You will recall that the bloodiest period for us came in the first few months of those wars—in 1941 and in 1979-1980. The same thing has happened in Chechnya. In exactly the same way the rulers hatched their schemes in secret and did nothing to prepare for war.

"One of the main lessons of the Chechnya campaign is that we need to stop just talking about Army reforms and get down to the real organizational development of the Armed Forces. This is a broader and more complex task. Otherwise we will finally talk the country's security out of existence with our endless chattering and will again use the Army not as a protector but as a threat to citizens' lives."

Readers Critical of Chechnya Coverage

MM1402134795 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 Feb 95 p 2

[Roundup of readers' letters to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA collated by Yelena Grechko]

[FBIS Translated Text]

...Let It Be Clear Who It Is That We Are Dealing With

I suggest that the article by State Duma deputy S. Sulakshin, "I Can No Longer Remain Silent," published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on 12 January, be widely circulated as a leaflet or pamphlet, so that everyone clearly knows who it is that we are in combat against in Chechnya and what the nature of the bandit regime of General Dudayev and his accomplices is. These Chechen nationalists are causing psychological and material damage to the homeland, the peoples of Russia, every family, and every person, irrespective of his nationality or religion. That is why I am bewildered by the position of certain politicians and State Duma deputies, who are going out of their way to vilify the Army as it pursues a difficult fight against Chechen bandit formations. I believe what they are doing undermines the troops' fighting spirit, demoralizes the public, and not only does nothing to assist the speediest elimination of the conflict in Chechnya but, on the contrary, makes the situation worse.

[Signed] Retired Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir Andreychenko, Great Patriotic War veteran, St. Petersburg.

Not Everything in the Paper Is To My Liking

I am not an admirer of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, but I started to read it of late to find out the truth about the conflict in Chechnya. I can honestly say that by no means everything in your pieces is to my liking.

For example, the photographs. Why are there so few combat photographs? Sure, soldiers with spades, with logs, with bags... But where are the troops in combat in Grozny? Where are the photographs of the city in ruins, of the Chechen prisoners...?

Furthermore, I have doubts about your writers' assessments of the events that are being described. For example, an airborne assault force colonel died after giving his flak jacket to an enlisted man before a battle. Why not ask: How can it be that fighting troops are not fully provided with flak jackets?

In one report you talk about causes. The presence of wounded, the lack(!) of ammunition. The presence of wounded can somehow be explained. But a lack of ammunition—that is unacceptable. Why was it in short supply? Did they not have the sense to take any with them, or had they not been given more than one ammunition ration?

As for the articles about poor training due to insufficient funding, this criticism is rather feeble, I have to say. There is no spark. Why don't you actually say that the 1995 military budget was presented to the deputies by members of the government headed by Chernomyrdin under the president's patronage. And that this niggardly budget will bring down the Army once and for all.

[Signed] Major Nikolay Platonov, Order of the Red Star, Afghan veteran, Kansk, Krasnoyarsk Kray.

Let Them Not Disgrace Us...

We are pensioners and refugees from Grozny, currently in Vladikavkaz. We watch the news bulletins on television and we are very angry at the lies of the so-called defenders of human rights. Let them come here and see our wounded and maimed soldiers for themselves. We went to the hospital and were horrified—only fascists could have done such things. It is disgraceful that they do not have a good word to say about the Russian boys and only defend the Dudayev gang. Another request. Send us some honest deputies who will tell the truth about what they see. Recall the liars. Let them not disgrace the body of deputies.

[Signed] V. Kurchankov and others (10 signatures in all), Vladikavkaz.

A Soldier Must Be True To His Oath

I decided to write a letter when I saw a meeting with soldiers' mothers on the television. I am a disabled war veteran, my son has done his stint in the Army, and now it is my grandson's turn. I think I am entitled to ask the mothers who are doing their darnedest to get their sons out of the Army: Is that what you raised them to do? Why has a soldier's duty become a heavy burden for them? Was it because they knew no problems in civilian life, were pampered, and were physically unprepared for service in the Army? If a young man is unable to serve 18 months in the Army, aren't his parents to blame for failing to raise a strong, bold person capable of overcoming difficulties?

Don't you remember the wartime poster which said "The Motherland Calls!"? Don't you think mothers in those terrible war years felt for their children? Don't you think their hearts ached for their little darlings? Nonetheless they

gave their sons their blessing to join the military. I therefore believe that calls for people not to serve in the Army are criminal. Military duty is sacrosanct for every soldier.

[Signed] V. Soteyev, disabled Great Patriotic War veteran, Irbit, Sverdlovsk Oblast.

I Do Not Accept That View

I have been reading your paper since 1956, since I was a student at military school. I will not enumerate the paper's qualities; a great deal has been said about them. But recently my confidence in them has been shaken. At a time when the Russian public is condemning the war against Chechnya, the paper, in my view, has not only failed to condemn the actions of the politicians who got the Army involved in this carnage, but is even trying to persuade readers that it is justified in the interests of a "united and indivisible" Russia. I do not accept that view.

[Signed] Retired Major K. Rizvanov, Nizhnekamsk.

"Chechnya" Criminal Haven

I am more and more convinced that by "democracy" our politicians mean indiscriminate criticism of the government and the Army. A well-known public figure, for example, appearing on television, described the members of the government as scoundrels for all the country to hear. The story you encounter everywhere is that the Russian Army is fighting not against the fascist regime of Dudayev (as the Chechens themselves call it), but allegedly against the unarmed Chechen people. This public disinformation leads to the mobilization of many Chechen citizens against our Army and to ethnic strife. From that we get extra difficulties and losses.

And what about the pronouncements by certain leaders of parties that were in power in the past about the need for a political settlement of the conflict! I would like to ask them what they did to prevent this powder keg from catching fire. I suppose that the transfer of Russian weapons to the Chechens is an example of a "wise" approach to the problem...?

I believe that if a decision has been made to disarm bandit formations in Chechnya the state organs should implement it. The "Chechnya" criminal haven is a danger to everyone.

[Signed] V. Lyamzin, engineer, Yekaterinburg.

Nevzorov-ZAVTRA Exchange on Chechnya

954F1201C Moscow ZAVTRA in Russian No 4, Jan 95 p 1

[Statements of A. Nevzorov and A. Prokhanov: "Nevzorov Breaks Up With ZAVTRA and Shakes the Little Finger Offered by the Regime"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

Nevzorov to Prokhanov

Dear Sir! I am not speaking to you as my old friend and comrade in arms, because the ease with which your newspaper has insulted me to a certain degree negates the friendship that in the past bound my program and your newspaper.

You still have not managed in this most difficult and decisive moment to abandon your political toys and understand that the Motherland is above politics; that war—and you cannot fail to understand its true danger and scale—annuls everything both in the past and in the future, because it is this reality, the reality of war, that currently defines everything, and one has to be blind and a fool to believe that one may be free of participation in the war our Motherland is conducting for our traditional lands.

I do not consider myself free of the duty to fight. And I do not quite understand the people who explain desertion by the lack of liking for the command or by old, albeit justified, grudges against it.

This is my war because it is Russia's war for lands and integrity. Looking for political or moral reason not to participate in it is the usual trick of the intelligentsia, and in the final analysis cowardice, in my book.

Excuse me, Aleksandr Andreyevich, but I do not see any difference in principle between Vilnius 1991 and Chechnya 1995... The only difference is that at the time the war was conducted by bureaucrats and military we found likable, while this time they are not very likable and on top of that guilty toward us, but this is not an excuse to run away from the front line into a deep rear, and from there pen "antiwar" lies.

Right now ZAVTRA is giving a boost to those who kill our soldiers and burn our tanks with crews in them; right now ZAVTRA is standing together with all enemies of the country—Gaydar and Burbulis, the God's fool Adamovich Kovalev and "Tanya..." What an end...

And I want to repeat to you, Aleksandr Andreyevich: We have been one for a long time, and the Chechen war—Russia's war for a huge chunk of its land—is our war, yours and mine, and no one has relieved you from participating in it; and no matter what, you—as well as I—do not and will not have a choice: for Russia or against it. It appears both you and I made our choice a long time ago... So be true to it, Aleksandr Andreyevich.

[Dated] 17 January 1995

Prokhanov to Nevzorov

I have to admit that I was hurt by your soliloquy about me, in which you compare me to a blind man and a fool and reproach me of cowardice and desertion. Your bravery is well known and is beyond doubt—especially the way you bravely change your convictions and friends and shift from one camp to another.

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You call the war in Chechnya your war. That is indeed comical. Nevzorov's War sounds somewhat like Przhevalskiy's Horse. This braggadocio is insulting for the motorized infantry and paratroops who are fighting there for real.

You chose to jump into the embrace of the regime, praising Stepashin and Grachev and demonstrating your friendship with Satarov and Shakhrai. You think that by doing this you do a favor to Russia fighting the war in Chechnya.

But it is Grachev, who sends Russian soldiers to battle in Chechnya, who also kills them with the weapons he transferred to Dudayev. But together with you, the war in Chechnya is supported by Kozyrev, who by doing so drags Russia into a conflict with the Muslim world—a conflict America would love so much. You, a person whom I thought of as a supporter of a strong Russian state, are contributing to the destruction of the remainder of the empire and rendering impossible its restoration in the future.

ZAVTRA's position is that the regime that fabricated a military-criminal state in Chechnya in 1991-1993, and now with the help of tanks and airplanes is destroying this state, pursues not the goals of Russia but its own, asking society to treat these goals as identical. By exploiting natural Russian patriotism, it wants to write off "on the war" the whole baggage of its mistakes and crimes.

I have no doubt that the persons whose company you now intend to keep will cheer the loud and spectacular break-up with ZAVTRA you chose to demonstrate. I hope you have finally found your political and moral niche among those who have destroyed the Soviet Union, stupidly bombed into dust one of Russia's cities, and intend to decorate with patriotic heraldry their stolen fortunes, covering with these theatrical symbols the tears and blood of the people.

[Dated] 22 January 1995

Kozyrev, Grachev 'Grateful' for Gromov Appointment

LD1402161995 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1558 GMT 14 Feb 95

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature: By diplomatic correspondents Aleksandr Korzun, Igor Porshnev, Yevgeniy Terekhov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Feb 13 (Interfax)—Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev said that he and Defense Minister Pavel Grachev were grateful to Russian President Boris Yeltsin appointing Deputy Defense Minister Boris Gromov to the Russian Foreign Ministry.

Kozyrev said today before leaving Moscow for Stockholm where he will meet with the new Swedish government and British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd, that

the Russian president had backed the joint initiative of the foreign and defense ministries and Gromov himself.

Kozyrev repeated that he had many times visited the hot spots, including Tajikistan and ex-Yugoslavia together with Gromov. Kozyrev said Gromov had done much for military integration within the CIS. Kozyrev said he and Grachev had agreed that they needed a man for ensuring close interaction between the defense and foreign ministries. Kozyrev said Gromov seemed the best man to take the position.

Kozyrev said Gromov would deal with relations with NATO, strategic stability in Europe, military and technical-cooperation between the CIS countries. Kozyrev admitted that the appointment of Gromov was an unprecedented case. When asked if Gromov would remain the deputy defense minister while working in the foreign ministry, Kozyrev said this would be decided later.

Military Issues

Grachev Seen Consolidating Position Despite Setbacks

MK1502085095 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 15 Feb 95 p 2

[Report by Maksim Isayev under the "Army" rubric: "Pavel Grachev Has Consolidated His Position on High. But the Ground Is Constantly Shaking Under Him"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Most generals of Pavel Grachev's favorite combat branch, the Airborne Troops—all of them his personal proteges—have failed during the Chechen operation. Airborne Troops Commander Yevgeniy Podkolzin was so unnerved that he started blasting everybody, including the minister himself, for setbacks in Chechnya. But he got away with it because of his particular proximity to Pavel Grachev. Colonel General Aleksey Mityukhin, commander of the North Caucasus Military District, whom Grachev liked to hold up as an example to other district commanders, bungled the entire initial stage of the Chechen operation. At the insistence of the General Staff and the Internal Affairs Ministry he was effectively suspended from command.

Some at the General Staff think that Grachev, to all appearances, will allow both Yevgeniy Podkolzin and Aleksey Mityukhin to stay on because they are too close to him, and, unlike Boris Gromov and Valeriy Mironov, cannot lay claim to the post of defense minister.

A persistent opinion is gaining ground in the Armed Forces that should yet another crisis requiring the use of troops break out, nobody would follow Grachev any longer.

Grachev's influence on his recent darlings, Valeriy Lapshov, Yelena Agapova, and Gennadiy Ivanov, is all but lost. Grachev is now holding Lieutenant General Ivanov responsible for bungling reform of the Armed Forces. His

staff, which was called the military reform administration, has been renamed the military policy administration.

Now it is the General Staff that bears responsibility for military reform, a body that should have steered it from the outset. But this is no longer the General Staff of two or three years ago, when there was strong resistance to Grachev's amateurishness in it, including at the top. Mikhail Kolesnikov, chief of the General Staff, is currently surrounded on all sides by Grachev's favorites, including Zhurbenko, first deputy chief of the General Staff, and Deputy Chiefs Bogdanov and Zherebtsov.

The edict on removing Matvey Burlakov from the post of deputy defense minister can be interpreted as a big victory of public opinion. This news has elicited a positive response in the Armed Forces. Some at law-enforcement agencies have also sighed with relief. "The Burlakov case" is unlikely to be investigated further, but, at least, it will no longer discredit the president's personnel policy in the eyes of such popular people among the troops as Gen. Aleksandr Lebed.

Further Commentary on Grachev Position

MK1502113095 Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian No. 11, 12-19 Feb 95 (Signed to press 14 Feb) pp 1, 9

[Report by military observer Aleksandr Zhilin under the "Commentary" rubric: "Army: Those on Top Cannot, Those at the Bottom Do Not Want To. Defense Minister Engaged in Staff Combat"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Last week, long-expected "purgings" appear to have begun at the top echelon of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry leadership. By presidential edict, Colonel General Georgiy Kondratyev and Col. Gen. Matvey Burlakov were removed from their posts of deputy defense minister.

It was not by chance that these two figures were sidelined "in tandem," reliable sources at the presidential administration believe. Boris Yeltsin, who is perfectly aware of how the troops treat the defense minister, fears the army's negative reaction to the elimination of the anti-Grachev opposition. For this reason Gen. Burlakov, whose reputation was greatly marred by the scandal over the Western Group of Forces, was "linked" to Gen. Kondratyev. On one hand, the president appears to be meeting public opinion—which demanded Burlakov's resignation right after the Western Group's withdrawal from Germany—half way. On the other, a shadow of the same scandals and suspicions of corruption will inevitably fall on anyone fired together with Burlakov. At the same time, the presidential edict does not answer the question of whether or not the allegations of corruption in the Western Group of Forces have been confirmed, although Burlakov's suspension from the duties of deputy defense minister last year was an interim one—till circumstances are clarified.

One cannot but note that Pavel Grachev has proved to be an outstanding strategist and tactician in staff warfare. It is said that after the New Year assault's debacle, the defense minister drew Aleksandr Korzhakov's strong displeasure, which fueled rumors about the Defense Ministry chief's early resignation.

Being invited to Boris Yeltsin's birthday party, however, Pavel Grachev, to all appearances, managed to regain the president's good graces and has launched a bold attack on the opposition. In so doing the defense minister has been employing much more sophisticated tactics.

Another senior military figure—Col. Gen. Boris Gro-mov—was also sidelined the other day. He was asked, while keeping the post of deputy minister, to leave for the Foreign Ministry to supervise matters of military-political cooperation between CIS countries. According to information from the Defense Ministry's central staff, military personnel department chiefs are searching for a "sinecure" for yet another "rebellious" deputy defense minister—Col. Gen. Valeriy Mironov. One option is to move him to the Armed Forces General Inspectorate under Army Gen. Konstantin Kobets, where benefits and pay are not lower than those at the Defense Ministry.

Notably, Col. Gen. Mikhail Kolesnikov, chief of the General Staff, has also stepped up his activity. In observers' view, this may be attributed to the proposed power sharing between the General Staff and the Defense Ministry, for which reason Mikhail Kolesnikov is demonstrating his "good work form."

It seems that Pavel Grachev plans to tackle all his problems through reorganization. Having tried this method on the generals, he plans to expand it onto the troops. In particular, the Airborne Troops, the best-trained and, it is said, the most opposition-minded part of the army regarding its attitude to Grachev.

A group of officers of the Airborne Troops General Staff visited the MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI editorial board the other day. Their story clarifies what kind of reform the defense minister is going to carry out in the Armed Forces.

It turned out that at the very beginning of the Chechen operation, Col. Gen. Yevgeniy Podkolzin, commander of the Airborne Troops, proposed his plan of action to the defense minister. Essentially, the issue was that the Airborne Troops and subunits attached to them should operate under a single command and on their own. By preliminary estimates, the entire operation to neutralize Dudayev was due to take from four to seven hours, that is, one night. At the same time Podkolzin insisted, however, that enough time be set aside to prepare the operation and to train the servicemen.

Perhaps it was precisely Podkolzin's plan that gave Pavel Grachev grounds to state that Grozny could be taken by one airborne regiment within two hours. When it came

down to business, however, all Podkolzin's other suggestions were for some reasons ignored, while the Airborne Troops commander in chief was not even allowed to Mozdok. Podkolzin repeatedly tried to contact the defense minister so as to defend his plan of combat operations, but to no avail.

According to the officers, after the bungled assault on Grozny—which was timed to coincide with the defense minister's birthday—during which, according to their information, about 4,000 servicemen of the federal troops were killed (by eyewitnesses' accounts a battalion burnt in combat within four to six minutes, and a regiment within 11 to 15 minutes), Gen. Podkolzin refuses to shake hands with the defense minister and tries not to communicate with him. The Russian Army's losses on New Year's night have become a key military secret, which the Defense Ministry is cherishing as the apple of its eye. The officers said that the Airborne Troops General Staff was prohibited from publishing the lists of airborne troop servicemen killed in action, because they could give an indirect clue as to overall losses.

The Airborne Troops commander's firm stance and his critical assessments of the Chechnya operation have elicited Pavel Grachev's indignation. According to the officers, a document effectively abolishing the Airborne Troops as an armed service has already been drawn up at the Defense Ministry. The document calls for airborne units to be subordinated to military district commanders. This means that the Airborne Troops will be dissolved into the ground troops and that the Russian Army will be deprived of the last more or less battle-worthy force.

Today it seems that the Defense Ministry central staff is holding its breath in anticipation. Everybody is waiting for Boris Yeltsin's statement to the parliament. The Defense Ministry board meeting, which was to analyze military operations in Chechnya, has also been postponed for a later date. Grachev's opponents should scarcely count on any drastic changes in the country's top military leadership, however. Unlike the Chechen campaign, the defense minister appears to be gaining the upper hand in the staff war.

Allegation of Continued Novichok CW Testing

95WC0022A Moscow NOVAYA YEZHEDNEVNAYA GAZETA in Russian 7 Feb 95 p 1

[Article by Oleg Zharov, Saratov MAP (expansion unidentified) press center: "Blister Action Disarmament: A 'New Guy' in the Class"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *It is done. In keeping with the chemical disarmament agreement signed by Russia and the United States, 1995 will be not only the Year of the Pig but also a year of the swinish treatment of Saratov Oblast residents, in particular those living in the Gornyy settlement, where by the decree of the RF [Russian Federation]*

Government, dated 26 January 1995, construction will begin on a plant for chemical weapons disposal, a research unit for the development of OV [toxic substances] disposal technology, and a disposal site for burying the waste from this wonderful process.

The convention on the elimination of chemical and bacteriological weapons, which was so actively advertised by the "progressive" public, already at the time elicited protests from various public and environmental organizations both in Russia and the United States. Nevertheless, the position of the Russian-American Big Honchos has not particularly changed either then, at the time when the convention was signed, or now that "the process has gotten going": Completely ignore any criticism.

The decision made by the RF Government on 26 January behind closed doors, which neither representatives of Saratov public organizations, nor Greenpeace of Russia, nor former military chemist-researcher Vil Mirzayanov were permitted to attend, contains so many contradictions and is so far removed from common sense that it simply does not make sense to make it public. Suffice it to say that the disposal plant, the unit for the development of disposal technologies, and the disposal site will be built simultaneously.

One does not have to be clairvoyant to predict a new rise of environmental movement in the regions one way or the other affected both by this decree and chemical disarmament in general.

Anyway, much has already been said and written on the topic of chemical disarmament; on the other hand, the topic that was on the front pages of various publications in 1992-1993: secret development of the RF Ministry of Defense of a new—binary—type of chemical warfare agents, now has been somewhat forgotten, but it should not have been. All in good time, however....

Novichok Binary Agent, the REUTER agency, the Ministry of Defense, and Everybody Else....

When Greenpeace organized in November 1994 a press conference on the question of safe disposal of the existing stockpile of chemical weapons, it probably did not think that this would cause another scandal. Among those who participated in the press conference's preparation were members of the Union for Chemical Safety in Shikhany, concerned over the fact that testing of new types of toxic substances was being conducted at the Shikhany test site.

No representative of the Ministry of Defense was present at the press conference, and in order to obtain firsthand explanations, the experienced REUTER agency boys immediately upon return called the Ministry of Defense. It so happened that none of those authorized to make decisions was in at the time, and various deputies in response to REUTER's statement that they had documents that Russia is working on new types of toxic

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substances decided that there was nothing to hide anymore and confirmed this information. For a full week, REUTER used this information in its dispatches. Naturally, many Western publications and broadcast companies used this information, pretty much plunging into a state of shock the burghers who had not heard such statements since the time of the end of the Cold War.

What is behind all this—real work on a new chemical bludgeon or a mere bureaucratic mistake?

Right now it is difficult to tell whether work is currently being conducted on the testing of binary chemical warfare agents under the working name Novichok ["New Guy"], although one can hear explosions at the Shikhany test site every day, and one can only guess at their purpose. It is inarguable that this work was conducted all the way up to 1992. Immediately after the scandal involving the arrest of Vil Mirzayanov, this work was suspended, and since then official sources deny that such testing is being conducted.

However, the obvious reluctance of the military to ease the secrecy restrictions around the Shikhany military-chemical complex, the daily explosions at the test site, and this blunder on the part of the Ministry of Defense bureaucrats give reason to believe that this work is indeed being conducted, albeit not in the same volume.

What is Novichok? It is a chemical warfare agent that consists of two main components; each by itself does not represent any danger to human life and health, but their interaction forms a toxic agent of great destructive power with both general toxic and nerve-paralyzing effect. Judging by reports from the time of testing (the beginning of 1980's), it may be five to 10 times more powerful than its American counterpart. According to Vladimir Uglev, former GITOS [State Institute for Organic Synthesis Technologies] researcher and one of Novichok developers, the process of manufacturing this agent is so simple that if its secret falls into the hands of reasonably serious terrorists, they will be able to set up its production.

I do not know whether I succeeded in the attempt to show the situation in the military-chemical complex from two completely different sides, but each of them possesses an extremely unpleasant habit of jumping over others' heads, guided by the principle: He who does not risk does not get to drink champagne. Let us just hope that they will choke on their champagne before they drown us in different generations of chemical warfare agents.

Pacific Fleet Command Denies Media Reports on Dumping

LD1502073595 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0553 GMT 15 Feb 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Dmitriy Kashirin]

[FBIS Translated Text] Vladivostok, 15 Feb—The reports by some mass media about the dumping of ammunition along with the transport ship Vologda are

unfounded, the command of the Pacific Fleet thinks. A statement circulated by the press service of the Pacific Fleet today says the attempt "by certain Russian and foreign mass media to make a sensation out of an everyday activity of the fleet during which ammunition was dumped" is seen as "another stage in the attacks on the Army and Navy, as an attempt to paint them black by any means."

"We are forced to state once again that 11-14 February the Pacific Fleet, according to plan, dumped from the transport ship Vologda written-off ammunition, including what was left after the explosions in Novonvezhino, which could not be scrapped by any other means. The area in which the ammunition was dumped from the transport ship Vologda is close to the coast of the Maritime Kray and is designated for these purposes in the book "The Regulations for Vessels Sailing in Waters Along the Pacific Coast of the USSR (summary), Admiralty No. 4440, 1986," the document says.

The Pacific Fleet command also said that there was no radioactive, poisonous, or other chemically active substances capable of harming the environment among the ammunition that had been dumped.

Regional Affairs

Sporadic Exchanges of Fire Continuing in Chechnya

LD1402151095 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1427 GMT 14 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Groznyy, Feb 14 (Interfax)—Sporadic exchanges of fire continue in Chechnya, despite the agreement on a temporary cease-fire covering heavy artillery which was reached at the Russian-Chechen talks in Sleptsovskaya (Ingushetia).

An Interfax correspondent reports from Groznyy that by 2 p.m., on Tuesday, artillery shelling of the city's southern districts, controlled by Dudayev supporters, became of "medium intensiveness." Earlier, at 11:20 a.m. the Chechen side dealt a strike from a jet salvo installation against positions of Russian tanks several kilometers from the Goita settlement (20 km south-west of Groznyy).

The agreement on a temporary heavy artillery cease-fire from the evening of February 13 was reached at the Russian-Chechen meeting held with the mediation of Ingush Vice President Boris Agapov. The warring sides were later expected to confirm preliminary cease-fire orders concerning heavy arms, which had been handed down before the start of the talks.

Combat Aircraft Refrain From Chechen Ground Target Strikes

LD1402152095 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1427 GMT 14 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, Feb 14 (Interfax)—Russia's combat aircraft refrained from strikes against

ground targets in Chechnya on February 13 and 14, a Russian Defense Ministry official has said.

He said the air strikes were halted as soon as negotiations began between the federal troops command and the chief of staff of Dudayev's armed forces Aslan Maskhadov in the Sleptsovskaya community in Ingushetia. The talks are to continue on February 15.

The Russian Defense Ministry official said that the Air Force would refrain from strikes against illegal-armed formations until ordered otherwise. The source also said that if the talks were a success, the aviation could halt combat operations in Chechnya altogether.

The Russian federal troops command and Aslan Maskhadov on February 13 agreed to temporarily cease the use of heavy artillery.

Federal Troops Gain Control Over Chechen Areas

LD1402155695 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1531 GMT 14 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow February 14 TASS—The press service of the Russian Government relayed on Tuesday to ITAR-TASS the following report:

"According to a report of the Defence Ministry, federal troops have been fulfilling the assigned tasks in the past day. The northern group of forces was transferring to interior forces the territories cleared of Chechen militants and was withdrawing artillery units from the populated locality Tolstoy-Yurt. The western and southern groups, overcoming resistance of scattered groups of militants, expanded the control of areas.

"The situation in Gudermes remains complicated. The retreating Dudayev units are concentrating there. The headquarters for coordination of the antiwar movement were set up in Gudermes. It is sought to establish the constitutional order in a peaceful way. Work to force militants out of the district is conducted jointly with Moslem clergy, elders and representatives of the local administration.

"According to the information of the Russian Interior Ministry, units of the Russian ministry for emergencies and engineer troops began clearing debris in downtown Grozny. Medical aid is given to sick and wounded. Food products and water are delivered to the city. The baking of bread will soon begin.

"Units of interior forces and militia in Grozny conducted operations to disarm illegal armed units. One militant was killed. Fifteen people suspected of crimes were detained. Interior forces and militia confiscated two grenade launchers, six submachine guns, two TT pistols, three hunting guns, five small-bore rifles, a sawn-off gun, a Zu-23 antiaircraft installation, one hundred mines, 185 charges to grenade launchers, 111 grenades, 93 shells and more than 21,000 cartridges. A grenade launcher and 23 charges to it were destroyed.

"The safety of movement of convoys on Chervlennaya-Kizlyar route was ensured.

"On the night to February 14, militants raided a checkpoint in Pervomaiskiy Street, opening fire. There were no casualties. In the area of the Grebenskiy Bridge, fire was open on a post from grenade launchers and fire arms from the opposite bank of the Terek. The fire was suppressed.

"Interior bodies of the Chechen Republic are being formed. The district interior bodies in the Nadterechnyy district have been fully manned. Personnel questions are being solved to complete the formation of interior bodies in Naur, Shilkovski, Urus-Martan, Grozny, Shatoy and Staropromyslovy districts of Chechnya.

Because of food shortages in Grozny, army and police share their rations with famished people residing in the areas of the dairy-plant and the cannery."

Chechen Information Minister on Current Situation

LD1402173295 Moscow Radiostantsiya Ekho Moskv in Russian 1600 GMT 14 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Despite the agreement reached yesterday on a temporary cease-fire from heavy weapons, federal troops continue to use artillery in Chechnya. Our radio station was told this today by Movladi Udugov, the Chechen minister of information and the press:

[Begin Udugov recording] Artillery and missile strikes were carried out today on Argun, the settlement of Chechen-Aul and also a number of other sectors, including Alkhan-Yurt, the settlement of Goyty and the Goyty crossroads. The positions of the government forces of the Chechen republic and people's militia forces also came under artillery and missile fire along the Argun river. One cannot say that the shelling was as intense as it was a few days ago, but still the shelling went on. The news of the start of some kind of talks process gave rise to hope in many people, but one can hardly trust the Russian command, and one can hardly trust Russia today. [end recording]

However, an official spokesman of the Russian Air Force's main command said today that the Air Force had stopped air strikes on Chechen positions. The military spokesman pointed out that aviation would not be used until further instructions are given in this respect. The command of the federal troop grouping in Chechnya is already considering the possibility of changing the methods of conducting combat operations. INTERFAX reports this citing sources in Mozdok. Among other things, a proposal is being examined whereby armed forces sub-units do not enter populated areas but set up roadblocks at entry and exit points. A final decision will be taken depending on the results of tomorrow's talks between the federal troops command and the leadership

of the Chechen armed forces. Movladi Udugov also told us what would be discussed during tomorrow's round of the dialogue.

[Begin Udugov recording] Questions on a cease-fire, on an exchange of the gravely wounded, on the withdrawal of troops to safe distances and a number of other questions—in other words, questions of a purely military nature. The Chechen side has more than once indicated, is now indicating and will continue to indicate that the main thing which is needed now is to stop the killing and the violence and to allow the people who are virtually hostages in the city of Grozny to somehow come out of the cellars. This would be the start of a real stable situation on the territory of the northern Caucasus, and the prevention of this conflict getting hold of a huge area of Russian territory. [end recording]

In his interview with 'Ekho Moskvy', Udugov said that President Dudayev and Aslan Maskhadov, chief of the Chechen main staff, today discussed the next stage of the talks. For his part, General Lev Rokhlin, commander of the northern group of Russian troops in Chechnya, said today that the talks with Maskhadov could not be successful because Maskhadov does not embody all the authority of Dudayev's supporters. Movladi Udugov, again:

[Begin Udugov recording] I have to say that General Rokhlin is right about one thing: Maskhadov does not, indeed, embody such political power. Maskhadov is a general who in practical terms heads the armed forces of the Chechen Republic, and he carries out his duties strictly in accordance with the laws of the Chechen Republic. As for General Rokhlin's hint that the main staff does not control all the armed sub-units, here I can say quite clearly that this is untrue. The main staff of the armed forces of the Chechen Republic in practical terms is one hundred percent in control of all the armed sub-units on the territory of the Chechen Republic. At the same time, the Chechen side and the main staff, and the state security department, and other special sub-units of the Chechen armed forces and special services are able to produce thousands of pieces of evidence that the Russian command is in fact not in control of the situation of its armed forces on the territory of the Chechen Republic. Suffice to say that looting is going on in the city of Grozny and the villages of Petropavlovskaya and Pervomayskaya, the settlement of Dolinskiy, Nadterechnyy rayon, Tolstoy-Yurt, Znamenskoye and other villages. [end recording]

Chernomyrdin Says Government Ready for Talks With Chechens

LD1402171095 Moscow *ITAR-TASS in English* 1654 GMT 14 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Bratislava February 14 TASS—Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin said on Tuesday that the Russian Government is open for talks with any of Chechen field commanders "provided they could influence the situation in Chechnya from the opposite side".

Commenting on a limited truce agreed on Monday during a meeting between commanders of federal troops and Aslan Maskhadov, chief of Dudayev's staff, Chernomyrdin told TASS that it was "a normal action which had been approved beforehand".

However the negotiations held on Monday in an Ingushi village were limited strictly to military matters.

According to the prime minister, Nikolay Semenov, head of the federal administration in Chechnya in the rank of vice-premier, is authorised by the government to hold political negotiations..

"If there is anyone to talk to on a political level, we have there a special body headed by Semenov", Chernomyrdin said.

The prime minister noted that another deputy prime minister will go to Chechnya soon to oversee reconstruction of the republic's economy.

"We are ready for negotiations, which can suspend actions of the military, in order to settle this problem as soon as possible", the prime minister said.

Peace Talks To Resume 15 Feb

LD1402171495 Moscow *ITAR-TASS in English* 1655 GMT 14 Feb 95

[By *ITAR-TASS* correspondent Ruslan Maisigov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Nazran, Ingushetia February 14 TASS—The second stage of negotiations between commander of federal troops in Chechnya Col. Gen. Anatoly Kulikov and separatist forces' chief-of-staff Aslan Maskhadov will take place on Wednesday at the airport "Ingushetia" situated in the village of Ordzhonikidzevskaya, a source in the Ingushi Government told TASS on Tuesday.

The first round of talks on Monday resulted in a limited cease-fire suspending the use of heavy artillery and missiles.

Russian-Chechen Talks Previewed

LD1502085995 Moscow *ITAR-TASS in English* 0817 GMT 15 Feb 95

[By *ITAR-TASS* Correspondent Ruslan Maysigov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Nazran February 15—Wednesday's round of talks between commandment of the federal forces in Chechnya and Dudayev's envoy will be "difficult and arduous", Ingushetian Vice-President Boris Agapov predicts.

"It is easy to begin a war, but to put an end to it is harder," Agapov told *ITAR-TASS*.

On February 13, Agapov participated in the first round of talks between Aslan Maskhadov, chief of headquarters

of Dudayev's forces, and Colonel-General Anatoliy Kulikov, commander of the grouping of federal troops in Chechnya.

Wednesday's round of talks are to be held in the "Ingushetia" airport at the Cossack village of Ordzhonikidzevskaya (the Sunzhen District, Ingushetia) in accordance with a previous agreement, a source inside the Ingushetian Government told ITAR-TASS on Wednesday [15 February].

The source failed to specify content of the forthcoming talks. However, Maskhadov pointed out earlier that he is empowered by Dudayev to discuss "exclusively military issues".

According to Agapov, both parties set about the talks, which are aimed, in the long run, at cessation of hostilities, in earnest.

For the time being, both parties seem likely to reach an agreement on refraining from usage of heavy artillery, aviation, tube rocket artillery, right up to grenade launchers, Agapov said.

Both parties are expected to come to terms on Wednesday on a mechanism for exchanging POWs and for searching, conveying and burying the lost, the Ingushetian vice-premier said. In his opinion, this point is one of the most complicated, since there is no front-line in Chechnya.

As ITAR-TASS reported previously, in the course of the first round of talks, in which General Anatoliy Kvashin participated, both parties reached an agreement on cessation of firing heavy guns, and tackled the issue of conveyance of bodies of killed militants to the Chechen party.

Second Round of Talks Begins

LD1502092795 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0851 GMT 15 Feb 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Ruslan Maysigov]

[FBIS Translated Text] Ordzhonikidzevskaya (Ingushetia), 15 Feb—In accordance with a previously reached agreement, the second round of negotiations started at 1130 today between the federal troop command and Dudayev's representative in the village of Ordzhonikidzevskaya, Sunzhenskiy rayon. The delegations are headed by Colonel General Anatoliy Kulikov, commander of the group of federal troops in Chechnya, and Aslan Makhnadov, chief of staff of Dudayev's forces. The mediator at the talks is Ingushetia's Vice President Boris Agapov.

'Normal Atmosphere' Reported

LD1502111595 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0959 GMT 15 Feb 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Ruslan Maysigov]

[FBIS Translated Text] Ordzhonikidzevskaya (Ingushetia), 15 Feb—The second round of talks between Colonel General Anatoliy Kulikov and Aslan Maskhadov, Dudayev's chief of staff, have started "in a normal atmosphere," Petr Kosov, adviser to the president of Ingushetia, reported to an ITAR-TASS correspondent after the first hour of talks.

"Shamil Basayev, one of the most authoritative field commanders in Dudayev's forces, has joined the negotiating process," Kosov reported. "This person wields great influence among the people's militia."

The Ingush president's adviser added that both sides understand "how difficult it will be to reach an agreement on a real cease-fire, but they are honestly searching for a way to do it."

"Both sides have the inclination to reach agreement," he said.

At the same time, Kosov noted that both sides were exchanging fire last night.

Moscow Said Making 'Unrealistic Demands'

LD1502143695 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1424 GMT 15 Feb 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Ruslan Maisigov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Ordzhonikidze, Ingushetia February 15 TASS—Chechnya accused Russia of making unrealistic demands at the negotiations in Ingushetia, urging Chechen militants to surrender all heavy weapons.

The talks launched on Monday have already produced a two-day ceasefire effective midnight Wednesday to exchange the wounded and pick up the bodies from the streets of the Chechen capital Grozny.

However, Shamil Basayev, an influential Chechen field commander, told ITAR-TASS that the talks were moving slowly and hard because the Russian delegation made unrealistic demands, including a surrender of all heavy weapons by Chechen forces.

He said that after a ceasefire had become effective, all problems would have to be resolved peaceably by political means. "We suggest solving all problems on the basis of international law, not the Russian legislation. Russia has shown that Chechnya does not belong to it because no one wages such a war against one's own hinterland," Basayev said.

"I do not like a war, nor do I like waging a war, but I have to," Basayev said, explaining how he had ended up in Chechen President Dzhokhar Dudayev's forces. He said that in peacetime he would like to be a land planning specialist.

The ceasefire agreement in Chechnya was reached at today's talks between Colonel-General Anatoliy

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Kulikov, the commander of the Russian federal forces in Chechnya, and Aslan Maskhadov, the chief of staff of Dudayev's forces.

Negotiations will continue on Friday.

Ingush President Ruslan Aushev said earlier today he was optimistic about the outcome of the Moscow-Groznyy negotiations after the first round brought about a decline in the intensity of fighting in the conflict zone.

The State Duma (the lower house of Russian parliament) welcomed the agreement and said that it was "ready to actively participate in the peace process".

Moscow, Groznyy Agree 2-Day Cease-Fire

LD1502125495 Moscow *ITAR-TASS in English* 1246 GMT 15 Feb 95

[By *ITAR-TASS* correspondent Ruslan Maisigov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Ordzhonikidzevskaya, Ingush Republic, February 15 TASS—An agreement on a complete two-day ceasefire in Chechnya was reached at today's talks between Colonel-General Anatoliy Kulikov, the commander of the Russian federal forces in Chechnya, and Aslan Maskhadov, the chief of staff of the Dudayev armed forces.

This was announced by a Chechen field commander Shamil Basayev after the end of today's round of talks.

The influential field commander said the ceasefire agreement was due to take effect at midnight on Wednesday to Thursday.

Negotiations will continue on Friday.

Further on Cease-Fire

LD1502154795 Moscow *INTERFAX in English* 1449 GMT 15 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] NAZRAN, Feb 15 (Interfax)—Russia and Chechnya on Wednesday agreed to a two-day cease-fire on all types of weapons, a source close to the leadership of the Russian republic of Ingushetia told Interfax.

The truce agreement, coming into force on Wednesday, was reached during talks between Russian and Chechen military commanders, which were mediated by Ingush Vice President Boris Agapov and are to resume on Friday.

The two sides also agreed to exchange dead and wounded, but in concrete terms the matter will be discussed later. The Chechen side gave the Russian commanders lists of Russian soldiers and officers taken prisoner but said it would exchange none of them for captured Chechen civilians.

Wednesday's round of talks, as the preceding one, took place in Ingushetia's Sleptsovskaya village.

The Ingush president's adviser Pyotr Kosov, who was present at the talks, described the atmosphere at them as "normal" and "constructive."

According to Agapov, the negotiators were the commanders of Russian army and Interior Ministry forces in Chechnya, Generals Anatoliy Kvashnin and Anatoliy Kulikov, and Chechen military chief of staff Aslan Maskhadov. But Kosov said "one of the influential commanders of (Chechen) volunteers, Shamil Basayev," had also been present.

Maskhadov told Interfax before Wednesday's meeting began that Monday's heavy weapons cease-fire had been violated. "You can't just simply stop fire the moment you want it. There are many problems which will take days to solve," nor were terms for the cease-fire fully agreed, he said. "Such terms will be worked on today, so that fire actually is stopped," the Chechen commander said.

An Interfax correspondent reported from Sleptsovskaya that the Russian generals had come to the village by helicopter, as on Monday. Maskhadov arrived by car, escorted by several dozen bodyguards.

As Monday's meeting, Wednesday's talks were held in the building of the village airport, guarded by large details of Russian riot police and Chechen volunteers.

Entry into the airport was controlled by Ingush police.

Relative Calm Overnight in Groznyy, No Artillery, Gunfire

LD1502154595 Moscow *INTERFAX in English* 1449 GMT 15 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Groznyy, Feb 15 (Interfax)—There was relative calm overnight in Groznyy and no artillery or gunfire could be heard, our correspondent reports from the Chechen capital.

This follows the similar calm on the eve of the first round of talks between Russian and Chechen military commanders held on Monday. Our correspondent says the two sides may have ordered their troops to stop fighting on the eve of the second round at Sleptsovskaya Village, Ingushetia.

Although the cease-fire agreement was reached on Monday, our correspondent says Russian forces mounted artillery fire on Chechen positions late on Monday and throughout the day on Tuesday. For their part, Chechen forces retaliated with rocket fire against Russian tanks as they advanced towards the populated center of Goytyy (20 kilometers southwest of Groznyy).

Aushev Notes Danger of Chechen War Spreading to Ingushetia

LD1502154695 Moscow *INTERFAX in English* 1449 GMT 15 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, Feb 15 (Interfax)—The danger of the Chechen War spreading to Ingushetia

still exists, Ingush President Ruslan Aushev told Interfax on Wednesday. He said, at the same time, that he was "making every effort to prevent the war's spread."

According to his sources, combat operations in Chechnya are becoming less intensive and "there is definite confidence" that the talks between Russian General Anatoly Kulikov and Chechen General Aslad Maskhadov under Ingushetia's mediation, "will gradually untangle this bloody knot" and ward off the danger of the Chechen conflict spreading to other republics.

"The termination of combat operations in Chechnya is being slowed down by the leaders' and commanders' emotions and lack of information," said Aushev. "Many are driven by the wish to avenge their dead relatives," he added.

He said he was skeptical about the expediency of introducing a state of emergency in Chechnya "even after the end of combat operations."

In his opinion "the algorithm of the Chechen settlement demands, foremost, the disengagement of the troops and the creation of a peace zone." "After medical aid has been given to the wounded and the problem of the POWs and the dead has been solved, one might pass over to political settlement of the conflict," he said.

He announced that according to the latest reports, 98,000 refugees from Chechnya had been registered in Ingushetia. He said that the influx of refugees is lessening as combat operations become less intensive.

Dudayev Planning To Call Chechen People's Congress

LD1502160895 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1449 GMT 15 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, February 15 (Interfax)—Dzhokhar Dudayev is planning to call a congress of the Chechen people some time soon, Chairman of the Duma Subcommittee on Federative Relations Vladimir Lysenko said at a news conference he held jointly with Chairman of the Duma Federation Committee Sergey Shapovalov Wednesday [15 February] in Moscow. The Chechen congress will be expected to oppose the idea of negotiations with Moscow, Lysenko said.

Shapovalov (Russian Unity and Accord Party) briefed newsmen on moves by his expert council, founded late last month on decision of the Federation committee. The council is to "find a mechanism for settling the Chechen crisis." It brings together, among others, a member of the Presidential Council, political scientist Emil Pain and the first deputy director of the Federal Counterintelligence Service Anatoliy Safonov.

On February 23 the expert council is expected to consider who can be chosen as Moscow's negotiating partner in Chechnya and under what conditions Moscow may be advised to launch negotiations with Chechen leaders.

Last week Lysenko requested President Yeltsin's Chief-of-Staff Sergei Filatov to call, immediately, a conference on ways to settle the Chechen crisis, Lysenko said in response to a question from Interfax. According to Filatov, this kind of a conference cannot be called earlier than next April or May, which is "absolutely unacceptable," from Lysenko's point of view, since we could come to witness "the most undesirable turn of the Chechen developments by next April or May." Lysenko leads the Republican Party of Russia.

General Says Chechen 'Marauders' Should Be Shot

LD1402192195 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1700 GMT 14 Feb 95

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[FBIS Translated Text] General Lev Rokhlin, commander of the Russian Army's northern group of troops deployed in Chechnya, believes that the conflict, in spite of its acuteness and seriousness, can be halted. Recalling his war experience, Lieutenant General Rokhlin said:

[Begin Rokhlin recording] The first thing to me, for example—even when fighting in Afghanistan—was weapons, if there was no other way [sentence as heard]. And after that there should be bread and other help. And this, the second—bread and help—was always more effective than weapons. And if the right policy is implemented, if no marauding is tolerated, if marauders are shot on the spot—on the spot, as it was during the hard days of the Great Patriotic War—I believe there can be negotiations and peace process. If not much of this is implemented, of course, it can develop in quite the opposite way. But the possibilities for peace are there. [end recording]

General Rokhlin believes that if force has to be used again, this will not present much difficulty with the experience gained in taking such settlements as Argun, Gudermes, and Shali and should not result in mass casualties. Tomorrow General Rokhlin returns to Chechnya.

Report on Chechen Mafia in Moscow Area

954F1272A Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 4 Feb 95 p 20

[Report from Crime Desk: "Chechen Devil Represented as Worst of All"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The regional organized crime administrations of the GUV D [City Internal Affairs Administration] of Moscow and St. Petersburg several days ago conducted operations directed against one of the most dangerous, in the opinion of the militia, criminal structures—the Chechen crime grouping. Representatives of the GUOP [Main Administration for Organized Crime] of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia at the same time stated that the Chechen bandits had allegedly stepped up their activity again after a certain pause

caused by the events in Chechnya—Chechen names again began to be seen in militia reports on extortion, robbery, and theft. But the history of this grouping, undoubtedly one of the most influential in Central Russia, which for some reason has not been publicized by the Main Administration for Organized Crime, is of undoubted interest.

Appearance and Dissolution of the Chechen Grouping

According to GUOP data, the Chechen organized crime formation originated in Moscow toward the middle of 1987. At the head of the structure, which was distinguished by its strict centralized control, were the figures of authority Ruslan, Lecho-Lysyy, and Khoza. The Chechens, as distinct from Slavic or Georgian criminal groupings, from the very beginning refused to recognize any "thieves'" laws or authority, preferring to follow their own traditions of ancestral clans. This was one of the main reasons for their constant conflicts with the Moscow crime groupings.

As a result, the Chechens were not present at the conference of capital gangsters in Dagomys, held in 1988, where leaders of crime groupings divided Moscow into spheres of influence (KOMMERSANT-DAILY covered this event in 1991). They announced that they themselves would take what they wanted. After a series of successful operations the Chechens were able to overshadow the most influential Moscow criminal formations (such as the Solntsevskoye, Balashikhinskoye, Lyuberskoye, and Dolgoprudenskoye) and assume a dominant position in the capital.

But this tactic did not lead to success after that. The attention of the public and the mass media was focused on the formation's criminal activity. The press was glad to publish articles on crimes committed by "individuals of Caucasian nationalities," who for some reason were associated in the readers' mind with Chechens, although there were also Ingush, Ossetian, Georgian, and Dagestani criminal groupings operating in the capital. It should also be noted that far from the last role in the formation of the public's sharply negative attitude toward the "Chechen problem" was played by the clearly expressed anti-Russian position of the government of Dzhokhar Dudayev. The ordinary person got the impression that there were no gangsters in Moscow except for Chechens.

It is worth noting that the leaders of the Chechen community in Moscow, to put it mildly, did not support Dudayev's policy. The idea of the separation of Chechnya from Russia was disadvantageous to them, primarily because of business considerations. The Chechens controlled or shared with Moscow criminal groupings the Berlin, Sevastopol, Sputnik, Orlenok, Yuzhnaya, Rossiya, Zolotoye Koltso, Moskva, Molo-dezhnaya, Voskhod, Aeroflot, and Sarya hotels, and also the Marfino and Izmaylovo hotel complexes. They also had control of large banks (for obvious reasons their names were not divulged).

At the end of 1991 law enforcement organs dealt their first serious blow to the Chechen grouping: Lecho-Lysyy,

Ruslan, and Khoza were arrested. The unified community split into separate criminal groups, each of which had its own leaders. Among them were Richard, the Talarov brothers, Gennadiy Arakelov (his grouping had 100 members), and Sultan Balashikhinskiy. Sultan was the only legal thief among the Chechens. As distinct from other Chechen authorities, he was in favor of a "milder" invasion by his countrymen into the Russian criminal environment. Sultan thought like this: The less war and bloodshed there is, the greater the income and the easier it is to resist law enforcement organs. His friends included well-known authority figures of the Slavic groupings. But this position did not find support among his countrymen. Sultan finally separated from them, took charge of his own brigade in Balashikhe, and peacefully divided up the territory with the leader of the local grouping, Sergey Frolov (who was killed at the end of 1993). Sultan himself was killed in March 1994.

Specialization and an Attempt at Integration

Toward the middle of 1992 Ministry of Internal Affairs workers announced that the Chechen groupings had begun to specialize in economic crimes. KOMMERSANT-DAILY has already noted repeatedly that they were the ones who began to engage in theft of funds with false letters of advice and theft of credit from commercial banks. According to the official Ministry of Internal Affairs version, a large part of the stolen funds were converted and transferred to foreign banks, and then, through dummy structures, reinvested in the Russian economy. Large commercial structures engaging in foreign economic activity were placed under Chechen control. Leaders of the groupings began to invest money in exporting ferrous and rare earth metals, oil, and timber. The Chechen-controlled commercial structures began to show an interest in the Ural region, one of the main sources of strategic raw material for export. This largely explains the large-scale criminal investigations that took place in Yekaterinburg in the autumn of 1992. But, as Ministry of Internal Affairs workers note, crimes which have clearly distinguished criminal features (robbery or murder) have become ancillary for the Chechens.

It is worth noting that the Chechen leaders (with rare exceptions) have tried not to maintain close relations with the government of Dzhokhar Dudayev—in order not to be betrayed once again. Many of them stubbornly refused to invest their groupings' money in the organization of the army of the independent Chechen republic. Moreover, at the end of 1992 and the beginning of 1993 the Chechens conceded leadership in the financial sphere to other Caucasian criminal groupings—mainly Ingush and Armenian. Statistical data from the Central Bank of Russia, which a KOMMERSANT-DAILY correspondent had a chance to peruse, show that during 1994 all the false letters of advice discovered by its workers came from the territory of Ingushetia.

The situation that had developed by the end of 1992 made it possible to speak of the possibility that the

Chechen groupings would again join into one. Their leaders had taken possession of large sums of capital. If necessary they could place 3,000 men "under arms." To many of the leaders it was obvious that if they were to unite, they would be a significant force. Therefore the danger of the unification of the Chechens was quite obvious to the criminal groupings of the capital as well—both Slavic and Caucasian.

The duty of "reaching agreement" on cooperation among the criminal groupings was taken on by the Talarov brothers—Musa ("Starik") and Vaytsa ("Vakha") since they were among the most respected leaders. Their first negotiations showed that unification was possible. The more so since all of them were afraid to fight openly alongside the Chechens. But this did not come to pass—the Talarovs were hampered by law enforcement organs, which were also against the unification of the Chechens. In November 1992 Vakha and several members of his group were arrested and accused of robbing a person.

The Investigator Had To Apologize

Talarov and members of his grouping were accused of robbing the head bookkeeper of the Prometey foreign economic association, Aleksandr Malyshev. At that time the law enforcement organs were familiar with that association—in May 1992 two false letters of advice for an overall total of R710 million passed through it (KOMMERSANT-DAILY covered this matter in detail at the end of December 1994). Workers of the Ministry of Internal Affairs investigating committee who had investigated the thefts assumed that Prometey's general director, Aleksandr Ivanenko, was in on them, but they were unable to prove this and Ivanenko went into hiding. The investigators also established that the president of this association, Svetlana Abakanovich, was not a party to the theft—she was not in Russia at the time.

Abakanovich did not refuse to cooperate with the investigation and turned over all the necessary documents. At the same time, workers of the Moscow Main Internal Affairs Administration had received operational information that, with help from Vakha, she intended to get from Ivanenko "her share" of the money that had been stolen through the association. To do this, Vakha's people more or less robbed Malyshev, the head bookkeeper at Prometey. He did not want to pay and suggested that Vakha deal with the Ingush criminal grouping, which had organized the theft with the false letters of advice.

Vakha did not get a chance to speak with the Ingush—instead of them, workers of the Russian Organized Crime Administration [RUOP] came to him at the end of October and arrested him and several of his henchmen. The next day they arrested Svetlana Abakanovich. The case was turned over for investigation to the Seventh Department of the investigation administration of the Moscow City Internal Affairs Administration.

Those who were arrested testified that they had not robbed Malyshev but had simply spoken with him—first in the restaurant Kore (across from the Butyrskiy SIZO) and then in his private apartment. Malyshev asserted the opposite and showed workers of the Seventh Department of the City Internal Affairs Administration reports that his ribs had been broken (different ribs were indicated in different reports).

Those who were arrested were sentenced two years after the beginning of the investigation. Those under investigation, except for Abakanovich (she was detained in a single cell for only a year), were kept under guard the whole time. In the trial Malyshev stated that no one had stolen anything from him. The case fell apart. In order at least to justify the actions of the militiamen, the judge for some reason charged all those arrested with arbitrary behavior (Article 200 of the Criminal Code of Russia). After the sentence was handed down on 28 December 1994 all the accused were released from the courtroom because they had served their prison sentences. An investigator in charge of the case in the Main Internal Affairs Administration came to the last court session and apologized to all the accused.

The Chechen Groupings Today

And so the attempt to unite the Chechen groupings into one failed. Left without Vakha's powerful support, Starik, like Sultan Balashikhinskiy as well, tried to reach an agreement with the leaders of the Slavic groupings and even began to pay into the "common pot." The Chechen leaders did not understand this and refused to cooperate with Starik. His attempt to reach an agreement with Ruslan, who had been released at the beginning of 1993, had no success either. Starik left for Chechnya.

But Vakha's arrest and Starik's departure did not weaken the Chechen groupings. This is shown if only by the fact that in August 1993 the Chechens killed the brother of Otari Kvantrishvili Amiran. Otari did not seek revenge—according to the version of the Moscow gangsters, he was afraid to quarrel with the Chechen leaders but he could not arrange relations with them either. Therefore after Otari's death, the "Chechen version" of the murder was one of the first to be put forth, but it, incidentally, was not confirmed.

The Chechen groupings maintained control over all the commercial structures they "held" by the end of 1992. From time to time there would be rumors in Moscow that the "Chechens are leaving," but they were never confirmed—their financial interests would not allow them to leave the capital. The groupings did not lose power after the murder of Gena Arakelov and several other Chechen leaders.

The Chechens themselves admit that Moscow was the hardest of all the places for them to work. As before, the ordinary citizen thinks "a person of Caucasian nationality" is a Chechen. This also explains the fact that the Chechens have calmed down somewhat, and it is not at

all because of the war in Chechnya, as representatives of the Main Administration on Organized Crime assert. Nor did the release of Vakhya cause the Chechen groupings to become more active.

But the militiamen are prepared for a new influx of guests from Chechnya. They are certain that after the end of the Chechen campaign a number of combat groupings (according to operational information, they have been trained in special private centers located in Estonia) will move to Moscow and try to get into the capital crime business. The Main Organized Crime Administration thinks that some of them, following Dudayev, will declare a "holy war"—gazavat—on the Russians.

Warning of a gazavat, workers of RUOP the arrested "seven active participants in the Chechen criminal community who were engaging in extortion and weapons trade." In the apartment of one of those arrested alone they confiscated two Mukha grenade launchers, 10 Kalashnikov automatics, 20 pistols, a Simonov semiautomatic carbine, a magnetic mine, 2.5 kg of TNT, 11 grenades, and about 4,000 cartridges. During the course of the operation they confiscated from the Chechens 161 units of firearms, 16,000 cartridges, 21 grenades, and 18 kg of explosives. At the same time the St. Petersburg RUOP arrested five members of a local Chechen grouping who were suspected of organizing the murders of several local merchants and two guests of the city from Azerbaijan. While searching the apartments of those arrested they confiscated a large quantity of firearms and bladed weapons and also blank command forms with seals of the Chechen state security service. They were put into circulation when it was necessary to explain to the St. Petersburg militiamen what armed "individuals of Caucasian nationality" were doing in the city.

But, most likely, there is no need to fear that the Chechen groupings will enlist in the gazavat and begin to blow up subway stations and railroad bridges. They understand quite well that this would only complicate their already difficult relations with local criminals and law enforcement organs. And this would have a negative effect on their financial position, which, of course, would be disadvantageous to them.

City in Samara Oblast Fights Mafia

954F1172A Samara SAMARSKIYE IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 Jan 95 p 4

[Article by the press service of the administration for organized crime under the Directorate of Internal Affairs of Samara Oblast: "Protection of the Mafia: Money, Arms, Sensation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Organized crime, if one is to speak briefly about the content of this concept, is nothing other than groups of people who have united to derive criminal super-incomes. Money is the whole idea.

The biggest profits are achieved when crime begins to exploit the economy, and from this comes the well-known endeavor of mafia structures to penetrate and consolidate itself in the highly effective branches of the economy.

In this respect, the city of Togliatti is unique not only here in the oblast but also in Russia. Competitive national production is concentrated here as nowhere else. While on the whole in the country the export of industrial products does not exceed 10 percent, it reaches 30-40 percent in the largest Togliatti enterprises. The volume of Togliatti industrial production exceeded the overall oblast's industrial production in 1993 by 40 percent.

These economic factors, but primarily the presence in the city of the motor vehicle giant VAZ [Red Banner Volga Motor Vehicle Plant imeni 50 years of the USSR], given the long-existing shortage of passenger cars, transformed Togliatti into a unique regional center of organized crime. The scales of its typical manifestations are a striking illustration of this. Thus, the level of grave crimes per 10,000 population here exceeds the oblast average by 60 percent, and, in comparison with Samara, by more than 100 percent. Of 40 unsolved contract homicides and homicides due to confrontations between feuding groups that were selected according to manner of execution from the total number committed in the oblast, 70 percent involve Togliatti.

The greatest crime-conducive activity is manifested in the city by about two dozen organized criminal formations that extend their influence to some of the commercial and entrepreneurial structures that have colossal incomes from the crime business (there is data on their receiving up to several dozen motor vehicles in the form of so-called "kickbacks" just from individual transactions involving the acquisition and sale of VAZ products).

Criminal capital is capable of producing 1,000 percent and up in profit. From here comes the anarchy that criminal formations create, beginning with internal confrontations accompanied by bursts of machine gun fire in populated places and ending with the physical removal, regardless of rank, of objectionable representatives of economic and state structures. Everyone remembers the daring murder of R. Yagutyan, assistant oblast procurator for Togliatti city.

It is necessary to have true courage to fight this "monster." The main burden of this task is carried by the Togliatti branch for controlling organized crime under the UVD [Directorate of Internal Affairs] of Samara Oblast.

In 1994 alone this relatively small subunit exposed and solved 89 crimes, stopped the activity of 50 organized criminal groups, and arrested 128 of their members for committing crimes. Twenty individual firearms were confiscated from the criminals, including five assault rifles, eight pistols, and 154 rounds of ammunition, including 14 grenades, and valuables for a sum of R13.698 million.

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During the arrest of one of the crime bosses of a criminal gang, four kilograms of gold and about \$5 million were confiscated (a very convincing example of the strength and power of the opposing side). All told in 1994, according to materials of the Togliatti UOP [not further identified] branch, three leaders out of a total number of not more than one and a half dozen who were the conductors of criminal policy in the region were charged with criminal responsibility. From the standpoint of professional practitioners the task is extremely difficult, given the existing legislation.

It is quite natural that the Togliatti branch is a bone in the throat of the organized criminal structures and their corrupt patrons. Their cherished dream is to paralyze its activity. All the resources for this are good (in monetary terms, in contrast to the state, they are not experiencing any difficulty).

What is amazing in this connection is that individual newspaper editorial offices take the side of criminal structures. With respect to an official state law enforcement organ, they permit expressions of the type: "A legalized gang of the sixth branch," "just like SS troops," and unfounded accusations can be heard regarding connections of the sixth branch with criminal gangs...

The authors of such publications evidently do not understand that by printing the unverified "confessions" of persons under investigation, or of their representatives, they are helping to splatter a whole stream of undeserved dirt on the pages of the press against people who are obligated according to service duty to fight crime (of those named in publications, Konovalov is charged with 19 episodes of criminal activity, including 17 instances of taking bribes; Vdovin is involved in a case of gangsterism and illegal possession of firearms).

Who gains from this? The impression is created that some authors do not know (or are they displaying obvious disrespect?) of a number of provisions in the Law on the Mass Media (Articles 4, 49, 51, and 59) that stipulate responsibility, including criminal responsibility, for their violation, in particular, failure to comply with such journalistic duties as verification of information reported.

Instead of this, it is proposed to arrange discussions between the accused and the accusers on the pages of the press, giving the first word to the accused and kindly offering the second word to representatives of law enforcement organs—they say, justify yourselves!

Press monitoring of the activity of law enforcement organs is undoubtedly useful. But it should be conducted within the framework of the law and decency. Cheap sensationalism obviously has no place in cases concerning people's lives, property, and tranquility.

Kemerovo Admin Grants to Church Derided

954F1197A Kemerovo KUZNETSKIY KRAY in
Russian 5 Jan 95 p 2

[Article by Vladimir Popok, under the "Financial-Religious" heading: "Political Commissars Trade Red Army Caps for Cassocks"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The oblast administration's press center reported on Patriarch Aleksiy's letter to Governor Mikhail. It had been sent on the occasion of the opening in Kemerovo an Orthodox Faith Institute branch, which will graduate highly trained clerics. The patriarch thanked the governor for supporting the church and noted: "The region headed by you is in particular need of our understanding and care."

Meanwhile these sinners—the deputies of the oblast's legislative assembly—are working on a decree that may be passed at one of the assembly's nearest sessions. It is called: "On Suspending Financing for the Construction of the Orthodox Ecclesiastical Center." The elected representatives of the people, for whom apparently the road to salvation is closed from now on, do not consider it their priority to fill the ideological vacuum that has emerged after the debunking of communist ideals, or returning to the Orthodox Church the cathedrals that the Communists had converted to use as clubs, schools, or vegetable storage facilities, as well as construction of new ones. The people's elected representatives, especially persistent among whom is the chairman of the culture committee, Igor Kovtun (who says he is a baptized Christian), consider the problem of housing construction a priority. Contrary to what the patriarch says, they maintain that this is the kind of "understanding and care" needed by Christians living in a number of Kuzbass population centers in barracks that have existed, judging by their condition, since the times of the pious Noah.

KUZNETSKIY KRAY editors have in their possession several documents that evidence, first, a close coordination between Kuzbass' executive authority and the Orthodox Church, and second, of considerable funds allocated by the governor's orders to the sustenance of church folks in Kuzbass. For instance, on 1 February 1994 a decree came out, signed by M.B. Kislyuk, on assistance in erecting the Orthodox Ecclesiastical Center in Kemerovo. According to his decree, financing was to be as follows: 1994—R2 billion, and 1995—R1.8 billion. Earlier, on 12 January, an agreement was signed on coordinated action between the administration's GlavUKS [Main Capital Construction Administration] and the administration of the Orthodox Center under construction. And even before the aforementioned agreement and decrees were signed, R100 million had been transferred to the center administration's account in 1993.

On 19 April a conference was held, chaired by deputy head of administration N.M. Slastenkov, on the subject of continuing the Ecclesiastical Center's construction. At

the same conference, a decision was made to sign a contract with the Union Engineering company to do interior finishing work on the Sunday school building. Union Engineering is the one that worked on the airport's reconstruction and built an Orthodox chapel in Kemerovo, in the part of the city near the former oblast committee of the Communist Party.

By the way, the decision to build a chapel on the grounds of the "wishes of the population" was made on 29 August 1993, when Patriarch Aleksiy participated in the Miners Day celebrations. The contract set the cost of work at \$947,680. The plan was that the administration in a way will loan this money to the miners, who later, in honor of the fallen comrades to whom this chapel-monument was being erected, will pay the dollars back into the budget. As of 1 October 1994, coal enterprises had contributed R398 million (not dollars!), while the GlavUKS paid to the aforementioned company more than R2 billion and still owes as much.

In light of this information, one may assume that the oblast administration will not stop at the aforementioned amounts of charitable expenditures but will increase them, prompting the Orthodox fathers to write more thank-you letters. Another piece evidence in favor of validity of this assumption is the fact that since a certain time the "church complex" was placed on the list of the oblast's priority programs. According to unofficial information, this happened after Mikhail Kislyuk was decorated with an important church order.... Let us also point out that transfers from the oblast budget are only a small portion of the religious development of Kuzbass, that considerable money goes into it from the budgets of our cities and rayons, and that construction of churches in Kuzbass has acquired epidemic proportions. Which is more than one can say about housing construction.

Sinner Igor Kovtun (baptized but does not observe rituals) is right in his own way when he says that this is not the right time for such expenditures from the oblast's meager budget. But governor Mikhail Kislyuk (baptized, and, judging by numerous mentions by the oblast television, very devout) will push his own line, fulfilling and overfulfilling the agreements signed between the administration and the Kemerovo and Novokuznetsk dioceses, interpreting "the revival and development of spirituality, culture, and education in Kuzbass" first of all as financial support for the Orthodox Church.

Kovtun's speech at the latest session of the legislative assembly provoked anger and a severe rebuttal on the part of Kislyuk, whose conclusion was that this deputy is unfit not only to chair the committee on science, culture, education, and ethnic policy, but even to remain a rank-and-file member of the assembly. Because he proposed the suspension of financing for the construction of the Orthodox Ecclesiastical Center. And then persisted in his delusion, permitting himself, as Kislyuk put it, "improper comments, bordering on insult, regarding the Orthodox Church."

I hope that our Orthodox Church will not call, at his opponents' petition, for anathema on the Christian Kovtun, because then he will find himself in the company of rebels and inveterate rogues the likes of Grishka Otrepyev and Emelka Pugachev. (On the other hand, Leo Tolstoy too.) I hope that the legislative assembly as a whole will escape this fate too, even if it passes a decree to the detriment of the cathedral construction and in favor of the barracks inhabitants. There is a precedent for it: The famous human rights activist and formerly jailed dissident, priest Gleb Yakunin, speaks against the expenditures on the restoration of the Christ the Savior Cathedral; so far, however, he has only been defrocked, but not excommunicated. So perhaps our guys will escape this lot too....

After the collapse of the system of ideological services built by the CPSU apparatchiks, a certain vacuum of belief has indeed emerged in the country called Russia. All sorts of ideologies are striving to fill this vacuum. A variety of Christian sects, and Oriental religious figures, and even Satan worshipers. But, of course, only Orthodoxy can count on state support in the process of filling the vacuum. Moreover, in the opinion of many observers, an intensive propaganda campaign is under way, suggesting to the Russian population the idea that Russia has never lived without an undivided authority, whether at the top of it be a general secretary, a president, or a tsar—it does not matter because they are all anointed sovereigns, and Orthodoxy is the cornerstone of the Russian foundation. (At this point one immediately recalls from the works of Russian historians that actually it was Russia that has taught the entire medieval world the example of people's power—the Novgorod veche; that Cossack self-rule is an example of traditional Russian democracy; and that adherents of old Orthodox rituals since the times of the rebellious archpriest Avvakum take pains to avoid state violence and are alive and well; and as to faith, in the pre-revolutionary Russian Army, new draftees were sworn in simultaneously by an Orthodox priest, a mullah, a pastor, and even a rabbi, and what is more—it made absolutely no difference in the power of their weapons).

The process of replacing portraits on the "walls of honor" of our homes is probably inevitable. And cathedrals look just as good within the architecture of our population centers as theaters, schools, and hospitals. Certainly much better than barracks. But I do remember all the time that the church is separated from the state, and freedom of conscience is a private matter of each individual. Why should a man who believes in other gods pay for the restoration of Orthodoxy? Why is there a build-up of the image of the atheist as the culprit for all Russia's troubles? Why is it that today's moneybags who spends part of his money earned on speculation, or a bureaucrat who disposes of public money in a way that earns him a patriarch's blessing, are more pleasing to the Lord than all of us stuck in skepticism? By all signs, we are witnessing the development of a new (a well-forgotten old) ideological estate. More impressive and

perhaps no less sincere, but all the same just like, in the past, "saving" us regardless of our wishes. And in doing that, as it has always been, blessing the Authority from the hands of which it feeds.

....There was a time when Pushkin's resounding lines ("A useless gift, an accidental present—life, why were you given to me?") were censored by Metropolitan Filaret this way: "It is not a waste or an accident that Lord gave me life." And I think that we will soon hear the new classic Bulat Okudzhava in the modern edition: "And commissars in dusty cassocks will silently bend over me...." And this is the way it will be until a new Voltaire is born....

Sverdlovsk Admin Quarterly Work Reported

954F1248A Yekaterinburg OBLASTNAYA GAZETA in Russian 6 Jan 95 p 2

[“Statement on the Work of the Sverdlovsk Oblast Administration in the Third Quarter of 1994”]

[FBIS Translated Text] The efforts of the renewed government of the oblast were concentrated primarily on assurance of the stabilization of the socioeconomic situation in the Central Urals. A number of decrees of the head of the oblast administration were adopted on the most acute problems.

The agro-industrial complex, for example, received tangible support. Financial and material resources were allocated for the procurement of fodder and for the harvesting.

Some R12 billion were channeled from the oblast budget in the period July-August 1994 into compensation (up to 50 percent) for the cost of fuel and lubricants. The funds were allocated every 10 days in an amount of not less than R2 billion.

Some R28.8 billion of a budget loan of the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation were channeled specifically for the purchase of food grain into the regional fund.

Problems of sectoral industry and the local economy are constantly in the field of vision of the oblast administration. The following decrees were adopted: “The Drafting of a Comprehensive Program of the Oblast’s Defense Enterprises for 1994-96,” “Preparation of the Oblast’s Housing and Municipal Services for Operation in the Fall-Winter Period of 1994-95,” “Measures To Stabilize the Activity of Consumer Service Enterprises,” and “Support for Enterprises of the Oblast’s Timber Complex.”

Questions of the financing of business projects of enterprises of light industry and the main directions of the development of the oblast’s communications for 1993-95 and enterprises of the fuel and energy complex were studied.

A subject of the daily attention of the oblast administration are problems of the social protection of the population: citizens who suffered the effects of radiation as a consequence of the catastrophe at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant; servicemen of the armed forces; officers of the internal affairs authorities and other departments that have military formations in their makeup; persons discharged from military service and their families under the conditions of the current reforms. The corresponding decrees of the head of the administration were adopted in this connection also.

Provision was made for measures concerning the allocation to citizens of the oblast in need of an improvement in housing conditions of nonreturnable subsidies for the construction or purchase of housing. A procedure of the allocation to the public of firewood, brushwood, wind-fall, and deadwood on preferential terms was approved.

The head of the administration approved the concept of the development of regional investing that was made the basis of the Investors’ Residence project. The project was devised by the Invur financial-investment corporation and the Rifev concern.

In accordance with Decree No. 94/18 of 29 March 1994 of the head of the administration and the oblast Federation of Trade Unions Presidium “Organization of the Labor and Recreation of Children and Adolescents in the Summer of 1994,” considerable work was performed in this direction.

The program of preparation for the new academic year was pursued persistently and strenuously. Some 1,411 schools, 2,870 preschool establishments (1,268 publicly funded), and 132 vocational-technical educational institutions operate in the oblast. Only two schools were commissioned anew: an annex to School No. 7 in the city of Kamyshlov and a high school in Alapayevsk’s Zapadnyy community; both schools were built from funds of the oblast budget to replace hazardous school buildings.

An enlarged meeting of the board of the Ministry of Education of the Russian Federation was held in July 1994. It discussed the progress of fulfillment of the law of the Russian Federation “On Education” by the Department of Education and Educational Establishments of Sverdlovsk Oblast. The report, the information, and the main list of documents produced earned high marks. There was, in fact, a presentation of the oblast’s educational potential.

The administration of the oblast adopted additional measures to strengthen preventive measures against law-breaking and the fight against crime. These problems are examined in this presentation or the other at practically each meeting of the government. The following decrees of the head of the administration were adopted:

“On a System of Preventive Measures Against the Neglect and Offenses of Minors and Protection of Their Rights”;

"On the Work of the Oblast Internal Affairs Administration To Ensure Public Order on the Streets and in Public Places";

"On the Progress of Fulfillment of Decree No. 189-p of the Government of the Oblast of 15 June 1993 "The State of and Measures To Step Up the Fight Against Malfeasance and Crimes in the Sphere of Influence on Economic Relations"; and others.

Work was completed on the formation of a new structure of the administration of the oblast and its functional subdivisions and the corresponding statutes and lists of personnel were approved in the third quarter. The result of the reorganization was a reduction in the size of the managerial machinery.

In accordance with the schedule for the training of senior officials of the executive authorities of the oblast, seminars of heads of city, rayon, township, and rural administrations, deputy administration chiefs for housing and municipal services, specialists in the coordination of law enforcement activity, lawyers, and chief accountants of the administrations of cities and rayons were held in July-September. The participants in the seminars discussed problems of practical activity and obtained accepted information and reference material on legislative acts of the Russian Federation.

[Signed] V. Mironov, chief of the Department for the Civil Service and Work With the Territories.

Samara City Officials on Fighting Crime

954F1172B Samara SAMARSKIYE IZVESTIYA in Russian 17 Jan 95 p 4

[Article by Sergey Nagayev: "The Situation Is Under Control. However, It Remains Difficult"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The leadership of the Directorate of Internal Affairs of the City of Samara held a meeting on 12 January with representatives of the mass media to consider the results of the fight against crime in 1994.

Vladimir Mikhaylovich Popov, chief of the crime militia of the city of Samara, acquainted them with the pertinent statistical computations.

Last year the number of criminal offenses committed on the territory of the city—there were 15,804—fell somewhat. A total of 67 percent of the crimes were solved, which is 8.7 percent more than last year. There was an increase in the number of crimes involving the use of weapons, contract murders, and grave crimes, under which thefts now fall. The number of muggings fell by 20 percent and robberies by 30 percent, including apartment robberies. The number of thefts of motor vehicles decreased by 20 percent. The investigative organs of internal affairs looked into 10,240 crimes, 10 percent more than in 1993, and 18 percent more grave crimes.

"Despite the positive results in the work of militia employees, a decreasing trend in the number of crimes is

not being observed. The organized nature of the criminal groups alarms the organs of Internal Affairs very seriously. At present the situation, although it is under the control of internal affairs organs, nonetheless remains difficult," said Vladimir Popov. "The spread of so-called contract murders committed on the territory of the city of Samara is disturbing. Their solvability, unfortunately, is low. Today, out of 16 committed murders, only eight have been solved. Suspects have been arrested in three murders. Five have been established and are under federal investigation. The rest have still not been solved. The difficulty is that the people who committed them are either killers; i.e., professional assassins who come in on contract from other regions, or the crimes were so carefully planned and prepared that there is no evidence yet to accuse specific persons."

As a result of operational-investigative measures on the territory of the city, several underground plants were discovered engaging in the production of vodka and cognac that is subsequently sold in commercial stalls. A large amount of alcohol was confiscated. The organizers of these products were charged with criminal responsibility.

The Koltso-2 and Koltso-3 operations were conducted, resulting in 230 individual weapons and several hundred thousand rounds of ammunition and explosives being confiscated.

For more effective work, organs of Internal Affairs have established three directorates—in Kirovskiy, Promyshlennyy, and Sovetskiy Rayons—whose rights are much broader than those of rayon branches. In addition, a branch has been opened in Kirovskiy Rayon that will serve the settlement of metallurgists. The number of 24-hour militia posts, to which citizens can appeal at any time, has been increased. A special company has been organized to combat auto thefts, as a result of which the number of such thefts has decreased. A special subunit for the consumer market is being created at the expense of its own reserves.

Of course, there were also questions at the news conference about subunits of Internal Affairs organs that are performing service in Chechnya. Thus, the Samara OMON [special purpose militia detachment], which has been performing service in protecting public order from the very beginning of the events in Chechnya, has been declared the best by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The UVD has established a reserve of employees (volunteers), who on the first order would be able to depart for Chechnya to maintain public order and fight crime on the territory of the Russian Federation.

To the question of whether it is possible to speak about the activation of Chechen groups in Samara, Vladimir Mikhaylovich replied:

"No. Such a process is not occurring. Just the opposite. Some of the actively operating groups have left the boundaries of the city, and those that represent some

kind of operational interest to us are conducting themselves at present as respectable citizens."

Petr Pavlovich Shaybulatov, chief of the OBEP [not further identified] in the city of Samara, talked about the criminal situation in the economic sphere.

"There is a literal plundering of banking structures on the territory of the city of Samara today. Billions are being withdrawn from banks by way of fictional bank guarantees and fictional guarantees of commercial structures. The organs of internal affairs learn of the falsification only after a half year, when it becomes necessary to pay off credits, and the commercial structures that took them have already disappeared. Yes, a massive plundering is going on. And where is the difficulty? This money is turned into cash, converted into hard currency, and sent abroad. It is a long process, but we are receiving this kind of information. Therefore, the question is being raised of the creation of a special subunit that would involve itself in banking and commercial structures, in which specialists experienced in credit and banking operations must work.

Tyumen Oblast Duma Inner Working Detailed

954F1220A Tyumen TYUMENSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 11 Jan 95 pp 1, 5

[Interview with Yu. Konev, deputy head of the Tyumen Oblast administration, by Yuriy Perepletkin; place and date not given: "No Superfluous Dispute over Words"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The press usually reports on the activity of the Tyumen Oblast Duma on days when there are meetings or immediately after the meetings are concluded. Most often these are accounts showing the external aspects of the work for the most part. But what is the internal drama of the heated debates like? What predetermines a particular decision? Wherein lies the ease or difficulty of a discussion?

We will acquaint the reader today with the point of view of a person who knows the life of the Duma rather well, so to say, "from the inside." Our questions are answered by Yu. Konev, deputy head of the oblast administration.

[Perepletkin] Yuriy Mikhaylovich, you invariably take part in the work of the oblast Duma, since as the deputy head of the oblast administration who guides the mutual relations of the representative and executive organs of authority, you are obliged to be in the know about all the nuances of the preparation and resolution of questions that are put on the agenda. Therefore, tell me, please, are there any "undercurrents" that influence the course of debates in the Duma that the journalists in the auditorium cannot know about?

[Konev] I will answer this question, but I will start with something else—the deputy corps. The oblast Duma, which is now fully elected, is represented by literate, respected, and competent people. There are oil and gas "generals" in it, experts from the social sphere, directors

of commercial structures, and workers in the administration. It is my profound conviction that they are capable of analyzing the most difficult questions and adopting correct decisions on them. It is another matter that deputies look at the same problem in different ways. Therefore, discussions are occurring that, by the way, are quite natural and useful.

Well, as for "undercurrents," it is necessary to say the following. This kind of concept exists: preliminary preparation of documents. If the draft of some decision is "raw" and far from complete, this means that more time will be spent on coordination and "completing" it directly at the Duma meeting. But if the obviously contradictory points are eliminated ahead of time in the course of working up a document, it will be adopted quickly without superfluous disputes over words.

Of course, the deputies who vote in the Duma always have the final word. But those present in the auditorium usually do not know about the preparatory work, and it is not always understandable why an important document is sometimes passed quickly and without tiring debates. Indeed, it is simply that the deputies have already discussed this problem, and they know the position of some of their colleagues beforehand. So, in fact, all "undercurrents" are incomprehensible to an outside observer.

Debates are inevitable, because it is hardly possible to accomplish ideal preliminary preparation of a document. The press frequently devotes principal attention precisely to this. But the essence, after all, is not in the quarrels but in the content of the decision adopted by the Duma.

[Perepletkin] It is well known that debates arise at meetings between the two branches of power—legislative and executive. In other words, between the deputies and you personally as the representative of the administration. Does this not put you on guard?

[Konev] Not at all. It would be terrible if different and at times acute problems did not evoke different assessments and judgments. I will note, however, that frequently the disagreements between the deputies themselves are far more principled than between representatives of the Duma and the administration. Arguments are unavoidable. Every deputy is a personality. With his own point of view. But the skill of the whole deputy corps is to find a mutually acceptable solution.

[Perepletkin] Could you give us specific examples: It is here that the opinions of the Duma deputies and the administration have diverged. And why. And substantiate your position?... Well, let us say, referring to the last meeting of the Duma in December?

[Konev] Of course. I will dwell in detail on three agenda questions on which there was the most intensive exchange of ideas. One of these questions was the "On the Plan of Draft Law Work of the Tyumen Oblast Duma for 1995-1996." There are no doubts about the

list of those laws that the Duma proposes to adopt. These are all important documents that are necessary to the oblast and without which it would be difficult to influence the economic and social development of the region. But the number! It is necessary to look at life realistically. To prepare, revise, discuss, and adopt such an enormous package of important documents in such a short period is simply impossible. The administration proposed its priorities. Out of all of the acts, the most important ones were selected and passed first of all.

First, the Oblast Charter. To live without our own little constitution and without our own law of the oblast any longer is unthinkable.

Second, the Law on the Referendum. There must be a mechanism for expressing the will of all the residents of our Tyumen Oblast—from the Arctic Ocean to Kazakhstan. The autonomous okrugs—they must be given their due—are working here with anticipation. Such a document has already been adopted in the Khanty-Mansiyskiy autonomous okrug, and Yamal is getting ready to adopt one. And the situation is the same with the charter: Yamal has adopted one, and Khanty-Mansiyskiy is getting ready to do so...

Third, legislative substantiation is needed for a treaty between Tyumen Oblast (as a component of the Federation) and the Government of Russia. I am personally opposed to the kinds of treaties that turn our state, it seems to me, from a federation into a confederation. I have talked about this in Moscow repeatedly when this subject was discussed there, but time is passing, and some components of the Federation (Tatarstan and others) are concluding agreements with the federal authorities that provide a whole series of various privileges. Why must we lag behind under such conditions to the detriment of the residents of the oblast? The administration believes that it is necessary immediately to develop, legalize, and send the draft of such a treaty to the leadership of the Russian Federation

Fourth, there is an extreme need for a Law on Local Self-Government. Some will immediately object here: Why jump ahead of events, such a document will be adopted at the federal level, and then... Yes, and it will be necessary to wait a very long time! Various and at times mutually exclusive drafts have come together in Moscow—from the government, from presidential structures, separately from the State Duma, and separately from the Federation Council. When has it yet been possible to establish a single law from them, and, indeed, will it ever be possible? But life goes on! There is no legal base in the localities, in remote areas. And so, the first foothold is necessary—a law on an oblast scale, and let it (the law) even be provisional. The administration has worked on this a lot, there are unfinished drafts, and it is only necessary not to put the question off for later.

[Perepletkin] But, it turns out, postpone the other 36 draft laws?

[Konev] What else? It is impossible to do everything at once. We will also work on the rest, but only gradually and not within the course of three months.

True, there is one debatable point here. The deputies think that specialists of the oblast administration should work on the preparation of the draft laws. True, it is difficult to do without practical workers. However, after all, it is the Duma that is the law-creating organ. It is probably necessary to unite efforts here. I spoke at a meeting of the Duma in this regard. An appropriate commission of the Duma, on the one hand, and a committee or office of the administration, on the other hand, should have appropriate instructions on each draft law. Then sense will come out of this.

[Perepletkin] You said that discussions also arose on certain questions?

[Konev] As could be expected, there was a difficult discussion on the subject "On Implementing the Budget of the Oblast and the Oblast Budget for Nine Months of 1994"...

[Perepletkin] To the uninitiated, the "budget of the oblast" and the "oblast budget" are absolutely one and the same!

[Konev] What can you do when we have ended up in a constitutional impasse with two competent components on the territory of a third component. I do not want to develop this tiresome but painful subject here. It is simply that in this case the "budget of the oblast" is the consolidated budget of all three components of the Federation, and the "oblast budget" is without the okrug budgets. So, the Duma sharply condemned the oblast administration for taking bank credits, and then it itself extending credit to one or another structure. Without going into detail, I will say that the reproach is justified. But how, tell me, does one behave differently under conditions of total nonpayments, when federal financing is chronically late, but when the money for vitally important purposes is needed now, immediately! We extend credit to the Farmatsiya Association: After all, in order to sell medicines in pharmacies and receive money it is first necessary to buy these medicines with something. Tyumenkhleboprodukt also cannot do without turnover resources: Before we buy a loaf of bread and pay money for it, the grain has to be acquired beforehand.

Or take this very recent example: Just before the New Year, federal financial organizations gave solemn assurances that several dozen billion rubles were being sent to Tyumen, and it seems that even the number of the payment was mentioned. The governor assured the budgeters: You will receive full payment before the holiday. But the money for some completely unclear reasons was tightly stuck in Moscow. But the holiday is at hand, people are waiting and hoping... What is to be done? The situation could be saved only by immediate bank credit. Sometimes several days can mean so much! It is possible, of course, to criticize the finance committee—when it is

a question of instructions. But an attempt could also be made to understand—when it is a question of life...

[Perepletkin] Was there still another noisy discussion?

[Konev] Yes. The question "On the Course of Implementing and Financing General Oblast Programs." Here there are generally a lot of occasions for arguments and discord, inasmuch as the term itself—"general oblast programs"—does not have a clear definition. I proposed putting three types of financing in this formula: for the maintenance of institutions that are necessary for the whole oblast (an oncology dispensary, hospitals, invalid and old people's homes, children's shelters, and some training establishments), for the implementation of general oblast investment programs, and for the conduct of major measures of the 50th Anniversary of the Oblast or 50 Years of Victory type. Money should come from all three components of the Federation for such purposes.

The system of general oblast programs, if it is really to have a right to life, should be improved. It does not have much effect in today's form: While the oblast budget implemented approximately 22 percent of the expenditures planned in 1994, the okrug budgets implemented somewhere around 8 percent. It is necessary to come to an agreement at the outset: who, how much, and for what the resources are allocated. But if, for example, the autonomous okrugs do not intend to support one or another institution, this means they do not need it. And Tyumen has the right to reduce positions there by half. It is true that the moral aspect arises there: But is the child in Yamal to blame, if he can be treated only in a Tyumen hospital, and Salekhard refused to finance it?

[Perepletkin] Yuriy Mikhaylovich, there will be another meeting of the oblast Duma soon. It is very likely that you will once again have to go through tense and not always pleasant moments. Does this prospect not frighten you?

[Konev] This is the job. I talked with you only about some aspects of the last meeting of the Duma, but, after all, it is also possible to talk about the final result. Given all the disagreements, arguments, and differences of opinion, I think that on the whole the meeting was very full and productive. I hope that the January meeting will also have a positive effect. I suppose that once again there will be sharp comments, insulting remarks, and angry speeches. It must be remembered that all those meeting in the Duma are ordinary people. Our people, from Tyumen. And all of them, albeit in different ways, are trying to make life in the oblast better, richer, and more interesting. This is the main thing.

[Perepletkin] Thank you for the interview.

Khanty-Mansiyskiy Okrug Duma Session

954F1222A Tyumen TYUMENSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 23 Dec 95 pp 1-2

[Report by Sergey Shilnikov: "Consensus Is Usually Arrived At, Where There Is a Willingness To Accept It"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The scheduled session of the Khanty-Mansiyskiy Okrug Duma was "sort of strange." To the question "Why?" one of the our interlocutors replied: "What do you mean, why—it could not adopt a single decent decision." "But how could you adopt one if the issues are mainly 'long-play'?" "But nevertheless. At least the budget..."

When it came to the budget, it was indeed interesting. A vote was held. Supporters win "by one vote." Opponents' protests to Duma Chairman Sergey Sobyenin: "Sergey Semenovich, you raped us by a one-vote advantage! Tomorrow Bogdanov (Surgut) will come, and we will be even. You cannot push the budget through like this!" Sobyenin's request: "Use parliamentary language." Deputy Viktor Karamzin's remark: "According to procedure, the issue passes if more than 50 percent vote for it—of those elected, however, not of those present." Apologies from Sobyenin, who "nearly bought it"—the situation was threatening to disrupt the relations of considerable trust that have developed here inside both the representative and the executive branches, since the bulk of deputies are heads of city and rayon administrations and their deputies. A repeat vote was held, as a result of which the budget was put off until the next session, and this one devoted to discussion of criticisms.

The substance of the disagreements boiled down to hidden subsidies Khanty-Mansiysk receives at the expense of other cities. Second, the opponents wanted to hear out various funds and sort out the budget with the purpose of consolidating it. Supporters also wanted this, but they clearly realized that they would not be able to do it now, since fund chairmen simply are not ready. Which means they have to be accepted "as is." Interestingly, both supporters and opponents appealed to okrug administration head Aleksandr Filipenko.

The latter pushed the microphone button: "All right, so we do not adopt the budget. What danger is there in this? Nothing in particular. It simply means I will not be able to finance anything except payroll. Time will be wasted. Besides, budget consolidation will show that our situation is not that bad. Which means it will be very difficult for the guys from Moscow to prove anything. You decide—it is your call."

Another debate. A decision was made to discuss the revenue part of the budget. It was discussed. It was decided to leave the expense part alone, but one way or another it was getting brought up, except not during the discussion but in an unofficial setting. Boris Khokhlov, chairman of the budget and planning commission, remarked with some humor: "Why did Timoshkov (head of the Nizhnevartovsk administration) raise hell? Only yesterday he was looking at R250 billion in subsidies. Today it is R209 billion. As a Nizhnevartovsk resident, I feel sorry for the residents."

Of course, it was more like a game, full of emotions. Or perhaps the coffee was too good, and Nizhnevartovskiy Rayon administration head Boris Khokhryakov could

not resist the pleasure of "sticking it" to Nizhnevartovsk administration head Yuriy Timoshkov. In short, the budget was a headache, and the main subject of both days of the Duma's work as well as of the conference of administration heads that had taken place the day before. "Guys, we cannot vote for such a disgraceful budget!" "Then propose a better one." "That is precisely what I am proposing..."

The Duma started its sessions with discussion of the Khanty-Mansiyskiy Okrug charter, which brought about the remark of Valentin Molotkov, chairman of the Save the Yugra association: "This cannot be discussed even in the first draft!" To the remark of Duma Deputy Chairman Petr Volostrigov: "Not the first—the second: Have you forgotten, Valentin Mikhaylovich?" came the reply: "That was not even a discussion."

Sobyanin called a vote on the issue. Having decided at the outset that the charter would have to be discussed in the third draft, they proceeded article by article. The essence of the disagreement: "We have to understand what the Khanty-Mansiyskiy Okrug is. Whose land are we living on? Who is the master here? At least 25 percent of the land use fees should go to the indigenous peoples" (V. Molotkov). "Have you read the constitution in the part regarding land and mineral resources, Valentin Mikhaylovich?" (P. Volostrigov). The second set of disagreements—the authority. "We need to create an assembly made up of six deputies and give them veto power" (V. Molotkov). "You can have the assembly, no problem. The charter envisages this, Valentin Mikhaylovich; regarding veto power, however—this way we will never adopt a single decision" (S. Sobyanin). "So what—so we do not!" "We need to hold elections of a vice governor among the indigenous population, and create a department for small nations affairs, with branches in cities and rayons" (V. Molotkov). "There is a committee for small nations affairs; what keeps you from working with it?" (A. Sidorov). The deputy to the right: "He keeps himself." (Interestingly, at one time he was one of the association's active members, but after a report-and-election conference, where V. Molotkov won with a minimum advantage, the association practically split into two parts. Although it would be premature to speak of any shadow cabinet.)

"About the vice governor. We cannot elect on the same territory both a governor and a vice governor, and on top of that with a clear 'vertical line of authority.' I think this is precisely what is called parallel authority" (A. Filipenko). In the end, it was agreed that "two parallel authorities" is absurd. The next set—relations with Tyumen. The charter practically does not say anywhere that the okrug is part of Tyumen Oblast. Which was enunciated by oblast Duma Chairman Nikolay Baryshnikov: "The constitution permits the okrug to raise the issue of secession—which, naturally, nobody here intends to do. Which means we have to settle this issue somehow." Sergey Sobyanin explained to the deputies in this connection that there are points that may place the

okrug bodies of authority outside the law. Therefore, one has to tread carefully here. A commission headed by N. Baryshnikov was tasked with working it out; in a private conversation he said: "Everything is proceeding normally. There are no principal disagreements. Which means that a mutually acceptable solution will be found. Just do not stir up this issue and try to earn political capital on it."

The next question on the agenda—on Duma commissions—did not cause any arguments and was adopted right away. So was "On Procedures of Publishing and Implementing Autonomous Okrug Laws and Other Normative Acts Adopted by the Duma." "On Deputy Status" was sent back for modifications. "On Questions Reviewed at the Joint Meeting of Deputies of the Tyumen Oblast Duma, the Khanty-Mansiyskiy Autonomous Okrug Duma, and the Yamal-Nenetskiy Autonomous Okrug State Duma on 2 November 1994" was adopted right away.

"On the Draft Charter of Tyumen Oblast" was sent to the commissions. "Because it is very voluminous and it is physically impossible to read it and think it through just like that" (S. Sobyanin). The administration was tasked with reviewing "On Approving the Procedure of Charging Fees for the Use of Mineral Resources for the Okrug Budget in the Form of Oil Produced." "On Forming a Permanent Commission on Regional Policy and Local Self-Rule" was adopted without any arguments.

Arguments did arise regarding the question "On the Regional State Fund of the Khanty-Mansiyskiy Autonomous Okrug's Heritage" ("The Progeny Fund"). This was already the second draft. It should be mentioned that there had been a considerable progress on this issue since the first draft (at the Duma's previous meeting). It was no longer a question of "do we or do we not need it." That we need it, Aleksandr Sidorov and Vladimir Grabovskiy proved to their colleagues rather quickly. We need to think about it. "It does not make sense to transfer into the fund less than 25 percent of mineral resource fees—we will not accumulate anything for the future. Capital has to work and grow itself" (A. Sidorov).

The question is, however, how to work and how to grow; how to ensure that it will not be "unpacked" and pilfered before its time. The draft's author, Aleksandr Kondyrev, was trying to resolve this the best he could in the course of the article-by-article discussion of the draft. In short, in the final analysis the fund became something akin to an all-okrug deputies' working idea.

There was another idea—"On the Concept of Socioeconomic Development of the Khanty-Mansiyskiy Autonomous Okrug until 2005." The presenters were Academician Yuriy Yakovets and Professor Vladimir Mayevskiy, but this is a topic for a separate report. For now, however, I will describe the last, and very difficult, question—the question of moving the rayon center from Kondinsk to Mezhdurechensk. Difficult because it affects the interests of people living in Kondinsk.

First there were debates over whether to put it on the agenda. The decision was—yes, because a referendum of rayon residents had been held, and there should be some reaction to it. The second—the persistence of administration head Viktor Redikultsev: “The question of moving it alternately dies down and then resurfaces. And now, after the referendum, in which 73 percent of the rayon population participated, of whom 86 percent voted for the move, you are putting me—and not only me, the rayon authorities!—in an idiotic position. I am asking you to put it on the agenda and discuss it.”

“It is hard to discuss it,” replied Sergey Sobyenin, “first, because we do not have an oblast administration opinion on the subject. Second, many things are unclear from the legal standpoint. Suppose we vote now, and tomorrow opponents of the move file a court motion; I am not at all certain that we will win. While people will already be uprooted, and then the situation will truly be idiotic!”

After a lengthy debate, in which the mood “to discuss” clearly prevailed, the Duma chairman put the question on the agenda. Rayon administration head Viktor Redikultsev argued with figures in hand the expediency of such a move: “Mezhdurechensk is the geometric center of the habitation pattern. It has an excellent transportation network (railroad, river, and airport). And it produces 90.4 percent of the output of commercial products.”

To the question: “Will this require any money,” the answer was: “No, we are not asking for any. We have long been forced to operate in both places, since the bulk of the population gravitates to that area.”—“Tell us, Viktor Fedorovich, how many people will lose their jobs?” (P. Volostrigov) “Between 400 and 450, but we are looking into ways to find employment for them.” “How did the vote in Kondinsk go?” “Strictly speaking, it did not go at all. Kondinsk boycotted the referendum. They probably counted on precisely this, but miscalculated.”

“I spoke on many issues today,” Duma Deputy Chairman P. Volostrigov summed up the discussion, “but the subject I have to speak on now will be the most difficult one, because we are talking about people. I am not at all certain that the jobs you plan to offer them, Viktor Fedorovich, will be acceptable to them. We need to weigh everything again and again and not rush in this matter.”

It was decided to resume the discussion later. This extremely important issue will probably surface in the media as well. With this, the session wrapped up its work. If you are interested in my opinion as to whether it was successful or not, it is unequivocal—it was successful. If for no other reason than that it brought into the limelight apparently long overdue questions, and in the process the deputies did not quarrel with the chairman, the executive branch with the representative, or the okrug with the oblast. Accord—or, as it is fashionable to say these days, “consensus”—is indeed achievable, but only where there is a willingness to accept it.

Economic Issues

Economics Minister Cited on Russian-IMF Relations

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1257 GMT 13 Feb 95

[By BUSINESS-TASS correspondent Robert Serobrennikov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow February 13 TASS—If the International Monetary Fund (IMF) fails to give Russia money on credit, the government will have to reject policy aimed at economic stabilization, Russian Economics Minister Yevgeniy Yasin told *ITAR-TASS* on Monday [13 February].

A delay in crediting Russia will pave the way for galloping inflation and thus result in undermining the plans for reasonable administering of the earlier given credits. Russia has been living only on budgetary taxation receipts for the last two months, Yasin said.

Yasin declared for increasing import duties with a view to replenishing the budget and shaping an effective balance between Russian industry and foreign competitors.

Asked to elaborate on current relations between Russia and IMF, Yasin said that any suspension of talks with IMF is out of the question. It is a matter of a technical break aimed to enable the IMF leadership to make a decision; in two weeks the talks will be resumed and an agreement on crediting Russia will be reached, Yasin added.

Most of the IMF demands are quite well-founded, particularly as far as liberalization of Russian economy and tough financial policy are concerned. It answers our interests, too. However, we understand certain things better than IMF experts do, he said.

In particular, the situation in Russia has changed much over the past three years: we entered upon a new stage—the stage of structural reform, when an equilibrium in world and domestic prices exposed drawbacks of Russian enterprises to such a degree, that noncompetitiveness of domestic industry became obvious, Yasin said.

Russia is a highly industrialized country, the bulk of its products are turned out by the industry, which must survive. If it collapses, certain foreign firms may turn to their advantage, but the (rest of) the world will lose, Yasin said.

Chamber of Commerce Official Views Trade U.S. Trade Links

LD1402195395 Moscow *INTERFAX in English*
1752 GMT 14 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, Feb 14 (INTERFAX)—The Russian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (CCI) has opened its representation in the United States, said

CCI President Stanislav Smirnov at the news conference in Moscow on Tuesday [14 February].

He said that according to the Chamber, the trade turnover between the United States and Russia in 1994 increased by 20% against the previous year and stood at \$6 billion. With the positive balance, imports from the United States amounted to \$2.6 billion.

Smirnov said that representatives of the U.S. business consider as promising investments in the Russian economy. He believes that special attention to Russia is caused by the withdrawal of U.S. companies from markets of countries of Latin America, for example, from Mexico, which is going through an economic crisis.

Smirnov said that U.S. companies occupy leading positions among the countries which invested in the Russian economy, for example, the U.S. insurance company OPIC [not further identified] invested in 1994 in different projects in Russia \$500 million. In 1995, with participation of U.S. investments, said Smirnov, it is planned to continue building the Center for International Trade in Moscow, which is estimated at \$300 million.

Smirnov said that U.S. consulting, advertising and juridical firms became active at the Russian market. Accredited at the CCI are 152 U.S. firms and five relief funds.

Provisions on Free Economic Zones Explained

MM1302161595 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 11 Feb 95 First Edition

[Unattributed "Commentary" on draft Federal Law "On Free Economic Zones": "The Law Is With the Businessman"—from the "Zemstvo" section p 6]

[FBIS Translated Text] The draft Federal Law "On Free Economic Zones [FEZ's]" has been submitted to the Russian Federation Government for examination by the Ministry of Economics in conjunction with the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, the State Customs Committee, the Finance Ministry, and the Justice Ministry. At the same time they are submitting draft federal laws on amendments and addenda to tax legislation associated with the enactment of the law on free zones.

In accordance with this draft law it is proposed to create FEZ's in the Russian Federation in compact areas (no more than a few square kilometers) and to divide them into two types: export production zones [EPZ's] and duty-free zones, which can in turn be industrial or commercial.

The amount of expenditure on the creation and development of various types of FEZ differs substantially. Industrial zones—EPZ's and duty-free zones—are the more complex, major, and as a result more costly economic and social projects.

To comprehensively develop 1 square km of EPZ (a zone usually occupies no more than 3 square km) costs

between \$20 million and \$70 million in various countries of the world (in some cases in the PRC this sum reaches \$300 million). There is no reason to think that less money will be required to set up Russia's EPZ's.

At the same time one must bear in the mind that ordinary expenditure on the formation of industrial EPZ's and duty-free zones can rise considerably in the event of a weak general infrastructure, particularly a poor transport system, in the region where it is planned to set up the zone.

Thus, according to preliminary calculations, around 72 billion rubles [R] (at early 1993 prices) in budget funds alone will be required for external infrastructure development (construction of water, electricity, and communications facilities, roads, and other installations) in the area intended for the creation of the (33 hectare) Russian-Korean industrial park (with FEZ status) in southern Maritime Kray. The overall cost of the industrial park's external infrastructure facilities is estimated at R136 billion.

Thus, the main expenditure involved in the formation of industrial EPZ's and duty-free zones is associated with the creation and development of the corresponding industrial, transport, business, and social infrastructure.

One must bear in mind the fact that the zones are generally developed at the host country's expense since foreign investors avoid investing money in the creation of infrastructure projects. Bearing in mind the high cost of these projects, the idea that their development can be financed using funds provided by a single city, oblast, or kray seems untenable. In line with broad world practice the main financial expenditure, particularly during the initial phase of the creation of EPZ's and duty-free zones, is met by the state budget.

At the same time state expenditure is not confined to the costs incurred in the structural development of FEZ's. Some funds are also needed to maintain preferential economic and legal conditions on these zones' territory. The system of concessions and incentives is one of the key elements in the mechanism governing the operation of FEZ's. It is designed to stimulate the flow of investment, primarily foreign investment.

In the several decades that various countries' zones have competed to "intercept" the flow of foreign capital unified conditions under which foreign investors are invited into a zone have developed. These conditions are determined by a standard international range of concessions, the level of which fluctuates depending on the capital market situation.

It is proposed to define the level of the concessions—a list of which features in the draft law—in the federal program for the formation of FEZ's on Russian Federation territory and in the statutes pertaining to specific zones in line with their specific conditions associated, in

particular, with the economic and geographical position of a particular Russian zone.

The prescribed level of the concessions for individual enterprises registered in EPZ's and exporting their own output (processing sectors of industry) from the Russian Federation—output which meets the criteria of originating from an EPZ—can vary depending on the amount of this output, the order of priority of spheres of investment, and also the volume of investment and reinvestment and the standard of technology used.

Given the above and also the substantial time allowed for FEZ costs to be recouped (ranging from three to five years or more) it is advisable for the first two or three years to restrict the number of these zones to three to five within the framework of the federal program for the formation of FEZ's in the Russian Federation, which is being organized on a competitive basis.

The enlistment of federal budget funds during the organization of duty-free zones may be limited by increasing the proportion of local budget expenditure, by income from providing services for zone users and from the activity of special organizations which develop and support the duty-free zones (particularly private organizations) and which are set up by the zones' administrations, and also by enlisting other funds (bank credit, funds from enterprises and organizations).

In accordance with the draft law, which was prepared with consideration for broad world practice, it is proposed to abandon the further formation of large-scale FEZ's in the Russian Federation at present, the decision on whose formation was adopted in 1990-1991 without consideration for the state's economic potential.

Davydov Says Oil Export Union Plans Links With OPEC

*LD1402185695 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1834 GMT 14 Feb 95*

[By BUSINESS-TASS correspondent Irina Bolshova]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow February 14 (TASS)—The Union of Russian Oil Exporters is planning to establish partner relations with OPEC, the International Energy Agency and others to help forming the world policy in oil exports, Russian Vice-Premier Oleg Davydov told BUSINESS TASS here today before flying to London. Davydov is also the chairman of the Russian Union of Oil Exporters.

A union delegation left for London today to represent Russian oil exporters at the London Oil Week.

Russia which counts for 12 per cent of the world oil exports has almost no influence on the oil market situation. "The Russian oil exporters have come to understand successful competition on the foreign market is impossible when you are alone," said Davydov. "Liberalization of foreign economic activities done by the

Russian Government and the lift of major administrative limits on oil exports have made the oil exporters to elaborate a coordinated trade policy to exclude domestic competition and ensure efficient supplies of oil and oil products." That was the reason for forming the Union of Russian Oil Exporters.

The Union is also good for foreign partners since it includes firms with good reputations, experienced in activities on the world market and opponents to damping prices, said Davydov.

When in London the vice-premier will meet the British secretary of state for energy, hold negotiations with representatives of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and help prepare a British visit of Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin on March 1.

Duma Tax Committee Finds Additional 12.4 Trillion Rubles

*LD1402192995 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1750 GMT 14 Feb 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, Feb 14 (FIA-INTERFAX)—The State Duma committee for budget, taxes, banks and finances has found another 12.4 trillion rubles to finance the budget expenditures by cutting the allocations to a number of other expenditure articles.

A committee meeting Tuesday decided to cut the expenditures on the maintenance of servicemen by 1 trillion rubles by reducing the armed forces by 400,000 troops and channel the money to purchase weapons and combat equipment. The committee also decided to cut the allocations to the Interior Ministry by 500 billion rubles and use the money to maintain the border guards, intelligence and counterintelligence. The committee proposed cutting the expenditures of the state machinery by nearly 700 billion rubles by abolishing a number of government structures, particularly the Economic Reforms Center, the Center for Economic Trends and government press office. The subsidies to the Moscow government were proposed to be reduced by nearly 1 trillion rubles.

According to the committee's chairman, Mikhail Zadorov, the committee will have to discuss more than 500 amendments within the next days to submit a modified draft budget for the third reading on February 17 or 22.

Cabinet Issues Decree on Space Rocket Accord With Russia

*AU1502122795 Kiev URYADOVYY KURYER
in Ukrainian 11 Feb 95 p 2*

["Ukraine's Cabinet of Ministers Decree No. 95 on Concluding an Accord Between the Ukrainian Government and Government of the Russian Federation on Cooperation in the Sphere of Creation and Utilization of Rocket and Space Rocket Technology" signed on 8

February 1995 by Ukraine's Prime Minister V. Masol and V. Pustovoytenko, minister of Ukraine's Cabinet of Ministers]

[FBIS Translated Text] Ukraine's Cabinet of Ministers has resolved the following:

1. To approve the draft Accord Between the Ukrainian Government and Government of the Russian Federation on Cooperation in the Sphere of Creation and Utilization of Rocket and Space Rocket Technology, submitted by the National Space Agency and coordinated with interested ministries and departments and with the Russian side.

2. To authorize V.M. Shmarov, Ukraine's vice prime minister and minister of defense, after the negotiations are completed and an accord is reached, to sign the aforementioned accord on behalf of the Ukrainian Government and allow him to introduce, in the course of the negotiations, minor changes and additions into the draft accord.

V. Masol, Ukraine's prime minister

V. Pustovoytenko, Ukraine's minister of the Cabinet of Ministers

International Affairs

NATO Delegation Meets Defense, Security Committee

LD1402172995 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 1600 GMT 14 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] A NATO delegation met today at the Supreme Council of Ukraine Defense and State Security committee. (Oleh Chornousenko), deputy chairman of the committee, told his guests about the committee's legislative and supervisory functions and recent achievements. He also answered questions about our state's national security concept under preparation and about relations between Ukraine and its neighbors.

Field Marshal Richard Vincent, chairman of the NATO Military committee, set out the view of the NATO leadership on the main aspects of Ukraine's national security, issues of possible expansion by NATO, and our state's participation in the Partnership for Peace program. Participants in the meeting acknowledged the mutual benefit of these contacts.

Military Delegation Ends Talks

LD1402200295 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 1900 GMT 14 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Field Marshal Richard Vincent, the chairman of the NATO Military Committee, ended his official visit to Kiev. For two days, NATO and Ukrainian military leaders discussed greater cooperation under the Partnership for Peace program.

Field Marshal Vincent met Prime Minister Vitaliy Masol and Foreign Affairs Minister Hennadiy Udovenko, and held talks at the Supreme Council Defense and National Security committee.

The main talks were conducted with Valeriy Shmarov, defense minister and deputy prime minister of Ukraine, and Chief of General Staff Colonel General Anatoliy Lopata, at the Ministry of Defense.

'Tentative' Agreement With Russia on 'Alfa' Space Project

WS1402160095 Kiev UKRINFORM in English 0810 GMT 14 Feb 95

[From the "Business News Weekly" feature No. 6, 6-12 Feb 95]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] On February 8, Andriy Zhalko-Tyarenko, acting director-general of the National Space Agency of Ukraine, succeeded in reaching a tentative agreement in Moscow with the Russians on Ukraine's participation in the "Alfa" project, which provides for an international orbital station.

On the very same day, Valeriy Shmarov, Ukrainian deputy prime minister/defense minister, and Russian

First Deputy Premier Oleg Soskovets signed a framework agreement in Kiev on Russo-Ukrainian collaboration involving space rocketry manufacture.

Alfa, the U.S.-Russian project, envisages an international space station with the Russian partner responsible for the station's power module, docking, orientation systems, and cargo shuttling. The United States has allocated \$400 million to Russia to be spent on the project's implementation.

According to the National Space Agency, the guidance and basic module orientation systems are being designed by the Kharkov-based Khartron. A Kiev-based radio factory has been named as sole drafter and holder of the docking system blueprints. The Proton series rockets (their guidance systems are manufactured by the Kievan "Komunar" works), together with Zenith missiles (these are produced by Dnepropetrovsk Yuzhmash), are supposed to serve as transport vehicles.

Russia's policy had been directed toward using Ukraine's space industry facilities and by-passing intergovernmental agreements to avoid settlement at the state level.

Russo-Ukrainian agreements notwithstanding, Ukraine's full-fledged partnership with Russia in space exploration is too premature to talk about, Volodymyr Horbulin, national security adviser to the Ukrainian president, says.

Civic Congress Party Seeks Reunification

LD1402204295 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1811 GMT 14 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Kiev, Feb 14 (INTERFAX-UKRAINE)—The party Civic Congress of Ukraine has declared it will collect signatures under the address to the Ukrainian parliament to hold in Ukraine a referendum on reunification of Ukraine, Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan into a single economic, political and defense union on the basis of the cultural and historical legacy of the peoples.

The statement handed over to INTERFAX-UKRAINE, says that "true independence of Ukraine is possible only in a union with Russia. It is absurd to divide Russians and Ukrainians, we have common ethnic, language and cultural roots, centuries-old Orthodox traditions, and, finally, 340 years of joint existence in a single state."

The Civic Congress of Ukraine is a political party of the left- centrist orientation. It stands for integration of Ukraine into the Commonwealth of Independent States. It was created in Donetsk in October 1992. Among its tasks is the struggle against national chauvinism, totalitarianism and authoritarianism. The party stands for federative land structure of Ukraine, the creation of a market economy, and for the attachment to Russian of the status of a state language.

Kiev Will Display T-84 Tank in UAE

LD1402210495 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1926
GMT 14 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] KIEV Feb 14 (Interfax-Ukraine)—Ukraine will for the first time participate in an international exhibition of military hardware IDEX-95 in the United Arab Emirates as an independent arms producer. Taking part in the Ukrainian exposition would be about 50 enterprises, which will put on display about 200 exhibits, Ukraine's Minister of Machine Building, Military-Industrial Complex and Conversion Viktor Petrov told a news conference in Kiev on Tuesday [14 February].

At the exhibition in Abu-Dabi, the United Arab Emirates on March 19 through 23 Ukraine will show only products of its own manufacture.

Ukraine plans to show the T-84 tank equipped with a powerful diesel engine apt for use in desert conditions. Speakers at the news conference said that the Russian analogue T-80 having a gas-turbine power plant made a worse performance in such conditions.

The list of other exhibits to be put on display will include a modernized version of the tank T-72 with a more powerful power plant, as well as various engineering machines, military electronics and ship instruments. Bearing in mind the fact that many countries are heavily equipped with military hardware of Soviet manufacture Ukraine would seek to display its repair and maintenance potential.

About the purposes of Ukraine's participation in IDEX-95 Petrov said:

"We are certain that the clue to ending our economic problems is in how quickly we manage to find new markets for our research-intensive products".

Black Sea Fleet Commander Denies Sale of Assets

LD1402210695 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1814
GMT 14 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] SEVASTOPOL, Feb 14 (Interfax)—The commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Admiral Eduard Baltin, has described as "a low-quality charge" the reports by the Ukrainian press on a sale of the fleet's land, installations and equipment. Speaking before journalists in Sevastopol Tuesday, he said as many as five charges had been filed against him with the Ukrainian Prosecutor General's Office, but inspections failed to reveal any violations by the fleet.

"All our activities are carried out in the channel of the agreement on dividing up property signed by the Russian and Ukrainian governments in 1993," he remarked.

Baltin emphasized that "the property was being transferred to the authorities rather than sold out as reported by the Ukrainian press."

Commenting on the last week's round of the Russian-Ukrainian talks on the Black Sea Fleet, Baltin said the declaration on the principles of dividing up the fleet was a "interim document, while commentaries may be given only after the two presidents' signing a full-bodied agreement."

At the same time, Baltin doubted the expediency of "participation of people not having an idea of the fleet, situation in Crimea and Sevastopol in the talks."

National Affairs

Kuchma: Fleet 1st Agenda Issue for Yeltsin Meeting

WS1402122395 Kiev INTELNEWS in English 2046
GMT 13 Feb 95

[Report by Oksana Hasiuk]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Kiev, Feb. 13.—The long-awaited visit of Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin to Kiev has been tentatively set for early March, and the division of the Black Sea Fleet [BSF] will be first on the meeting's agenda, President Leonid Kuchma announced Monday [13 February].

"Right now Russian and Ukrainian experts are working towards agreement on key articles of the declaration that will set out principles for the division of the Black Sea Fleet," Kuchma said. "The initialing of the draft Treaty on Friendship, Partnership, and Cooperation opened the door for the visit of Boris Yeltsin to Kiev," he added.

Russian First Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Soskovets and Ukrainian First Deputy Prime Minister Yevhen Marchuk initialed the draft partnership treaty in Kiev Feb. 8. The initialing came after repeated negotiations on the controversial issues of dual citizenship, territorial integrity, and inviolability of borders. Ukraine opposed any clause on dual citizenship, and insisted on territorial guarantees. The Russian delegation conceded to Ukraine's demands in these areas, but insisted dual citizenship should be subject to a separate future agreement.

"I personally had two meetings with Soskovets in Kiev and I can say that this is a person who has the support of Yeltsin and the authority to sign the draft treaty," Kuchma said. "But if I had not met with Yeltsin in Moscow the treaty would not have been initialed. For Ukraine there are no minuses to signing the treaty," he added.

With the treaty initialing clearing the way for a future visit, Kuchma said he and Yeltsin had finally agreed on a March Kiev meeting to iron out the issue of BSF division at the Feb. 10 Commonwealth of Independent States summit in the Kazakhstan capital of Almaty. Leaders of CIS nations gathered to discuss the future of the CIS and the Multilateral Economic Committee (MIC), a consultative body set up at the end of 1994 to deal with economic relations between CIS states.

Kuchma said at the summit Ukraine signed an appeal to CIS nations and the world community for friendship and cooperation and a non-binding memorandum on peace and stability within in the CIS. Ukraine also signed a resolution on renewing and maintaining a common scientific and research frontier within CIS borders.

"The CIS has no future if the mechanisms of MIC don't work," said Kuchma, assessing summit discussions.

Kuchma also said Ukraine abstained from signing documents on CIS collective defense and any agreements dealing with collective CIS peace-keeping forces or their participation in maneuvers on the Tadjik-Afghanistan border. But Ukraine did take part in discussions on the political situation along the frontier border, Kuchma reported.

"All decisions taken by Ukraine at the summit not only support national interests but also reaffirm the development of our relations within the CIS," Kuchma said.

In April, Kuchma returns to Almaty to meet again with Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev for further discussions on bilateral relations.

Kuchma Seeks Early Approval of Self-Government Bill

LD1402145995 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1119 GMT 14 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] LVOV, Feb 13 (Interfax - Ukraine)—The conciliatory commission for finalizing the draft law proposed by the president on power and local self-government has practically completed its work. President Leonid Kuchma told a Monday [13 February] meeting with the administration of Lvov region that only two articles of the document—on the mechanism of stopping the functioning of parliament and on the relationship between the president and government—remain open.

The president hoped that the matters would be settled in the nearest future.

The next step after the approval of the law on power, according to Kuchma, will be a judicial reform and the formation of a constitutional court. In extraordinary conditions the executive branch of power should also be able to take extraordinary steps, he said adding that judicial power should protect the border beyond which democracy ends.

Kuchma also thinks that only a socially-oriented economy is capable of conducting true market reforms. He criticized parliament for deciding to increase public incomes. "The money the deputies promised does not exist," he stressed adding that it can be obtained only by printing new banknotes.

He admitted though that market levers cannot do anything themselves that is why he favored an effective government system and reasonable regional power.

Kuchma said that individual productions should be altered, frozen or closed, if the government can no longer support them.

The president also spoke for restructuring the mechanism of social security. In his opinion such support should be given to people who cannot support themselves.

Kravchuk Warns of Dictatorship, 'Democracy in Danger'

LD1402201095 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1814 GMT 14 Feb 95

KIEV, Feb 14 (INTERFAX-UKRAINE)—The Ukrainian ex-president, now people's deputy Leonid Kravchuk believes that "democracy in Ukraine is in danger." This is indicated by "such signs of narrowing basic principles of democracy as the direct interference by representative and executive bodies in the activities of judicial and law-enforcement bodies." He told a news conference in Kiev Tuesday [14 February] that "the fight against corruption is used to constrain democracy."

Kravchuk said another sign of endangered democracy was replacing laws with instructions, legitimate bodies with commissions, while officials bear no responsibility for their assessments of representative bodies. This could be applied to some officials from Leonid Kuchma's administration, he added.

Kravchuk stated that the notion of "struggle for a stronger executive power" was displaced by a "struggle for a powerful personality." This is fraught with dictatorship, he said.

Kravchuk described as "absolutely unacceptable" a situation when the presidential administration "stood above the cabinet of ministers."

IAEA Report on Nuclear Power Plant Says Money Needed

LD1402124195 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1146 GMT 14 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Kiev February 14 BUSINESS-TASS—The Ukrainian State Statistical Committee has received a report on the preliminary results of a survey by experts of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at the South Ukrainian nuclear power station. IAEA experts surveyed in January the work at the station to ensure safe operation and prevent accidents, BUSINESS-TASS learned from the State Statistical Committee. Experts suggest that Ukrainian bodies allocate for the station the funds needed to enhance safety of power-generating sets and to ensure that specialists employed at the station do not quit.

Energy consumers owe about 44 million dollars to the station. Because of this, there is a danger that the work to enhance the safety of the nuclear power station will not be fulfilled. At the same time, the experts noted that over the

past five years, the time when power-generating sets at the South Ukrainian nuclear power station were idle decreased. The radioactive situation at the station and around it is within norm, the dose of irradiation to which the personnel was subjected was within the permissible limit.

Trade Unions Urge Attention to Social Sector

WS1402133495 Kiev VSEUKRAINSKIYE
VEDOMOSTI in Russian 2 Feb 95 p 2

[Report by T. Melnichuk: "Trade Unions Urge the President To Adopt an Edict"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Fifteen leaders of independent Ukrainian trade unions, among them the "Solidarity" Trade Union Federation, the Pan-Ukrainian Free Trade Union of Working People in Solidarity, the Federation of Trade Unions in Joint Ventures, and others have issued a joint appeal to Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma. It says: "The reforms that are taking place in Ukraine in the political, economic, and financial sectors unfortunately affect only, to a minor degree, the social sector, without which the formation of new socioeconomic relations is impossible. In this connection, the trade unions gave the Ukrainian president an entire list proposals, among which virtually the most important one was to resolve the matter of passing the laws 'On collective labor disputes and their settlement' and 'On mechanisms for social partnership at enterprises.' In addition, the trade unions suggested the expedited passage of the presidential edict 'On the non-state pension system' and insisted on the preparation of a separate article in the constitution governing their functions and rights."

Anticrime Committee Casts 'Serious Doubts' on Masol

WS1502102795 Kiev UKRINFORM in English 0815
GMT 15 Feb 95

[From the "Current Events" feature]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] On Tuesday, February 14 the Ukrainian media circulated a statement by Hryhoriy Omelchenko, chairman of the Verkhovna Rada [parliament] Standing Committee for Fighting Organized Crime and Corruption, about the Committee's investigation into the fate of a \$500 million credit to Ukraine, particularly that part of it which was received by the "Land and People" association.

As Mr. Omelchenko asserts, the committee subjected to the General Procurator's Office certain materials in late 1994, which severely compromised the said association and, in particular Oleksandr Tkachenko—the then association chairman and presently Supreme Council first deputy chairman—as testifying to misuse of the credit.

According to the statement, the committee's newly found evidence allows to conclude that very similar accusations could be leveled against Prime Minister Masol and some other high-placed government officials,

whose personal integrity thus raises very serious doubts in light of the embezzlement charges.

Anticorruption Drive Seen as Step to Police State

WS1402150995 Kiev KHRESHCHATYK in Ukrainian
8 Feb 95 p 2

[Article by D. Dzhangirov: "Who Will Protect Whom?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Two hundred days elapsed since Kuchma's election as president, and one hundred since Leonid Kuchma announced the course toward radical market-oriented reforms. So, it seems that the time has come to sum up the "second" first results.

For some reason, however, the economy would listen to various statements least of all. Late January saw a five-fold increase of prices for electricity. The authorities promise to prevent price jumps for other goods, but, according to Viktor Pynzenyk, the inflation rate will reach the 40-percent point in February. So, there can be no talk about any financial stabilization.

With the absence of other "scapegoats," the responsibility is shifted onto the present power—primarily the president and the Cabinet of Ministers. Paradoxically, it is Prime Minister Masol who is in the most favorable position which can be described by one phrase only: "We told you so!" The pessimistic assessment given by him in the New Year's Eve address to the legislative speaker (and for which he was exposed to the "highest rage") proved more adequate to the current situation than the optimistic statements of the president and the first deputy prime minister. Since the art of clairvoyance was much appreciated for centuries in our country, especially in combination with the aura of martyr, it is a safe bet to say that the price hikes strengthened the position of the prime minister and, hence, the left-wing forces supporting him.

With the lack of "bread," the president, who has nothing with which to justify his economic performance, is forced to give people "games."

Perhaps the ongoing anti-corruption campaign will be different from the past ones by the higher rank of the suspected. It seems that the president's people will definitely seize this opportunity to settle accounts with their opponents, both with the old ones, like Kravchuk, for issuing commodity obligations, and the present ones, including Masol, who sanctioned the operation of "Slavutych" and "Respublika" concerns handling the Ukrainian foreign debt. However, it does not change the [president's team's] penchant for campaigns. Future developments can be predicted with almost a 100-percent rate of accuracy. In one or two months, the wave of unmasking will level off. "Shadow economy" bosses, and maybe even Kudyukin himself, will be acquitted due to lack of evidence, while Kravchuk will be simply forgotten. Public attention could again be concentrated on talks about a quick introduction of the national currency.

This cycle was last completed somewhere between the end of last summer and the beginning of this past fall. In addition, it should be noted that the real causes explaining the failing reform remained intact: as in the past, the issue of power has not been resolved; no agreement was reached as to who should get what and how much as a result of privatization; and no economic legislation has been devised so far.

You could sneer at this permanent condition of our power if it were not for one circumstance. Each anti-corruption and anti-organized crime campaign, again due to the absence of a coherent legislative foundation, will inevitably prove to be another step turning Ukraine into a police state in spite of all assurances on the part of our president. The point is that such campaigns typically elevate officials above penal bodies, delegating at the same time control powers to even higher ranking officials.

This leads to a concentration of the state's "power" and "penal" powers at the very top of the power pyramid that is, in fact, beyond the reach of the representative branch. One can already categorically state that Deputy Prime Minister Yevhen Marchuk is virtually the second highest leader in the state today, overseeing all power ministries and structures and, simultaneously, the operation of the executive branch of power. This is quite a meaningful career development for the former Ukrainian Security Service head.

Crimea's Crime Situation Viewed

954F1321C Simferopol KRYMSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 10 Feb 95 p 1

[Report by Valentina Selivanova: "We Need Zheglov and Sharapovs"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The question of what the militia is doing about the rising number of murders, muggings, and theft has long become a rhetorical one. Journalists had the opportunity to get the answer, so to say, first-hand at the press conference on the subject of Crimean criminal investigations' work.

Militia Major General V.A. Petukhov, chief of the republic criminal militia, made a small detour into the history of Crimean criminal investigations. It was interesting to learn that December 1920 is considered the official date of birth of Crimean investigations (that was the way it was called then). Its first chief was F.P. Pashekhontsev, who died in the line of duty.

Today the criminal investigation division is one of the main branches in the structure of the criminal militia. People who work here are devoted to their profession and risk their lives every day. While the total of 2,046 crimes already have been registered in Crimea over January of this year, 1,751 of them fall under the criminal investigations jurisdiction. Of them, 997 are grave. It was noted that the number of grave resonating crimes has risen lately. Solving them is the direction of the criminal investigations division's efforts.

The presentation of sad statistics was continued by Militia Colonel O.D. Kochegarov, chief of the criminal investigations division, the only criminal investigations officer in Ukraine awarded the title of distinguished jurist. He said that 349 premeditated murders were committed in Crimea in 1994 (270 in 1993), 583 instances of grave bodily harm, 97 rapes, 407 muggings, 7,068 thefts of collective and public property, and 11,846 thefts of individuals' personal property—4,443 of them apartment burglaries. He also named the percentage of crimes solved. In particular, those that already have been investigated and referred to courts. In 1994, it was 34.2 percent and in 1993—30.4 percent. But almost 3,000 already-solved crimes are in the process of being brought to a logical conclusion.

It was said that the greatest number of crimes against individuals are committed in Kerch, Yalta, Yevpatoria, Saki, in Nizhnegorskiy and Simferopolskiy Rayons, in the republic center's Zheleznodorozhnyy Rayon, and other places. Among those already referred to court are 207 cases on crimes committed by juveniles. Also alarming is the fact that among the persons charged with crimes, 56 had prior convictions.

So-called contract murders have become frequent lately. Over the past years, gang members committed 34 such murders. In most cases, using firearms. To the question whether the organizers of such crimes can be charged under an article of the Criminal Code, it was said that unfortunately, it is very difficult to prove culpability in such cases. Although examples were cited when criminal investigations personnel averted contract murders and their organizers were charged.

It was said that of particular concern today is the growing number of crimes committed by juveniles. They commit four to five crimes daily, and last year accounted for one in five. Eighty-two percent of all juvenile crime is theft, robberies, and muggings. Organs of internal affairs are practically the only organization dealing with juvenile crime. What is needed, however, is a long-term state program to work with juveniles and engage in crime prevention. It was noted that the cause of many crimes is the lack of things to do and the worsening economic situation of families—that is, our current realities.

Of course, journalists were obviously interested in the progress of investigation of criminal actions committed in Simferopol: contract murders and bombings. Investigation is being conducted, they were told. The damage from the bombing of the Vialaki company store, in particular, is estimated at \$15,000. A special group of criminal investigations officers is trying to find a connection with similar crimes committed in other places.

It was acknowledged that, unfortunately, there are instances of "binding" between militia personnel and the criminal world. In Yevpatoria, six members of internal affairs organs have been arrested for this crime. There is a special internal security service in the Crimean Internal Affairs Administration, whose task is to identify

such crimes. This may be a topic for a separate press conference for members of the media. Journalists were shown filmed episodes of criminal investigations officers's daily work. Press conference participants also answered journalists' other questions.

New Crimea Leftist Union States Platform

954F1322A Simferopol KRYMSKIYE IZVESTIYA in Russian 10 Feb 95 p 1

["Resolution of Republic Conference of the Union of Workers, Peasants, and the Working Intelligentsia of Crimea"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Workers and all working people of Crimea!

Comrades!

The disastrous policy of self-isolation imposed on Ukraine by its leadership has brought about economic catastrophe.

The collapse of the unified state—the Soviet Union—has caused the destruction of production, scientific, and cultural ties, and entailed a decline in production unprecedented even for wartime.

There is no longer any doubt that the anti-popular course that has been proposed by President of Ukraine L. Kuchma is ruinous both for Ukraine and for Crimea. Those who still hope that his program will help us emerge from the profound crisis and alleviate the life of the working man are profoundly mistaken. Numerous facts indicate that the president's program corresponds to the interests not of the working people but the latter-day comprador bourgeoisie, whom the people call "fat cats."

The Republic of Crimea, whose leadership is preoccupied with mutual ambitions and a shareout of portfolios, has been assigned the role of passive executant of the anti-popular economic experiments, a consequence of which have been a rapid fall in the living standard, which has cast the majority of the population beyond the poverty line, the deprivation of social safeguards, and the loss of a sense of security, confidence in the future, and a secure old age.

All that has been achieved by the strenuous labor of several generations of Soviet people—a great united country with a developed economy and a powerful Armed Forces, the relatively prosperous material situation of the vast majority of the citizens, and social protection ensuring the practical realization of the right to labor, housing, free education, and treatment—has been lost in just three years. The living standard of the working people has declined in this time tenfold. Mortality in Crimea is in excess of the birthrate. The industrial enterprises are practically at a standstill. Crimea is increasingly forfeiting its own resources to provide the populace with food. Crime is raging, health care, public

education, and the cultural sphere are being ravaged, and the youth is being corrupted.

We representatives of the work force and organizations and institutions of Crimea, concerned for the fate of our motherland and our children's future, declare our intentions to actively conduct a political struggle for our rights and social justice and are to this end creating the Union of Workers, Peasants, and the Working Intelligentsia of Crimea.

We will fight for:

the denunciation of the Belovezhskoye agreements and the phased restoration on a voluntary basis of the single union state;

the maximum possible representation of the working people in the organs of soviet power;

a reduction in the machinery of administration of the state organs of power;

early elections of the Supreme Council of Crimea;

the elimination of the institution of the presidency in Crimea;

an end to forcible, hasty privatization as a system of the predatory redistribution of state property;

prevention of private ownership of the land and natural resources;

state support for farms of the agro-industrial complex;

the adoption of a law on employment and the fight against unemployment, and the assurance in practice of a real subsistence level for the people;

restoration of public control over production and income;

a change of economic policy and the implementation of emergency measures of state regulation for an end to the decline in production, the fight against inflation, and a rise in the people's living standard;

the return to the working people of guaranteed socioeconomic rights to labor, recreation, living quarters, free education and medical services, and a secure old age;

assurance of state support for the family and mother and child;

the suppression of crime and a tightening of punitive measures in respect to persons involved in the theft of property, corruption, speculation, and gangsterism;

restoration of the country's scientific potential;

a strengthening of the working people's ties to subunits of the Army and Navy.

We advocate cooperation with the Communist Party of Crimea, the unions, and all organizations and movements sharing our goals and tasks.

We appeal to all workers, peasants, and the working intelligentsia of Crimea to unite their efforts in the fight for the interests of the working people and against slavery and exploitation, want, and starvation. Tomorrow will be too late.

The yoke is already round our necks.

Our slogan was and remains:

"Workers of the world, unite!"

Crimean Party Demands Law Favoring Minorities

WS1402160495 Simferopol KRYMSKA SVITLYTSYA in Ukrainian 4 Feb 95 p 1

["Open letter" from the Council of the Ukrainian Civic Congress of Crimea to S.P. Tsekov, head of the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, issued in Simferopol on 27 January]

[FBIS Translated Text] The elections of deputies to the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea in 1994 revealed their nationalist, pro-Russian orientation, which prevented Ukrainians from being represented in the Supreme Council. For this reason, 700,000 Ukrainians inhabiting the peninsula cannot democratically participate in resolving either Crimean or their own national issues.

In connection with the law on the elections of deputies and the heads of rural, settlement, rayon, city, and rayon-within-city councils, which was adopted by the Crimean Supreme Council, and proceeding from a resolution from the second congress of the Ukrainian Civic Congress of Crimea, we demand that an amendment be made to this law and to the law on elections to the Crimean Supreme Council to grant proportional deputy representation in the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea to the Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar people.

The adoption of such an amendment will enable the Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar people to have representatives in the central and local power bodies who will defend their interests, and to consolidate society on the peninsula to resolve important problems in our lives.

Approved by the Council of the Ukrainian Civic Congress of Crimea

[Dated] 27 January 1995, the city of Simferopol

Nationalist Group Calls For Russian Sanctions

LD1402185495 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 1600 GMT 14 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The leadership of the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists has called on the president, Supreme Council, and Government of Ukraine to recognize the independence of the Chechen Republic and appeal to the United Nations Organization to propose the use of universally accepted forms of influence on

Russia which, for a long time and on many occasions, has violated human rights in Chechnya. The statement by the congress maintains, in particular, that, while peaceful negotiations in Chechnya are possible on condition that the Russian forces are fully withdrawn, Moscow is unlikely to agree to that step.

It is pressure by the international community and the use of economic sanctions against Russia alone that will force its current leadership to end bloodshed, the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists believes. Members of the congress think that the intention of the Estonian parliament to recognize the independence of the Chechen republic can set an example to all countries of the civilized world.

Communists Seek Presidential Action To Uphold Constitution

LD1402210795 Kiev UNIAR in Ukrainian 1915 GMT 14 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev, 14 Feb—Ukraine's Communists for Social Justice and Democracy issued a public statement about the transfer of deputies to professional work. It notes that deputies who have been elected for a four-year term work on a permanent basis with full release from electoral or official duties. However, there are some deputies, for example, who head ministries or committees or work in the president's administration.

The communists are demanding that the president of Ukraine, as the guarantor of the Constitution, should take measures to remove violations of the Constitution and laws of Ukraine with regard to those deputies who work in the presidential administration. They have in mind: Vasyl Durdynets, Oleksandr Novikov, Yuliy Yoffe, Viktor Pynzenyk, Anatoliy Holubchenko, Roman Shpek, Yuriy Karasyk, as well as other deputies that work in the armed forces of Ukraine.

The statement was signed by Petro Symonenko.

Economic Revival Party Demands Civil Order

954F1321A Simferopol KRYMSKIYE IZVESTIYA in Russian 10 Feb 95 p 1

[Staff information: "The Current Information Concerns Everyone"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In connection with the worsened crime situation, the political council of the PERC [Party of Economic Revival of Crimea] drafted a statement saying that the brutal assassination attempt on Krymgaz director V. Sinelnik and the terrorist act against the Vialaki store cannot be written off to the increased score-settling between mafia structures. Until we put an end to crime, we will not be able effectively to implement economic reforms aimed at improving Crimeans' welfare.

This is not the first time the PERC has called for a decisive imposition of order on our peninsula, by

applying tough measures to people committing unlawful acts. In its statement, the PERC political council demands that the parliament and the Government of the Republic of Crimea immediately look into the current situation and adopt the relevant legislative acts, as well as measures on providing material support for law enforcement organs.

The PERC appeals to all citizens of Crimea who have unregistered firearms to surrender them voluntarily to law enforcement organs, and it calls for consolidation of all forces to ensure guarantees of peace and harmony.

National Guard Patrols Kerch

954F1321B Simferopol KRYMSKIYE IZVESTIYA in Russian 10 Feb 95 p 1

[Report by S. Kurin: "Spetsnaz Patrols the Streets"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Patrols in the uniforms of the National Guard of Ukraine have appeared on the streets of Kerch.

While one can recognize our home militia a kilometer away by their blue uniforms, the spotted camouflage uniforms of young, strong lads still elicit some puzzlement. We have learned that in keeping with Order No. 437, dated 26 June 1993, of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the National Guard of Ukraine (NGU) command, upon completion of the preparatory measures together with militia officers, the guard was sent to patrol city streets with one single task—maintaining public order. They are subordinate to the Supreme Council of Ukraine, and are under the immediate leadership of the National Guard's commander in chief.

By the way, we would like to remind our readers that insulting or refusing to obey, as well as threats or attempts on the life of NGU personnel is punishable by law.

Economic Issues

Finance, Economy Ministry Teams Complete Draft Budget

WS1502103195 Lvov INFOBANK in English 0805 GMT 15 Feb 95

[From the "News Service" feature]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] On February 14, a working group of the Ukrainian Ministry of the Economy and the Ministry of Finance, with the participation of experts from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the National Bank of Ukraine [NBU], completed their work on the draft Ukrainian national budget for 1995. This draft includes a deficit of 5 percent of GNP. By this step, the Ukrainian Government fulfilled the requirement which was made by the IMF for the granting of standby credit, which is estimated to be \$1.3 billion. First Deputy Prime Minister Viktor Pynzenyk, Minister of the Economy Roman Shpek, Deputy Chairman of the NBU

Board Volodymyr Stelmakh, Petro Hetmanchuk, Minister of Finance, and Peter Hole, head of the IMF mission in Ukraine responsible for resolving the question of granting standby credit, will take part in a meeting on February 16. During this meeting the participants will discuss the draft of the Ukrainian national budget. Subsequently the Cabinet of Ministers will submit the draft budget to the Supreme Council for approval. Mykhaylo Zinchuk, expert for economic affairs at the Ministry of the Economy, told an INFOBANK correspondent that on February 17, the IMF mission will report to the Executive Board of the IMF in Washington on the likelihood of the enactment of the Ukrainian national budget. The Executive Board of the IMF will then make a final decision regarding the granting of standby credit to Ukraine.

Economics Minister Views Economic Reform

WS1502100095 Kiev URYADOVY KURYER in Ukrainian 4 Feb 95 p 3

[Interview with Economics Minister R.V. Shpek by Z. Krasnodemska; place and date not given: "Life Will Improve"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Krasnodemska] Roman Vasylyovych, for how many years has the government tried to overcome the economic crisis? About a dozen various stabilization programs have been drafted and adopted. They did not work, however, and no measures were efficient. Why?

[Shpek] The main reason is that the previous programs were not implemented; this implies, first of all, an absence of political will on the part of the state leadership, in particular the structures that we call the executive power. The existence of a program, however, does not mean that reform will be implemented. As I said, what is needed to implement any program is political will, a strong and purposeful team, a concrete mechanism through which the program is supposed to be and will be implemented, and a system to monitor and track the initial results and correspondingly correct the course of reform.

I should mention at the same time that not everything depends on executive power alone. Something that Ukrainian Supreme Council Chairman Oleksandr Moroz said—"The one who does not miss the USSR has no heart, while the one who thinks about its return has no brains"—remains imprinted on my mind. I would like all people's deputies to unite around these words by the chairman of our legislature and think hard about how to build a strong Ukrainian state. Legislative acts and Supreme Council decrees, however, have been adopted, in particular, those lending support to the presidential program to conduct economic reform. We so far hear only numerous slogans from the legislature calling for a change in the economic course. There are also instances of executive structures impeding the implementation of adopted decisions.

Our state, however, has the ability to develop; it can be strong and rich, if all branches of power act in unison. Naturally, there may be different views on resolving one problem or another and contradictions may arise. These should be examined and coordinated before a decision is adopted, because later these decisions will have to be implemented unconditionally by everyone. We cannot have discussions taking place at the implementation stage.

So, in order for the current presidential program not to suffer the same fate as previous programs, all of us should unite as a single team, adopt a law on power, and strive for the implementation of the adopted decision. In addition, it should be emphasized that the current presidential program has an advantage over all the previous ones, primarily in that it predicts the macroeconomic figures, the rate of inflation, and the money supply.

To tell the truth, the program has its opponents, who say that not everything has been thought over here, not everything has been weighed, however, no one has yet put forward an alternative program with infallible calculations or specific mechanisms. By the way, I am against fighting over whose program is better and all the discussions that go with it. The presidential program, however, was put forward and adopted by the Supreme Council, so the efforts by all branches of power should be directed toward its implementation. Only then will we be able to enable the Ukrainian state to become economically strong and, to some extent, independent (as the world sees it). But there are no absolutely independent states, because some are independent in terms of energy, while others are independent politically. Exactly the same thing goes for Ukraine, which was proclaimed a politically independent state. Therefore, by implementing the presidential program, the government, the legislature, and the people of Ukraine must do everything to make our state economically independent so that we can eliminate the negative trade balance, rely on our financial strength, have no debts either to Russia, Turkmenistan, the United States, or the European countries, and service and pay off the loans we are taking on a timely basis.

[Krasnodemska] What would you say about the current economic situation in Ukraine? What anti-inflationary measures should be used in the near future?

[Shpek] To describe the current economic situation in Ukraine, we should, undoubtedly begin with 1990. Over the past four years the national income has fallen almost 50 percent. This shows that the state has the financial opportunities to resolve critical issues or apply the appropriate programs. [sentence as published] Naturally, social services have not been cut. Medical services, education, health protection, and maintenance of the army and interior organs have remained at the same level, but due to the reduction of the national income, the state's possibilities have been sharply limited. For example, the state cannot currently take upon itself the purchase of all agricultural produce. At the same time, as a primary purchaser, it cannot leave this market without

establishing new mechanisms. As a result, decisions to reform agrarian relations, decisions pertaining to state contracts on agricultural produce, and a variety of other documents have been adopted recently. All this creates new conditions, when the state finances from the budget only what is necessary for the functioning of the state budgetary sphere and the formation of state reserves. In particular, this applies to the system of selling surplus crops from previous years at stock exchanges. The first stock exchange sales, incidentally, were held on 27 January of this year.

Having no sufficient budget resources, the state is forced to create such a mechanism, by means of which all structures, private or joint-stock, that have spare funds at their disposal, are attracted to financing the agrarian sector. They, however, are entitled to own part of the agricultural produce, that is to say, to dispose of it at their own discretion. Naturally, this does not imply that Ukraine can remain without bread, that all foodstuffs will be exported. This will never happen. We have developed comprehensive mechanisms against this. The most important issue is not to cheat the agricultural producer, not to make promises and pay for his labor with worthless bits of paper, thus putting another loop into the inflationary spiral.

Among the anti-inflationary measures, in particular, are price liberalization, liberalization of foreign business activity and business activity in general, and the development of entrepreneurship and competitiveness....

The refusal by the state to subsidize bankrupt enterprises is another efficient restraining lever. Everyone must live according to how they work.

Moreover, there should be a clear-cut division between the social and production spheres. For example, the social sphere should be managed from the budget. A producer should be able to draft not only a production plan, a quantitative one, but also a financial plan, to stabilize production by means of revenues that will become a primary source of replenishing working capital and forming investment funds.

Therefore, we should also critically revise investment programs and a few populist social programs, and boldly allow the nonstate sector to participate in the production and implementation of state, or all-Republican, programs.

There are many mechanisms. They also include an additional issue of stock to the value of property subject to privatization and the value of investments. The primary issue is to grant guarantees, so that an individual who has invested money (regardless of whether this is a Russian or a Ukrainian investor, or an investor from the far abroad), is given guarantees and the right to use his dividends. Undoubtedly, given such conditions, we should also work out an appropriate stance toward monopoly enterprises to prevent them from disrupting prices on the domestic market.

One more thing. Anti-inflationary measures are connected with strict credit and monetary and budget policy, in particular, with balancing budget expenditures and revenues. A decision that was adopted to the effect that the budget deficit should not exceed 5 percent is not an invention and was not foisted upon us by the West. Ukraine can actually cover this by credits from the IMF, the World Bank, potential loans from Russia, Turkmenistan, Japan, EU or a variety of other states, or by issuing securities. If the budget deficit becomes more sizable we will not be able to cover it. This will lead to a further twist in the inflationary spiral which could develop into hyperinflation. It is primarily the poorest segments of the population who suffer most from inflation. These measures, therefore, have not been thrust upon us. They will provide us with the opportunity to stabilize production.

Everyone also knows that it is impossible to stabilize production without financial stabilization. During the planned, socialist economy, we attached great importance to the balance of material and labor resources. (They also struck a balance between financial resources, but for some reason we do not remember this now.) We need all this, but balance in financial resources is of primary importance right now.

Certain managers often try to plan production output—1 million tonnes of steel, 1 million pairs of shoes, tractors, and so on—without considering either the financial opportunities or whether there is any demand for this kind of product on the domestic or foreign market.

Regrettably, most products manufactured at our enterprises are uncompetitive on Western markets, where money is available. The states of the former USSR, in fact, can purchase these products, but they have no funds. In addition, high quality goods from the West and East are penetrating the markets. We should pay special attention to the development of new, mutually beneficial relations, first of all with Russia, as well as with other states of the erstwhile Soviet Union. Economic expediency and profit are primary factors in such relations.

I am convinced that the implementation of our president's program, the first stage of which envisages only financial stabilization, is the implementation of anti-inflationary measures. If the government and National Bank coordinate their fiscal, credit, and budgetary policies, we will make progress.

[Krasnodemska] Many economists believe that to overcome the crisis, it is necessary first and foremost to restructure our economy....

[Shpek] I also share this opinion. I would like to remind you that until recently Ukraine was not an independent state. Its economy was a small part of the economy of the great Soviet Union. Therefore, it is clear that first of all we should now specialize our economy in new fields to meet the demands of the domestic market and our population, at the same time looking for opportunities to create new markets.

[Krasnodemska] How can we resolve the situation? Or, to be more exact, how can we change the structure of the economy to meet today's demands?

[Shpek] In the agricultural sector, we should primarily pay attention to processing and creating reserves of harvested crops. Farm managers should think about how to increase the harvesting yield and the productivity of the cattle-breeding sector, that is, of every sector related to agricultural production. The primary point here is that this should be done by attracting existing money, rather than printing it.

As for the chemical, metallurgical, and machine-building industries, we need to pursue a strict policy aimed at conserving energy and resources and increasing labor productivity and the quality of goods. Enterprises unable to fit in the framework of modernization should either retool or simply mothball their production. Another path, however, is possible: A new owner—producing competitive goods—will emerge. First of all, we should look after the sectors from which we can gain something, such as machine-building, aircraft construction, and shipbuilding.

Projects for further financing a specific enterprise or a specific program to increase the production of competitive goods that will enable us to make additional profits are being drafted. It is precisely by making such profits that we will be able to raise Ukraine's economy in general, although naturally we will not be able to boost the entire system of the metallurgy, gas, and machine-building sectors that worked jointly for the military industry of the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Treaty, Vietnam, Angola, Ethiopia, and a variety of other states.

The thing we should not be afraid of is investments, and not only foreign ones, because our state has people and entire structures that have earned capital. They should be given the opportunity to invest their money for Ukraine's benefit. This money should not flow abroad because this only harms our state. Ukraine's economy should be efficient, productive, and low-cost. This could be achieved by increasing the productiveness of joint labor and reducing the power-output ratio. Our producers should learn marketing; they should not proceed from the idea of who produces and purchases goods, but should think about what products are in demand and how to improve their quality.

Demand, supply, and competitiveness will force our producers to plan their expenditures and production costs at a level that will enable them to make a profit. This is a difficult thing to do. However, I hope we will cope with it.

[Krasnodemska] What is your economic forecast for this year? Will economic reform begin to work? Will we be able to curb inflation?

[Shpek] Yes, unquestionably, reform will work.... If we are united, if the president, who heads the executive

branch, receives support from the legislative branch that adopted his program. If the regional leaders, oblast council chiefs, and all of Ukraine's population unite to make reform work, we will curb inflation and life ahead of us will indeed be better.

If we hesitate over whether to begin reform or not, or whether it is expedient, we will not, naturally, achieve anything and a deepening of the economic crisis, a drop in production, and reduction in living standards will await us in the future.... Social protection is one of the primary tasks of the state at a time when it is implementing market reform. People should be protected. Even though reform makes great demands on all of us, we must go ahead. It is impossible to skip an epoch, however, and we can and must—painful as it may be—proceed along this thorny path.

Sevastopol Offered Debt Relief Package

LD1402192095 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 1530 GMT
14 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Sevastopol—To grant the city of Sevastopol a budgetary loan amounting to 750 billion karbovantsi in the first quarter of 1995 to cover the debts of state-financed organizations for the payment of salaries and to write off the city's total debts of 1.367 billion karbovantsi to the Ukrainian state budget for 1994, this was the decision adopted at a conference in the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine under the chairmanship of First Deputy Prime Minister Yevhen Marchuk. Finance Minister Petro Hermanchuk also took part in the work. The conference was held under an instruction of President Kuchma, following his meeting with the Viktor Semenov, chairman of the Sevastopol city council. The press service of the Sevastopol city council told UNIAN about this on 14 February.

The conference reached an agreement on increasing supplies of gas to the city, to write off the debts of establishments financed from the local budget, as well as the debt of the housing and municipal management services for receiving heat and electricity, totalling 63.5 billion karbovantsi from enterprises of the Ministry of Power Engineering.

Having examined the documents submitted by Viktor Semenov on the formation of the budget and stabilizing Sevastopol's economy in 1995, the representatives of the Cabinet of Ministers agreed to submit for the parliament's consideration an application on the amount of subsidy for the city and to continue financing measures that were financed in 1994 from Ukraine's state budget.

Cabinet Resolution Sets Out Guidelines for Prices

LD1402184495 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 1440 GMT
14 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev—In its resolution of 13 February, the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers has defined the powers of central bodies of state executive

power, the Crimean government, and local executive committees in the pricing sphere.

In accordance with the resolution, the Ukrainian Ministry of Economy determines the procedure for regulating tariffs for electric energy and Ukraine's Ministry of Coal Industry determines wholesale prices for coal and coal products.

Ukraine's Ministry of Economy, together with the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Machine-Building, Military-Industrial Complex, and Conversion, and the Ministry of Defense, is to confirm the provisions on the procedure for regulating prices for products of defense designation. In its turn, the Ministry of Defense is to determine the limits to the prices for products of public catering enterprises in military camps and is to regulate prices for the repair of armaments and military equipment and for spare parts.

The Ukrainian Ministry of Transportation is to establish tariffs for transporting cargoes by rail and for transporting passengers, tariffs and duties for servicing vessels in Ukraine's sea and river ports, air navigation duties, and so on.

Ukraine's Ministry of Finance, in coordination with the Ministry of Economy and Ukraine's National Bank, is to approve prices for precious metals in manufactured products and scrap metal and precious stones purchased from the population.

The Ukrainian Ministry of Industry is to regulate prices for coke and products of the mining, metallurgical and chemical industries.

In accordance with the resolution, the rent for apartments is established as follows: 1,500 karbovantsi for one square meter from 1 February, 2,600 karbovantsi from 1 May, 4,000 from 1 July, 6,000 from 1 September of this year. Rent for apartments is increased by 30 percent for surplus space (except for one-room apartments).

Ministry Ordered To Publish 'Certain' Prices

WS1402155895 Kiev UKRINFORM in English 0810
GMT 14 Feb 95

[From the "Business News Weekly" feature No. 6, 6-12 Feb 95]

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] According to the Ukrainian president's decree of August 25, 1994 "On Measures to Preclude Export of Commodities Which Originate in Ukraine and Which May Be Regarded as Dumping, and on Settlement of Trade Disputes," the Ministry for Foreign Economic Relations should publish lists of indicative prices for basic commodities not later than the fifth day of every month, with these commodities categorized as stable exportable and highly liquid.

Such commodities may not be exported at prices, which are lower than the stated indicative ones. [passage omitted]

Presidential Decree on Gas Procurement Company
*WS1402142495 Kiev UKRINFORM in English 0810
GMT 14 Feb 95*

[From the "Business News Weekly" feature No. 6, 6-12 Feb 95: "UkrResursy To Secure Ukraine's Natural Gas Imports"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The UkrResursy state-run joint-stock company will be in charge of purchasing natural gas piped to Ukraine under intergovernmental agreements and other contracts, in accordance with the Ukrainian President's decree of February 7, 1995, "On Providing Ukraine's National Economy and Population with Natural Gas and Settlement for It in 1995".

Until UkrResursy closes the contract with Russia's Gazprom, the UkrGazProm joint-stock society will still be responsible for payment for natural gas supplies to Ukraine.

Under the presidential decree, the State Committee for Petroleum, Gas, and Oil-Refining Industries (GosNefte-GazProm) will act together with UkrResursy.

Direct and indirect contracts involving Ukraine's natural gas imports will have to be adjusted to relevant intergovernmental agreements of Ukraine by March 1, 1995.

The decree also instructed the Cabinet of Ministers to submit, within a two-week term, its proposals involving application of acceptance-free payment patterns.

The Ministry of Economics will have to draft pricing procedures involving all categories of consumers by March 1, 1995. These will reportedly proceed from natural gas tariffs expressed in U.S. dollars and will incorporate transit gas piping charges and UkrGazProm's expenses involving maintenance, operation, and upgrading of Ukraine's gas pipeline system.

Several other ministries and departments will be involved in supporting UkrResursy's contract by assisting it in meeting its contractual commitments.

In particular, these ministries and departments will have to ensure:

- UkrResursy's preferential acquisition of hard currency to settle for natural gas;
- mandatory and priority conclusion of contracts with UkrResursy or its authorized and designated agents by enterprises involving supplies of their products necessary to settle with GazProm;
- gratuitous transfer and shipment of products to UkrResursy during February-June involving the 1994 State Contract's procurement;
- quota and license issuance to UkrResursy for exports of products.

The presidential decree named Deputy Prime Ministers Mytyukov, Osyka, and Dyuba as the people who will exercise control over its implementation.

Deputy Prime Minister on Reasons for Credit Emission

*LD1402184995 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 1520 GMT
14 Feb 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev—Five percent of the budget deficit is 201 trillion karbovantsi, 160 trillion karbovantsi of which the government wants to cover by means of emission, explained First Deputy Prime Minister Viktor Pynzenyk in a commentary circulated to the press.

According to Viktor Pynzenyk, the government was resorting to emission because it understood that the population did not have much trust that the deficit would be covered by any means other than by an emission at a time when the budget deficit was so large. On the other hand, the government could not avoid paying wages and social benefits.

Viktor Pynzenyk stressed that in the first quarter the budget deficit would be higher than 5 percent because most disbursements take place at the beginning of the year owing to various subsidies.

State To Procure Grain Through 'Forward Deals'

*WS1402151395 Kiev UKRINFORM in English 0810
GMT 14 Feb 95*

[From the "Business News Weekly" feature No. 6, 6-12 Feb 95]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Cabinet of Ministers and NBU [National Bank of Ukraine] adopted a resolution on February 10 which specifies that grain to be procured under the state contract for 1995 will be purchased through forward deals with prepayment of 50 percent of their sums. Prices involved in the contracts will be set in U.S. dollars. Final settlement will follow after the grain growers repay their advance sums as grain marketing progresses at prices which were valid on the days the deals were concluded. Grain buyers will cover transportation and storage expenses.

NBU has opened a special account to ensure grain purchases (its official designation is "Budgetary Accounts for Financing the State Contract for Grain to Be Harvested in 1995"). Sums from the above account will be allocated primarily to prop up vernal agricultural work.

The state financial bodies will resort to this account to pay sums under deals concluded between grain producers and procuring agencies, as well as payment transfers from the producers meant for acquisition of fuels, lubricants, seeds, mineral fertilizers, pesticides, spare parts, and agricultural machinery.

The producer's outstanding debt to the state will be included in the state contract for 1995.

Recent Changes in Tariffs for Oil Transit Viewed

WS1402142595 Kiev UKRINFORM in English 0810 GMT 14 Feb 95

[From the "Business News Weekly" feature No. 6, 6-12 Feb 95]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] According to spokespersons of the Druzhba (Friendship) major oil pipeline's management, new tariffs were set effective January 19 1995, for transit piping of Russian oil intended for export via Ukrainian pipelines which reportedly range (depending on the amount, distance and petroleum quality) from \$2.35 to \$4.90 per tonne of oil per 100 km. of pipelines.

Russia's TransNeft poses as the major partner of the Ukrainian major pipeline administrations (the aforementioned Druzhba, Transdniprian major pipelines).

In early January 1995, Druzhba virtually discontinued transit piping of Russian crude petroleum, which brought the Czech, Slovak, and Hungarian oil importers to the verge of abrogating their contracts with the exporter-firms. However, the Ukrainian part of the Druzhba administration is generally thought not to be the party at fault, since the underlying reason was the Russian oil exporters' failure to settle payment with the Ukrainian partner for transit petroleum piping in a timely fashion.

As Lyubomir Bunyak, Druzhba's C.E.O. in Ukraine, flatly stated, Ukraine received neither timely requests involving transit piping, nor charge payment notifications, in view of which transportation of Russian crude oil was suspended from January 1 through 7.

According to Mr. Bunyak, the new tariffs do not differ much from 1994's which averaged \$3.75 per tonne of Russian oil.

In November 1994, the Ukrainian side set the tariff at \$5.2 per tonne, which remained effective until January 17, 1995 (when a decision was made to reduce the maximum charge to \$4.90).

However, the Ukrainian party reportedly intends to increase the maximum charge to \$5.20 in the second quarter of 1995. As Mr. Bunyak maintains, his estimates suggest that the maximum charge should be eventually raised to at least \$7.20 per tonne of oil.

In 1994, Russia's TransNeft signed a contract with the Ukrainian UkrTransNeft state-run company which provided for transit piping of Russian oil to the Odessa Import-Export Enterprise (it was set on the base of the Odessa Petroleum Harbor). The latter was in charge of transporting Russian petroleum via the Transdniprian major oil pipeline system. UkrTransNeft was set up in compliance with the Ukrainian President's decree of March 16, 1994. For some unspecified reasons however,

its activity was blocked by the Ukrainian State Committee for Oil and Gas; these resulted in sizable material losses. Presently, attempts are being made to revive the company through also including it in some rolling-stock. As experts believe, the company's most recent operational pattern appears reasonably efficient and unlikely to be altered.

Within a mere six months, TransNeft and UkrTransNeft succeeded in making Russian oil transit piping more orderly, which resulted in a normal even workload for the Odessa Oil Harbor.

During the May-August 1994 period, the Transdniprian system of major oil pipelines carried about 4 million tonnes of crude oil and petroleum products.

Article on Progress of Land Plots Privatization

WS1502080995 Kiev SILSKE ZHYTTYA in Ukrainian 9 Feb 95 p 4

[Report by Viktor Kozoriz: "4.2 Million Citizens of Ukraine Have Already Privatized Their Land Plots, But Nobody Knows the Degree of Shadow Privatization"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Experts from the department of land reform at the Ukrainian State Committee for Land Resources have analyzed information obtained from oblast land resource departments about the progress of privatization of land plots by Ukrainian citizens as of 1 January 1995. What does this analysis show? Out of 13 million citizens entitled to the privatization of land, this right has been used to their advantage by nearly 4.2 million people (31.6 percent). We have privatized nearly 6 million plots of land with a total area of 1.5 million hectares. Nearly 600,000 applications are currently being examined by local councils of people's deputies. By way of comparison, only 2.5 million citizens (19 percent) privatized their land plots as of 1 January 1994. Thus, as we can see, the privatization of land is not standing still. The problem is that this process is advancing at different speeds in different regions of Ukraine.

Privatization is advancing dynamically and consistently in Volyn, Sumy, Ivano-Frankivsk, Chernivtsi, Zhytomir, Ternopil, and Khmelnytsky Oblasts. In these oblasts, people have privatized over 50 percent of plots formerly allotted to them for running subsidiary farms, constructing dwellings, etc. As to Donetsk, Kharkiv, and Lugansk Oblasts as well as Sevastopol, less than 10 percent of the land plots have been privatized. No land has been privatized in Kiev. Experts point out that, on the whole, cities are much slower in resolving privatization issues than suburban areas or the countryside. This is due to factors influencing the prospects for town-building, and the lack of clear legislative norms regulating land management in towns. The privatization rate is also impacted by such factors as unfavorable attitudes toward private ownership, vague taxation policies, and inadequate public information. In addition, drawing up

the technical documentation to obtain the state certificate of private land ownership requires certain expenses, which today amount to nearly 600,000 karbovanetses. For some people, this is a trifling sum, but for others it constitutes a considerable part of the family budget. However, one must note that, according to governmental decree, the right of private land ownership is granted to a citizen immediately after a resolution on its granting has been passed by the appropriate council of people's deputies. It is up to the citizen whether and how he desires to dispose of this right in his state certificate.

Now about the things remaining outside any statistical reports—the shadow privatization of land. Here is what Boris Chepkov, head of the Ukrainian State Committee for Land Resources, said in this regard:

"This process is not controlled by the state. Therefore, I have tried to gather information from rural councils about the nationality of people owing land in Ukraine. It turns out that their geographic range is large. It comprises Africa, Scandinavia, Canada, the United States,

and Germany, not to mention the near abroad. Land-plots are being legalized by figureheads—this can be done by anyone who is willing, starting with aerobic instructors and ending with astronauts. This is why the state is obliged to interfere in the process of registering the ownership of land. We need to establish an efficient land registration system, a system for registering ownership and land use rights.

"Currently, we carry out land valuations by hand, whereas by using some automatic process, we would be able to get rid of many problems, including the shadow privatization of land plots. Donetsk Oblast provided an example for us in this respect. When a computerized system had been introduced for the Donetsk suburban area, it turned out that there were individuals owing up to seven or eight land plots. This is where we need to bring order. Therefore, we are simply forced to mark the granting of land plots to owners in their passports. We are currently examining the issue of reregistering rights to land plots in general. It is another matter how we will do this, but we need to use some kind of filter."

Belarus

Popular Front Activist on Union With Russia

WS1502110095 Minsk SVABODA in Belarusian
1 Feb 95 p 6

[Interview with Syarhey Navumchyk, coordinator of the Belarusian Popular Front Opposition in the Supreme Soviet, by Pyatro Pankratovich; place and date not given: "In Duma, They Say That 'the Belarusians Are Trying in Vain To Sit on the Fence'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Parliamentary hearings on Russian-Belarusian relations were held at the Russian State Duma last week. Deputy Syarhey Navumchyk, coordinator of the Belarusian Popular Front [BNF] Opposition in the Supreme Soviet, was a member of a group of Belarusian parliamentarians who participated in the hearings.

[Navumchyk] The hearings finally convinced me that a union with Belarus is regarded as an opportunity to take revenge for the political fiasco in Chechnya. This is primarily meant for Russian citizens, who will be treated to the candy from a restored "Slavic unity" during the parliamentary and presidential elections. Additionally, supporters of maximum unification are not concerned over the reaction from the West: They understand that the West will not want to challenge Russia. At least, it did not want to do so until recently. For financial and industrial sharks, however, such a unification means an opportunity to obtain free transit, and for generals—new military units, meaning new stars.

[Pankratovich] Could you provide specific examples?

[Navumchyk] Here are several statements by Russian officials I recorded: "Russia should not pay for Belarus' independence, since this independence may turn against us. Russia's interests require state unity with Belarus. Caucasus is burning, and the Belarusians are trying in vain to sit on the fence" (Deputy Yevgeniy Mikhaylov); "A unified customs area means unified rules for foreign economic activities, and in this sense, we are apparently one state" (Georgiy Gabunya, deputy minister of foreign economic relations); "Of course, from the viewpoint of Russia's defense capabilities, the best option is to have united armed forces" (the General Staff deputy chief); "Duma deputies will politically persecute those officials from the federal executive branch who are hampering integration with Belarus" (Konstantin Zatulin, chairman of the Committee for CIS Matters).

Or let us look at the statement by a Border Troops Command representative, who said that the commander of the Belarusian Border Troops will have two deputies—both Russia's representatives. You must realize the level of absurdity of this—it is as if deputies of the French border service chief were German and Belgian generals.

[Pankratovich] Did you try to present BNF's position to the Duma deputies?

[Navumchyk] This was the primary goal of my visit. I had to deliver quite a harsh speech, though I did not transgress the proprieties. I had to present arguments against the customs treaty and against agreements on the deployment of Russian military bases on our territory. These arguments are well known, and I do not have to repeat them. Concluding my speech, I advocated good relations with Russia, though over a solid border.

[Pankratovich] Who else, from the Belarusian representatives, addressed the Duma?

[Navumchyk] I remember best a speech by N. Masherava. I learned a great deal of interesting things about the situation in Belarus. As it came to light, the majority of the Belarusian media is "under the influence of ethno-radicals," an attack on Catholicism is under way, and national-chauvinists are imbuing people with the rejection of everything which is Russian. Finally, "Lukashenka must be supported as the only legitimate guarantor of Belarusian-Russian relations." Natalya Pyatrovna complained that periodicals which "correctly understand" these relations are experiencing shortages of paper.

Her words did not go unheeded. Numerous Russian deputies emphasized that relations between Minsk and Moscow depend on the results of the elections to Belarusian parliament. Mr. Migranyan, adviser to the Russian president, noted that, in the near future, the Ostankino television will correct its "bias, which is currently in favor of national-radicals." And at the end of the hearings, Konstantin Zatulin promised that a substantial portion of Russia's 150-billion credit will be spent to support appropriate newspapers. So far, this is still only a statement, but it is not far from what is called interfering in other state's internal affairs in the language of international practice.

[Pankratovich] Is this position characteristic of all Russian politicians?

[Navumchyk] Although I did not have much time, I managed to talk to representatives of the "Russia's Choice" faction such as Arkadiy Murashov and Defense Committee Chairman Sergey Yushenkov. They realize that market reforms should become a foundation for cooperation, and, as I believe, these deputies have no illusions regarding the pace and depth of reforms in our country. I think that BNF and all democratic forces should enter a principally new level of relations with Russia's democratic parties. Of course, one can accuse them of imperial ambitions, and statements by certain leaders, unfortunately, provide grounds for that. But we could act differently—we could initiate bilateral consultations and explain our positions. Can you imagine what would be Gaydar's reaction if he heard from the Slavic Union "Belaya Rus" chairman that children are prohibited from learning Russian, and that it is hard for Russians to find information in their native language? His reaction, of course, would be negative. Russian deputies, however, did not know that there was no single Belarusian school in Minsk as early as seven years ago,

nor did they know that the overall circulation of Russian-language press exceeds the circulation of Belarusian-language publications. This deficit of objective information from Belarus is perhaps a result of our unwillingness to establish contacts with Russia's democratic leaders. And thus, given all the circumstances, the most fruitful way is to establish mutual contacts and consultations. If Holubew, Barshchewski, or Khadyka [BNF faction deputies] do not go to Moscow, Haydukevich [leader of the Popular Movement of Belarus] and his company will go there and tell them whatever they want. Therefore, let us make a choice.

Moreover, Belarusian politicians should be aware of prospects for the development of the political situation in the East. The Russian president's ratings are lower than ever before, and I also became convinced that democratic movements will not support him during the future elections. One should pay attention to such politicians as Yegor Gaydar and Georgiy Yavlinskiy. I would also single out Sergey Yushenkov, who is free of imperial thinking, and realistically sees prospects for the development of Belarusian-Russian relations. In any event, contacts with these politicians would be beneficial to Belarus.

[Pankratovich] What steps will the opposition take with regard to agreements signed between Belarus and Russia?

[Navumchyk] We will insist that these agreements be submitted to the parliament for ratification. The government and the "vertical line" oppose this, because, apparently, it is not the parliament's business what Chyhir signed. But numerous points of the agreements contradict our legislation, and the Supreme Soviet must thus present its opinion. Deputies from BNF will not vote for the ratification of these documents. Plus, the Collective Security Treaty must be denounced as soon as possible—our boys should not die in Chechnya. Speaking about relations between Belarus and Russia in a broad context, BNF's position is well known: Russia is among our state's priorities; this is the reality. Nevertheless, relations should be built on a parity basis, taking the interests of both sides into account.

Hryb Explains Decision To Ban Weapons in Parliament

LD1402181695 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1705 GMT 14 Feb 95

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature: compiled by Nikolay Zhrebtsov, Andrey Petrovskiy; edited by Vladimir Shishlin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Belarussian parliament has voted to ban the presence of armed persons, including presidential bodyguards in the conference hall.

Speaking in an interview Mechyslaw Hryb said that such rules existed in many civilized countries. "Heated debates between factions and individual deputies are frequent. Some end in insults and bodily assaults", Hryb said. He recalled one such instance, when in reply to a

verbal insult the head of the parliamentary commission for ecology and the rational use of natural resources Boris Savitskiy slapped opposition deputy Leonid Borshevskyy, of the Belarussian Popular Front on the face. "Fortunately, no guns were drawn", Hryb said.

He fears that the bodyguards of various politicians pose no fewer risks.

It must be a rule that everybody entering the building of parliament hands in one's weapons, if any, to the security service and gets them back only when leaving parliament," Hryb said. He remarked that he had never carried arms in parliament himself. Nor had the President, at least to his knowledge. "Deplorably, far from all deputies stick to this rule", Hryb said.

Hryb said that the idea of suspending full-scale parliamentary sessions after the official date of nominating candidates for the new parliament, March 5 made sense in a way. He fears that many of the current MPs would be trying to use parliament to campaign for their platforms and thereby have an advantage over other contenders. But that does not mean that those current officials who are going to seek seats in parliament, including himself, would [be] unable to use television and other mass media, if need be.

"We have quite a few unsettled problems and if full-scale parliamentary sessions are suspended, the solution of those problems would be postponed at least by a year. A new parliament would need much time to establish an effective law-making machinery", Hryb said.

He said that microphones placed in the aisles tempted many law-makers to take the floor to score additional points.

If the hall is re-equipped and each seat has a separate microphone, the situation would be totally different.

Hryb quoted his Russian counterpart Ivan Rybkin as saying that after the State Duma's hall was modernized that way, the number of those willing to speak reduced by half.

President Speaks on Fight Against Crime

MM1402122995 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 14 Feb 95 p 1

[Report from SELSKAYA ZHIZN-ITAR-TASS column: "Crime Has Lashed Republic"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka is prepared to don a bulletproof waistcoat himself and join the struggle against crime. Such an extraordinary statement was heard from the lips of the head of state at a collegium of the Ministry of Internal Affairs with the participation of leaders of all the power structures. The president's concern is no accident. Crime has really lashed the republic, which used to be renowned in the CIS as stable and peaceful. Last year slightly over 120,000 crimes were recorded.

High Officials, Tycoons Set Up National Club*WS1402123795 Minsk ZVYAZDA in Belarusian
7 Feb 95 p 1*

[Report by Valyantsin Zhdanko: "Big Money and Great Power Have United in an Elite National Club"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The nationwide public association has not even been registered with the Justice Ministry so far. In terms of its formal status, once it registers it will become one of the hundreds (if not thousands) of public organizations in our country. In terms of its real political significance and influence on the authorities and public opinion, the newly established "East-West" national club is aspiring to a particular position and an extraordinary role.

The club is to become the beau monde of political and business circles, or an elite get-together of "new Belarusians"—owners of large capital and people who have real power today, or may have it tomorrow.

The real influence of the recently established club can vividly be confirmed by the short list of names on its management board. The club is headed by National Bank Chairman Stanislaw Bahdankevich. Its disciplinary committee (a body which will select members, or exclude them for acts discrediting the club) will be chaired by Viktor Hanchar, former deputy prime minister and the president's supporter, and currently, one of the key activists of the "Civic Accord" liberal centrist bloc. The council also comprises Deputy Prime Minister Mikhail Myasnikovich and Presidential Administration Chief Leonid Sinitsyn. Following is another list of names which, though less familiar to our readers, are unrivaled in Belarus' business circles, in terms of influence: Alyaksandr Pupeyka, Vasil Shlyndzikaw, Dzmitryy Shaikin, Heorhiy Surawnyow, Pyotr Martsaw, and Yuryy Feaktistaw. Who are they?

Alyaksandr Pupeyka, for example, is one of the founders and owners of the well known "Pusha" company, whose turnover, according to Mr. Pupeyka himself, currently amounts to \$150 million.

Stanislaw Bahdankevich, referring to the statute of the new organization, stated that the primary activities include relations, dialogue, discussions, and exchange of information and experience, or, to put it briefly, contacts that should contribute to stability, obedience to the law, and patience in society. All this should consolidate democracy and the market economy. Additionally, according to the statute, the club should not deal with politics, and rules out any use of political methods to achieve goals in the interests of its members. To put it another way, the founders of the national club dissociate themselves from the possibility of lobbying. During a meeting with the national club founders, however, journalists repeatedly raised this issue. Here is how Mr. Hanchar responded to a question concerning the possibility of lobbying:

"Lobbying is out of the question—this contradicts the club's statute. The establishment of such clubs is traditional in any country. The only way of lobbying and influencing public consciousness is the authority of the people united in the club."

Mr. Bahdankevich's response was held in approximately the same tone, though it was less categorical:

"Of course, the club is trying to have influence on social development, as well as on the authorities and public opinion. This influence, however, is for the sake of democracy and the market economy. From this viewpoint, one can see that political lobbying should exist. We want to discuss and develop the most admissible stance and mechanisms for implementing it. We will be gathering to do that."

To emphasize the elite nature of their organization, the national club founders set such an admission fee, that having learned about its amount, certain potential members refused to join the club. The founders did not tell journalists how much the fee was. There were backstage rumors that businessmen who want to join the club must initially pay \$20,000. This is a rather good sieve to sift out small fry and assemble a company pleasant and solid in all respects.

The political orientation of the new public organization can be more than vividly confirmed by the presence of figures from the "Public Accord" bloc such as Viktor Hanchar, Vasil Shlyndzikaw, or Henadz Karpenka, who did not participate in the official part of the meeting, but were seen during unofficial events.

There were no representatives of the national democratic wing (that of the Belarusian Popular Front) at the ceremony.

It will be interesting to see how the president will react to the fact that a number of key figures from his government participated in the alliance of power and large capital.

Moldova**Russian, Moldovan Delegates on Chisinau-Tiraspol Talks***MK1402124095 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 14 Feb 95 p 1*

[Report by Natalya Prikhodko in the "Settlement" column: "The Dialogue Between Moldova and Dniester Region. Chisinau Is Not Particularly Happy With Its Results"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Both Chisinau and Tiraspol have drawn a correct conclusion from the well known Chechen events: about the need to continue the political dialogue, said Vladlen Vasev, the Russian president's plenipotentiary representative who acts as a mediator in the Dniester conflict. According to him, in the ongoing negotiating process a balance is generally maintained

between undue tardiness and unwarranted haste. The success of the Russian Federation's mediation mission here was helped by three main circumstances. First, in this region Russia began its peacekeeping activity relatively early. Second, from the outset it used a correct tactic: It first stopped and disengaged the warring sides and only then put them at the negotiating table. And third, the leadership of both conflicting sides here has displayed decisiveness, renouncing the use of force.

Vladlen Vasev described as false the current belief that as long as former leaders remain on either side of the Dniester bank, the Dniester problem will be impossible to resolve. Present-day leaders in Chisinau and Tiraspol are pursuing a balanced, centrist position, the Russian presidential representative noted. To be sure, in both cases there is an opposition which in particular is not averse to shifting the responsibility for a final settlement of the conflict to Russia.

Participants in the negotiations on the Dniester problem have often bitten off more than they can chew. Whereas one side seeks to multiply its command positions, the other seeks to expand freedom of action. Nonetheless, gradually the tough confrontation of mutually exclusive intentions is softening. But it will take a transition period, the need for which was stressed in, among others, the 28 April 1994 joint statement, Vladlen Vasev said.

According to Nicolae Osmocescu, first deputy foreign minister of the Moldova Republic, who leads the Moldova group of experts, the negotiating process still lacks effectiveness. The implementation of the accords reached at the December and January meetings between Moldova and Dniester Region leaders is being impeded by Tiraspol—as is also the case with the apparently coordinated question of repairing the bridges. In an obvious bid to stave this off, the Dniester Region began to set forth new conditions. For instance, that a joint declaration on the nonuse of force be worked out—even though both sides have repeatedly made such statements, Nicolae Osmocescu points out. According to him, the work of expert groups is also being delayed by the Dniester Region's unsubstantiated claims, in particular to autonomy in foreign policy, defense and state security, law enforcement, and in the financial sphere. Although in any civilized state such problems come under the jurisdiction of the central authority, Nicolae Osmocescu said. But the problems of separating powers are still acute. Osmocescu explained that the points on which disagreements were not overcome will be presented by experts in two versions, in a consolidated draft status of the Dniester Region within independent, territorially integrated Moldova. The sides will discuss this draft, along with the outstanding problems of economic cooperation, at the next summit meeting 15 February.

Snegur, Yeltsin Sign Additional Protocol

AU1402165695 Chisinau BASAPRESS in English 1850 GMT 13 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Chisinau, BASAPRESS, 13/2/1995—At the Almaty summit of the CIS presidents,

the Moldovan and Russian Presidents signed an additional protocol to the Agreement of Principles of Interstate Relations between Moldova and Russia. The Agreement itself was signed by Snegur and Yeltsin in the autumn of 1990 and was ratified only by the Moldovan side. The additional protocol was signed to adjust the 1990 Moldovan-Russian Interstate Agreement to the realities of the day, relay sources from the Foreign Ministry. According to the protocol, Russian and Moldova will desist from undermining mutual statehood and "will not allow that their territories be used to the detriment of the other party." The parties confirmed their conviction to reduce armed forces and weapons. Besides, the protocol provides for protection and preservation of ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of the minorities in Moldova and Russian. Earlier, a member of the Russian delegation to the 14th Army withdrawal negotiations pointed out that the protocol will allow for the conditions in which "coordinated measures will be taken and mutual help in counteracting aggression against either of parties." The attempts to find out whether such a clause was included in the protocol yielded no results.

Snegur Commends Memorandum on Peace in CIS

AU1402165395 Chisinau BASAPRESS in English 1850 GMT 13 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Chisinau, BASAPRESS, 13/2/1995—Anticipating a less efficient summit on February 10, Moldovan officials justified their visit to Almaty by pure economic reasons. On his return President Mircea Snegur dwelled on the appeal to CIS peoples and international opinion on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of victory over fascism and on Memorandum on peace and stability in CIS. According to the president, the memorandum is a unique document in history of CIS; it condemns separatism, nationalism, and chauvinism. As a paradox, more officials are becoming prisoners of skepticism displayed by those who opposed Moldova's joining the CIS and who said that "it is difficult to ride a dead horse." In 1994 when the new Parliament was ratifying the agreement on CIS and CIS Economic Union, Moldovan authorities gave categorical reasons for joining the new Eastern structure. Dumitru Motpan, PDAM [Democratic Agrarian Party of Moldova] leader and deputy speaker, stated then that delaying ratification of the CIS agreements is a deliberate blockage. Premier Andrei Sangheli was also vehemently arguing for an immediate ratification of the CIS agreements. He implied that otherwise the parliament would only harm the Moldovan economy, losses amounting to 40 bn rubles in 1993 alone. The opposition protested that Moldova would give up western alternatives to overcome the difficulties and that joining the CIS would not favor Moldova. But these statements were overlooked. After a year, Nicolae Andronic states in the Parliament "though Moldova intends to cooperate with the CIS, this community gave its member states nothing. Many agreements were signed but they do not function

since there is no control mechanism for their fulfillment." Since April, political evolutions have been so dynamic that Foreign Minister Popov easily dispelled the suspected "infidelity" toward the CIS imputed by some deputies. According to Popov cooperation with the East will be made further "with common sense, responsibility, and on a calculated line." The Foreign Policy Guidelines passed last week by the Parliament suggests that Chisinau will no longer commit itself to a single party and will try to focus on a larger number of pursuers of geopolitical interests. While the multilateral accords signed within the CIS are subject to new uncertainties, Moldovan-Russian relations seem to have made insignificant progress. In Almaty, though "he was suffering from the consequences of an abrupt change of climate," Boris Yeltsin put his signature on the additional protocol to the Agreement on Principles of Interstate Relations between Moldova and Russia signed on September 22, 1990 by the two presidents and ratified by the Moldovan Parliament. According to Chisinau, the protocol will create favorable conditions for the Moldovan-Russian Interstate Agreement to take effect. However, to name these favorable conditions is a luxury which diplomats cannot yet afford.

Democratic Party Leader on Almaty Summit Results

AU1402165595 Chisinau BASAPRESS in English 1850 GMT 13 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Chisinau, BASAPRESS, 13/2/1995—The fact that some Chisinau authorities eschew the signing of the CIS political and military documents does not necessarily mean that Moldova will not have the same fate as the signatory states, Nicolae Chirtoaca, co-chairman of the Party of Liberal Democracy, told BASAPRESS. Commenting on the results of the February 10 summit in Almaty, Chirtoaca said that the CIS

structure does not presuppose a genuine partnership, "because there is a hegemonic power, namely Russia, that has geostrategical interests in this region." In Chirtoaca's opinion, "the CIS problem has to be tackled from a broader perspective, because Russia tries to supersede OSCE in the ex-Soviet area by setting up the CIS." Also, according to him, the fact that the idea about integration into the CIS was also stipulated in the guidelines on Moldova's foreign policy recently adopted by the Parliament, will lead to some difficulties regarding Moldova's integration into the European structures and NATO. At the same time, Chirtoaca said that the CIS does not contain a mechanism that would contribute substantially to the solution of the problems Moldova faces nowadays.

OSCE Opens Office in Tiraspol

LD1402212895 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 2009 GMT 14 Feb 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Valery Demidetskiy]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Kishinev February 14 TASS—The Moldovan mission of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE] opened an office in Tiraspol, mission head Philip Hann said here today. A reason for this is the need for permanent contacts with residents of the Dniester region.

A recent visit of Philip Hann to the region included his meeting with Dniester leader Igor Smirnov and Chairman of the Tiraspol Supreme Soviet, parliament, Grigoriy Marakutsa. The meetings discussed the upcoming meeting of Moldovan President Mircea Snegur and Igor Smirnov scheduled for February 15. The meeting is expected to discuss the draft special status of the Dniester region which is the topic of negotiations mediated by the OSCE mission and special representative of the Russian president Vladlen Vasev.

Kazakhstan

Yeltsin Summit Involvement Sparks Protest

954F1336A Almaty PANORAMA in Russian No 6,
11 Feb 95 p 4

[Report by A.G.: "The Participants in the Demonstration Outside the Parliament House Expressed a Protest Against the President of Russia's Participation in the Summit of Heads of State of the CIS"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The arrival in Almaty of President Yeltsin, who is taking part in the meeting of heads of state of the CIS, has evoked an ambivalent public response.

A demonstration organized by the Kazakhstan Workers Movement and the Generation movement was held on 8 February outside Parliament House. In the vanguard of the column of demonstrators from the ranks of the Workers Movement was a poster whose content eloquently expressed the mood of the participants in the demonstration: "Executioner of the Peoples Yeltsin Out of Kazakhstan!" Retirees armed with the red flags of the USSR periodically proposed toasts in honor of the coming socialist revolution.

Other motives guided the grassroots associations of a pro-Slav persuasion (the Lad Slavic Society, the Russian Community, the Russian Cultural Center, the Russian Union, and the Semirechensk Cossacks). Representatives of the Slav movements had prepared a draft appeal to President Yeltsin, which contains, aside from hospitable greetings, a call for a joint meeting on problems of the Russian-speaking population in Kazakhstan. The document expresses concern at the fact that "a feeling that Russia has abandoned us is widespread among the Russians and Russian natives as a whole in Kazakhstan."

It is known that the president had not responded to the Slavic movements' appeal as of 9 February.

Cabinet Predicts Economic Stabilization

MM1402120395 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in
Russian 14 Feb 95 p 1

[Report from SELSKAYA ZHIZN-ITAR-TASS column: "Expecting Economy's Stabilization"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In the forthcoming year a stage of stabilization can and must begin in Kazakhstan's economy—that was the conclusion of the republic's Cabinet of Ministers, publishing a forecast for socioeconomic development for 1995. It would seem that the government has no grounds for being optimistic since the decline in industrial production has been continuing for four years. Nonetheless, the cabinet's statement probably has a solid basis. The exchange rate for the national currency has stabilized in Kazakhstan now. A positive bank interest rate in relation to the pace of inflation is being maintained. The results of the past six months,

when the pace of inflation steadily declined, reaching 10 percent in December, for instance, are also encouraging.

Yesimov on Irresponsibility, Civil Service

954F1313A Almaty KARAVAN in Russian No 7,
10 Feb 95 p 9

[Interview with A.S. Yesimov, deputy prime minister, by Viktor Mironov; place and date not given: "Civil Service Does Not Tolerate Irresponsibility"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A strange thing happened: The government's KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA severely scolded the Cabinet of Ministers. Moreover, this was done on the pages of the newspaper by an employee of the Ministry of Industry and Trade. His article also ended quite strongly: The author predicted that soon "the Cabinet of Ministers would cross the line beyond which its actions will not arouse merely criticism but ridicule." (KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA, 25 January).

Of course, KARAVAN could not overlook a story like this. We asked A.S. Yesimov, deputy prime minister of the government, to comment on the situation that has developed.

[Mironov] Akhmetzhan Smaghululy, the author of the cited article—N. Moldakhmetov, deputy chief of the contract and legal branch of the Ministry of Industry and Trade—accused the Cabinet of Ministers of passing an incompetent decree concerning foreign trade in agricultural products.

[Yesimov] It was easy to foresee such a dispute. The fact is that the decree in question was passed by us on 8 December 1994, and it recurrently simplifies the procedure for acquiring permission to export agricultural materials abroad. Now, to get into the foreign market it is sufficient to register the transaction on the exchange and coordinate the price in a special commission. This takes half a day at most. But previously the procedure for obtaining permission took several weeks, and the result was unpredictable.

[Mironov] But if entry into the world market is really becoming a very simple matter, will our agricultural raw materials not start to be sold dirt cheap? Maybe those filters and barriers that the new government hastened to abolish were actually necessary?

[Yesimov] The cheap sale of Kazakhstani agricultural raw materials really began to flourish before the adoption of our decree. Despite the intricate and dense palisade of prohibitions, restrictions, and agreements, contracts where the prices were simply ridiculous were getting through more often than not. Twenty dollars for a tonne of a strong variety of Kazakhstan wheat, or \$400 for a tonne of quality cotton—this is a disgrace. Lower than world prices by a factor of four to five.

There are many such examples. As a result, many of our neighbors are already "spoiled" by the low Kazakhstani prices, but our budget was short enormous sums in the form of taxes.

[Mironov] But if the complex mechanism of acquiring permission for export did not ensure observance of state interests, then why do you think that a simplification of this mechanism will resolve the problem?

[Yesimov] The rules of foreign trade must be simple, clear, and at the same time strict. The representative of a sovkhos or a firm that desires to sell grain, for example, does not come to the ministry now and submit a request, all he does is register the transaction on the exchange. But if he plans to sell the grain cheaper than the minimum price established by the interdepartmental commission, he is told: No, friend, such a price will not pass. And that is all, understand? The matter is resolved in a few seconds.

[Mironov] But, after all, people establish prices. Some subjectivism is inevitable here.

[Yesimov] I do not agree. The price is now established by the market, and everything is done publicly. If the minimum for third-class wheat is set at a level of \$77 per tonne, then this is the minimum for everyone without exception. These prices are published in the press, and the grounds for "a selective approach" disappears.

[Mironov] But why must a transaction be registered specifically on the exchange? Not at the Ministry of Industry and Trade, which also included the former MVES [Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations], but on the exchange, which is not a state organ at all?

[Yesimov] Let us assume you are a farmer, and you have a batch of wheat, or cotton, or leather raw materials. You want to sell your commodity at a higher price. But what price is considered high, and what price is considered low? Where can you make inquiries about this—at the ministry, the Cabinet of Ministers, from merchants with whom you are acquainted? In the whole world this is done at exchanges. Those who want to sell and those who want to buy turn to the exchange. They find each other at the exchange and come to an agreement on a price. This is the most objective and sensitive indicator—it reveals the level of supply and demand. Not unimportant is the fact that by virtue of its specific nature, the exchange operates openly and publicly. It is advantageous for it to be "transparent."

[Mironov] In contrast to the Ministry of Industry and Trade?

[Yesimov] When I worked as head of administration, I could discuss the specifics of the ministries and the departments more freely. It is no longer ethical now to criticize organs that are subordinate to the government. But, as you yourself understand, there are problems in their work.

[Mironov] If an unassuming deputy chief of a branch of the Ministry of Industry and Trade attacks the Cabinet of Ministers with the daring of a kamikaze, then I see two explanations. Either the Cabinet of Ministers committed such an utterly stupid deed that for an honest clerk the

situation arose where he could not "remain silent" and he resorted to this extreme measure. Or, as a result of the decisions adopted by the Cabinet of Ministers, the unassuming clerk and his colleagues lost something that to them was personally very important. Which version do you like more?

[Yesimov] I would not want to enter into a discussion on this subject. But I categorically do not agree that our decision on the new agricultural export rules were "insufficiently considered," or that they are "not objective." The liberalization of foreign trade is one of the provisions of the anticrisis program that A.M. Qazhybeldin succeeded in putting into effect. Our decision lies in the course of the June 1994 message of N.A. Nazarbayev to parliament. But this is not the only thing. Look at how much easier our foreign trade in agricultural products breathed in recent months, the state treasury began to receive more taxes, and all the dirty rumors regarding payment of services for an "issued" license disappeared... However, the adopted decree of the Cabinet of Ministers will be perfected, taking into account the changing market in the center and in the localities.

[Mironov] But references are made in the cited article to legislative acts that are contradicted by a decision of the Cabinet of Ministers.

[Yesimov] I will not give a detailed legal analysis—this is done by the divisions of our administration of affairs. But it can be noted as an example that the statement that exemption from payment of customs duties for commodities that are being established within the framework of intergovernment agreements contradicts our laws, to put it mildly, does not correspond to reality. Inasmuch as the Law on the Customs Tariff and Duty in Article 24 proclaims the priority of international treaties that precisely also envision the abolition in such cases of customs duties...

Other "legal pretentious innovations" of the opponent also do not withstand criticism. Overall, I think that this entire incident is a subject for serious official examination, not a quarrel with the involvement of the public and the mass media.

[Mironov] Incidentally, KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA is an official newspaper, and this gives the whole story a special nuance.

[Yesimov] In my opinion, these are the costs of our boundless democracy. I personally cannot understand: How come you work in the ministry and "sling mud at" the Cabinet of Ministers? If you do not agree with its policy—go into the opposition, establish a party or an opposition newspaper... But they receive a wage from the government, and then they "trash" it. Indeed, if it was at least relevant... Personally, I think that methods of this kind go far beyond the scope not only of ethical norms of work in civil service, but they also torpedo such notions as executive discipline, subordination, and responsibility, without which statehood and administration are

inconceivable. I am not even saying that this is an obvious attempt to stop the course of reforms in one of the strategic directions.

[Mironov] Thank you for your candor.

Kyrgyzstan

Meeting Discusses Turkish Credit, IMF Program

LD1502054695 Bishkek Kyrgyz Radio First Program
Network in Russian 1400 GMT 14 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Immediately following the session of the Republic's government, a session of its presidium was held on 13 February. It, too, was chaired by Prime Minister Abbas Dzhumagulov.

This time four agenda items were discussed. These were, first, the use of a \$75 million credit from the Turkish Republic and second, the introduction of cash registers in commercial enterprises in Bishkek and in the Chuy region. In addition, two national programs, on forestry and the labor market and employment in the Kyrgyz Republic for 1995, were discussed.

The session noted that a considerable portion of the Turkish credit, which was allocated to the Republic on easy terms, is not being employed at all or is being employed very ineffectively. Measures were approved to achieve swifter and more effective investment of the funds allocated via the Turkish credit line. [passage omitted]

A plan of measures to implement the IMF program in 1995 and a program to combat unemployment, which promises to be very considerable this year, were approved.

Trade, Cooperation Agreements Signed With CIS States

LD1502054595 Bishkek Kyrgyz Radio First Program
Network in Russian 1000 GMT 14 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Agreements on trade and economic cooperation for 1995 were concluded between Kyrgyzstan and the CIS republics of Belarus, Moldova, and Tajikistan at the meeting of CIS heads of state and government held in Almaty on 10 February. The agreements were signed by the prime ministers of the states. Specific proposals were made on mutual deliveries of goods at contract prices.

New Amendments Seal Fate of 'Caretaker' Government

LD1402190695 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1705
GMT 14 Feb 95

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature: compiled by Nikolay Zherebtsov, Andrey Petrovskiy; edited by Vladimir Shishlin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The adoption of new constitutional amendments will seal the fate of the country's

caretaker government, head of the administration's Supervisory Department Batyr Davlesov told INTERFAX. He said the new law provides for parliamentary approval of a new prime minister who will next form his own government.

IF Note: Although the country's interim government resigned on September 4, 1994, it was ordered to carry on by President Askar Akayev until a new one was formed.

Davlesov said it was highly important that constitutional amendments be made before the formation of a new cabinet to help the new prime minister to form his own cabinet. If not, the president will have to name his own prime minister who will next present his own list of cabinet members to parliament.

Davlesov said the "interim coalition government proved unworkable from the very start because of being formed by the previous parliament on the basis of different political and regional groups." Since each cabinet member was approved in a separate vote, "the government has too many ministers who do not work at all," he said.

IF Note: A number of government experts speaking on condition of anonymity said President Askar Akayev was keen to hold on to Prime Minister Abbas Dzhumagulov over an interim period until this autumn at least or until a new presidential election due one year later. However, they said Dzhumagulov political fortunes were hinged on the balance of forces in the new parliament.

Tajikistan

Opposition Head Returns from Long-Term Tour

LD1402145895 (Clandestine) Voice of Free Tajikistan
in Tajik 0600 GMT 14 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Ustad Sayed Abdullo Nuri, leader of the Islamic Rebirth of Tajikistan, has returned to Afghanistan from his long-term visit to foreign countries. Our correspondent says that Ustad considers this visit successful and of particular political significance.

On his arrival Abdullo Nuri held a meeting. The meeting, which was held in a sincere atmosphere, was attended by Dr. Mirbobo Mirrahimov, one of the well-known figures of the Tajik opposition, and the former chairman of Tajikistan's state television and radio during the government of national reconciliation, as well as by refugees, mujahedin, and officials from the Islamic Rebirth of Tajikistan.

This meeting took place yesterday. Those present warmly welcomed the leader of the Islamic Rebirth of Tajikistan. Ustad Nuri delivered a brief speech at the meeting. Explaining the reasons of his long-term visit, the beloved leader of the people expressed that lately some artificial obstacles have appeared which could halt our struggle and jihad. [passage omitted].

Speaking about events in the Islamic world, the supreme leader stressed that this Rebirth Movement is not the Rebirth Movement of Tajikistan alone. This is the Rebirth Movement of the Islamic world.

[Begin Nuri recording] After our Rebirth Movement, a rebirth movement has appeared in Chechnya. We will never admit that the Chechen Muslim people has been defeated. It is not a defeat, it is only the start of the struggle and jihad. The Chechen people is waging a severe struggle against our enemies and colonialists. We will soon see this struggle begin in Dagestan, Ingushetia, and in the whole region, and God willing we will not be alone in our struggle. In other words, the events in Chechnya will be the continuation of our rebirth movement. [end recording]

Opposition Blamed for Deadlock in Inter-Tajik Dialogue

*MM1502114795 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
15 Feb 95 p 3*

[Report by Alisher Niyazov: "Some People Do Not Want Peace in Tajikistan"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Dushanbe—The talks process for a peaceful settlement of the inter-Tajik conflict, to all appearances, has entered an impasse and, with it, the hope for a speedy peace in this republic is becoming ever more elusive. There are more than sufficient grounds for this pessimism. The fourth round of the inter-Tajik dialogue, scheduled at the Islamabad meeting in October last year for last December, did not take place either in the middle of or at the end of January of the new year.

Official Dushanbe asserts that the Government of Tajikistan did everything possible to ensure that the fourth round should proceed precisely as scheduled, and piled the blame for its breakdown on its political opponents. As Tajik parliament speaker Abdumadzhid Dostiyev told PRAVDA's correspondent, the republic authorities have honored all obligations undertaken during the third round of talks, and on no occasion have they violated the inter-Tajik agreement on ceasing fire and other hostilities both on the Tajik-Afghan border and within the country. Terms for the disarmament of illegal armed groupings of the former People's Front and the confiscation of weaponry from the population have been met. The recommendations of the United Nations and the OSCE for the democratization of the law on elections to the new national parliament, set for 26 February, have been adopted. Measures to bring about the speedier return to the homeland of Tajik refugees and to provide guarantees of their personal safety are being undertaken.

So what has the opposition done in response? According to the head of the Tajik parliament, not a day passes without a violation on its part of the cease-fire agreement. Armed provocations are continuing on the Tajik-Afghan border, and, since the beginning of December

last year, they have led already to the deaths of 10 Russian border guards and several peaceful Tajik citizens. Certain leaders of the armed opposition have signed leaflets calling for a new jihad against the legitimate government of the republic....

Rakhmanov, Ubaydulloyev Assess Economic Situation

*LD1402200595 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1654
GMT 14 Feb 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Dushanbe Feb 14 (INTERFAX)—Tajikistan's economy must be helped out of the deep crisis in 1995, President Emomali Rakhmanov said. He was speaking at a national conference in Dushanbe on Tuesday [14 February].

The conference was attended by government ministers, heads of other governmental bodies and leaders of regional, city and district administrations.

First Vice-Premier Mukhammad Ubaydulloyev said in his report that the country's economic performance last year was unsatisfactory.

National Bank President Murodali Alimardonov said the bank issued 1 trillion 800 billion rubles to the economy, including 1 trillion to agriculture. He said that the treasury hadn't got the money back yet.

Alimardonov said that the National Bank owed the people 620 billion rubles in wages, pensions and other social security payments. Currently there were a mere 8 billion rubles in circulation instead of the planned 140 billion.

Council of Ministers Reviews Economy, Prospects

*LD1502091495 Dushanbe Radio Tajikistan Network in
Tajik 1300 GMT 14 Feb 95*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] An expanded-format sitting was held at the Council of Ministers conference hall on 14 February. Here is a report prepared by our correspondent, Otabek Ghoyipov from the meeting:

[Ghoyipov] An expanded-format meeting was held at the Conference Hall of the Republic of Tajikistan Council of Ministers at 1000 today with the wide-scale participation of officials from the presidential apparatus and government of the Republic of Tajikistan; the chairmen of the Supreme Council and the regions; the leaders of town and district administrations; and the heads of ministries, departments, enterprises, associations, the agro-industrial sector, and joint-stock companies. It was opened by President Emomali Rakhmanov.

There was one issue on the agenda: the economic results of the Republic of Tajikistan last year and the prospects for this year. First Deputy Prime Minister Mukhammad Ubaydulloyev was given the floor to speak on this issue. In his speech, Ubaydulloyev dwelt on the fact that a great deal of produce, especially cotton, was left lying on the

ground because of the mistakes committed in the economy last year. In addition, he noted that cotton-fiber processing is being done in an unsatisfactory way at the factories.

In his speech, he also spoke about the activities of industrial enterprises, joint-stock companies, and a number of other plants and factories. The only way to get out of this economic turmoil is to direct all efforts toward production, he said in his speech. He also said that one of the urgent issues of the moment is to provide all the conditions needed for spring sowing, above all, fuel and spare parts. [passage omitted]

Deputy Premier: 1994 Production Recession Not Halted

LD1402173995 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1451
GMT 14 Feb 95

[By Khovar News Agency correspondents Andrey Sidorin and Bakhodur Zayrov—TASS]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Dushanbe February 14 TASS—The Tajik Government failed to slow down production recession in 1994 despite all measures taken, First Tajik Vice-Premier Mukhammad Udaydulloyev told an expanded meeting of the Tajik Government here today.

The industrial output dropped by 30 per cent as compared to 1993. The agriculture has been affected most. The produce of cotton, grain, meat and dairy products

has been cut, and the harvest of raw cotton decreased to the 1953 level. No more than 530,000 tones of raw cotton were collected in 1993 and 1994. The government program to increase grain output is been poorly implemented. Only 209,000 tones of grain out of the planned 604,000 were collected last year.

Tajik President Emomali Rakhmanov urged the government to achieve economic stabilization in 1995 and outlined economic priorities of reconstruction and building of export enterprises, full provision of the population with domestic foodstuffs and boosted construction of hydropower plants. He noted the significance of deeper integration in the Commonwealth for Tajik economy.

Moscow Receives Dushanbe's Accession to Nuclear Treaty

LD1402183195 Dushanbe Radio Tajikistan Network in Russian 1000 GMT 14 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] In accordance with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1 July 1968, on 17 January this year the government of the Russian Federation, being a depository of the treaty, accepted for safekeeping the document by which the Republic of Tajikistan acceded to the treaty. Tajikistan acceded to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a state that does not possess nuclear weapons.

Armenia

Azerbaijan, Russia Not To Cooperate in Military Sphere

NC1402154495 Yerevan NOYAN TAPAN in English
1538 GMT 13 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] 13/02/95 NOYAN TAPAN—On February 11 the Armenian TV Company televised the comments of the Armenian State Minister Vazgen Sargsyan on the process of discussions, concerning military cooperation, which are held at the current summit of CIS member-states. State Minister assessed the results of the discussions as being positive, noting that cooperation between Russia and Armenia on the matter of protection of both countries' borders continues developing. The Armenian State Minister also underlined that Azerbaijan once again, and this time finally, convinced Russia that it is not going to be Russia's partner on the issue of military cooperation.

Bagratyan Views Defense Capability

LD1402220795 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1614 GMT 14 Feb 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Tigran Liloyan]

[FBIS Translated Text] Yerevan, 14 Feb—Armenian Prime Minister Grant Bagratyan believes that last year was a successful one from the point of view of strengthening the republic's defense capability. He spoke about this at a news conference here today.

According to the premier, by the end of 1994 the Armenian government had brought the strength of the republican armed forces up to the planned level. It is now double what it was at the beginning of 1993. At the same time Grant Bagratyan stressed that there are no plans to further expand the Armenian national army.

The head of government believes that the creation in Armenia of separate production facilities necessary for defense, which the republic did not possess before, have been a success. In a number of instances these are new factories. Grant Bagratyan said. He stressed that out of the five factories which are being commissioned this year, three relate to the military. Last year the numerous enterprises of Armenia's defense industry received more orders last year than in 1993, and not only from the CIS countries, he said.

"However events develop we must have a certain minimum level of defense," the head of the Armenian Government stressed. Grant Bagratyan expressed the hope that all conditions are there for a deepening of the economic reforms in Armenia, including the army. He also expressed the hope that "should hostilities break out we will have enough strength to prevent them developing into a full-scale war."

Karabakh Administration Adopts Budget, Privatization Law

NC1402221795 Yerevan Armenia's Radio First Program Network in Armenian 1900 GMT 14 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The first session of the first convocation of the Supreme Council of Nagorno-Karabakh Republic

[NKR] took place in Stepanakert. It concentrated on economic issues. The NKR Press and Information Department reported that speaking at the session, NKR President Robert Kocharyan stressed the need for serious economic reform and the creation of a relevant legislative base for that purpose.

Government head Leonard Petrosyan submitted the basic principles of economic reform for parliament to examine. They practically cover every aspect of the Republic's socio-economic life.

According to the prime minister, parliament's adoption of the government's reform program, which will be implemented in stages, will create the prerequisites for conducting an active economic policy within the context of market relations.

The first deputy prime minister and minister of economy and finance, Spartak Tevosyan, submitted the Republic's 1995 state budget for the session's consideration. It was approved.

The deputies also examined and adopted the NKR Law on Privatization and Denationalization.

Privatization Program '94 Results Reported

NC1402153495 Yerevan NOYAN TAPAN in English
1233 GMT 13 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] [No dateline as received]—The questions connected with the implementation of the structural changes and widening the non-state sphere of economy were discussed at a joint session of the Armenian Government and Economic Bloc of the Parliament. In compliance with the document introduced by the Armenian Government to the Supreme Council, as of September 1, 1994, 39 percent of state and public living-fund [housing], 134,236 apartments were privatized in the republic. Taking into account the cooperative living buildings, 44 percent of the living-fund was privatized.

In the sphere of privatization of state enterprises a partial gratuitous privatization of the property of state enterprises was carried out, in result of which joint-stock companies of closed type were established with participation of the state. This process includes 1,096 enterprises (53 percent of the total amount of enterprises). 10 big enterprises were selected in order to reorganize them into companies of opened type. 50 more big enterprises are to join the first ten in 1995. Also privatization of bakeries is planned in 1995 after the full liberalization of bread price is carried out.

The Government estimated 500 "small businesses," (trade, service ones etc.), 145 of them being already privatized. 260 mln drams entered the budget, including 175 mln drams with privatization certificates.

Azerbaijan

Russia, Sweden Blamed for Poor Moscow Talks Preparations

LD1402174595 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1427 GMT 14 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Baku, Feb 14 (INTERFAX)—Azeri State Councillor for Foreign-Policy Matters, Azeri

chief negotiator at the Armenian-Azeri talks, Vafa Guluzade, has blamed mediators - Russia and Sweden - for the fact that the recent round of talks held in Moscow last week, "was not prepared in a proper way."

At a news conference in Baku on Monday [13 February] Guluzade said that in Moscow "there is virtually no advance in the political process." He said, "Arguments circled around wordings of minor importance" in the agreement for a political settlement of the Armenian-Azeri conflict.

Guluzade also said that "the Russian side tried to present the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh as a side to the talks." Guluzade said that the Azeri delegation expressed an official protest on this score. In line with the mandate of the OSCE Minsk Group on Nagorno-Karabakh of 1992, he said, Armenia and Azerbaijan are the negotiating sides, while Armenian and Azeri communities of Karabakh are concerned parties.

Meanwhile, the delegation of Nagorno-Karabakh and mediators demanded that the Karabakh people be recognized as a side to the conflict on the basis of the recent OSCE documents, which call participants in the conflict those sides which last May signed a cease-fire agreement: Armenia, Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh.

Guluzade called positive results of the Moscow talks, only the sides' intention to continue observing the cease-fire and to work out an agreement on the exchange of hostages on the "all for all" principle.

Leaders of SOCAR Leave for London

NC1402145895 Baku TURAN in English 1620 GMT
13 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Baku (February 13) TURAN—Late today the president of SOCAR [Azerbaijan National Oil Company] Natig Aliyev, the vice-president Ilham Aliyev and the advisor of SOCAR's president Valeh Aleskerov are leaving for London, according to the well informed source in the government. The same source reports that two working groups which will stay there till 20 February also leave for London. The purpose of a visit is a discussion of an issue concerning the development of the gas and oil field "Shakhdeniz." The negotiations on the development of this field have been conducted with the alliance "BP-Statoil" and Turkish State Oil Company. The main principles of the future contract will be discussed on that field and if the parties come to an agreement on the main parameters, in the second half of 1995 the draft of the contract will be worked out and submitted to the leaders of the republic, according to well informed source in SOCAR.

A second question to be discussed in London is the attraction to the development of the fields "Chirag," "Azeri" and "Guneshli" two joint companies: Mc Shelf and Mc Dok. These companies were set up last year by the US company McDermott and SOCAR. Azerbaijan

relies on the fact that both companies will receive orders for the producing the oil equipment for these fields.

Well-informed source in SOCAR said that at the latest session of the consortium in London the issue concerning Iran's participation in the oil consortium was not among the principal issues. According to that source the West is not going to settle this problem in the near future.

Armenia Blocks Efforts To Join CIS Security Accord

LD1402180395 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1559
GMT 14 Feb 95

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature: Reports by our diplomatic correspondents Aleksandr Korzun, Igor Porshnev, Yevgeniy Terekhov and others]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] BAKU, Feb 14 (Interfax)—Azerbaijan's Foreign Minister Gasan Gasanov believes that "Armenia's aggression obstructs Azerbaijan's efforts to join agreements signed by the CIS countries in the framework of their collective security treaty."

"That is why Azerbaijan cannot join the agreement on protecting the outer borders of the CIS either," Gasanov told Interfax in Baku on Tuesday [14 February].

As he said, "the agreement on protecting the outer borders of the CIS lacks a mechanism that would make it possible for Azerbaijan to safeguard its frontiers seized by Armenia's armed forces."

Gasanov confirmed Azerbaijan's intention to press for introducing some amendments to the CIS treaty on collective security. "In our view, the CIS countries must take joint actions to rebuff not only external, but also internal aggressions," he explained.

The Azeri foreign minister pointed to the importance of the memorandum on stability and security in the CIS adopted at the summit held in Almaty recently. "The main importance of the document lies in its condemning separatism and interference in the internal affairs of the Commonwealth countries," Gasanov said.

As Interfax learned from sources in Azerbaijan's Foreign Ministry, on February 9 Baku and Sarajevo (the Muslim government of Bosnia-Herzegovina) established diplomatic relations.

Nakhichevan President Praises Iran, Islamic Revolution

LD1002204795 Tehran IRNA in English 1806 GMT
10 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Nakhichevan, Feb. 10, IRNA—President of the autonomous republic of Nakhichevan, Namik Gassanov, said at the Iranian consulate here Thursday night that the Islamic revolution is the most significant event of the 20th century when compared with other developments of the century.

He said the Islamic revolution demonstrated to the world people that Islam can ensure the prosperity of all nations.

Gassanov added that as the blessing of the Islamic revolution in Iran the Iranian people have attained many of the original goals set by the father of the Islamic revolution, the late Imam Khomeini.

He said the Islamic revolution in Iran had left a very friendly mark on the hearts of the people of Nakhichevan because the people of Iran had not left the people of Nakhichevan alone when they were in trouble.

He said the people of Nakhichevan would not forget the help in kind offered them by the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Among the participants at the gathering that was on the occasion of the 16th anniversary of the triumph of the Islamic revolution were consul of Iran Mohammad-Sadeq Touri, consul of Turkey in Nakhichevan Mohammad Cenar, governor general of the east Azerbaijan province of Iran Abdol-Ali Zadeh, and three Iranian deputies of the Majles from the cities of Orumieh, Marand and Maku, and a large group of the officials of the west Azerbaijan province of Iran.

Security Chief's Trip Precedes 'Decisive' Action

NC1402145495 Baku TURAN in English 1342 GMT
14 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Baku (February 13) TURAN—At the end of last week the Chief of the Management for Public security in the Ministry of Interior, Colonel Fatulla Guseynov, left Baku for Nakhichevan.

Many Baku's observers consider that Guseynov's visit is connected with the tension between the official Baku and the supporters of ex-President, Abulfaz Elchibey in the Ordubad region of Nakhichevan. The observers say that usually Guseynov visits this or that region of the country before the decisive activities of the police.

As was earlier reported, 10 days ago four units of armoured personnel carriers, policemen and units of the National army appeared around the village of Keleki, the place of Elchibey living. Two days ago Minister of Interior of Nakhichevan and the Prosecutor of the Republic sent the ultimatum to Elchibey and threatened to "take decisive measures" if he does not stop "to conceal criminals and support illegal armed units".

However, Elchibey and the PFA [People's Front of Azerbaijan] representatives in Baku said that the information of the authorities that criminals or illegal armed units are concealed in Keleki is absolutely false.

Keleki Situation 'Tense'; Officials Cited on Activity

NC1402154295 Baku TURAN in English 0825 GMT
14 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Baku (February 14) TURAN—Last night the events around the village of Keleki of the

Ordubad region of Nakhichevan developed impetuously and the tragic outcome could happen any minute.

As was earlier reported, ex-President, Abulfaz Elchibey and his close supporters were encircled by 25 units of armoured personnel carriers and 200 policemen in the Keleki village. The ultimatum on surrender was presented to them. At 7 p.m. 4 units of armoured personnel carriers moved towards the outskirts of the village. The authorities announced on local radio stations that there are criminals in Keleki and they must be rendered harmless.

Yesterday the PFA [People's Front of Azerbaijan] distributed the statement saying that "the authorities intend to eliminate the leaders of the opposition physically".

"Physical elimination of Abulfaz Elchibey can lead to the political explosion and civil war", reads the statement.

Last evening 4 Deputies of the Supreme Soviet met with the speaker of Parliament, Rasul Guliyev, and informed him about the situation in Keleki. One of them, Mir-mahmud Fattayev told TURAN that Rasul Guliyev condemned the possibility of such operation and promised that he will not let conduction of the operation. "Such activities against Elchibey can deliver a blow at the Azeri state system", Rasul Guliyev said.

However, at 8 p.m. the Minister of Interior, Ramil Usubov, told TURAN: "We are ready to disarm the criminals in Keleki, but at first we intend to safeguard security of Abulfaz Elchibey". He said that "there are not less than 10 criminal elements, which can act against Elchibey". "Now we started the operation and safeguarding security of Elchibey is the issue number one". The Minister of Interior said that the Deputies of Azerbaijan's Supreme Soviet, Faraj Guliyev and Shahmandar Jafarov, must be arrested. He also said that those three persons, who failed to attempt upon President Aliyev's life in autumn 1993, are in Keleki.

Asked will the police take steps if Elchibey does not leave the village, the Minister said that "in this case we will take appropriate measures but we will not expose Elchibey's life to danger".

At 22.00 on February 13 Keleki reported that the Chief of the Management for Public security in the Ministry of Interior, Colonel Fatulla Guseynov, negotiates with the PFA leaders, but the details of the talks are unknown.

On February 14 in the morning, the majority of military and police sub-units as well as armoured vehicles of the Ministry of Interior and the National Army were withdrawn from Keleki to the region centre of Julfa. Only four military posts with 4 armoured vehicles and 15-20 soldiers are left around Keleki.

As Keleki reports, the situation around Keleki remains tense and any minute it can worsen.

'Conflicts' Between President, Speaker Discussed
NC1402145995 Baku TURAN in English 1342 GMT
14 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Baku (February 13) TURAN—During the last week there were conflicts between President Aliyev and the speaker of Parliament, Rasul Guliyev.

First one was in the Parliament. On Friday during the session of the Milli Mejlis Rasul Guliyev said that "the executive power ignores the resolution of the Parliament on social protection of population and this fact leads to dissatisfaction". At the same time, there is an opinion that Rasul Guliyev is to blame for worsening of the socioeconomic situation, the speaker mentioned.

On the same day the Milli Mejlis adopted the resolution on decrease in fares by 50 per cent.

On Saturday there was a broad meeting in the Presidential staff and President Aliyev called the activities of those Deputies, who speak about failure of the economic reforms in the country, "populism".

It is no secret that over the past months the authorities of the Republic did not make any step for implementation of the market reforms. The only resolutions were decree on increase in prices for bread, energy infrastructures and different goods.

NKR Parliament Adopts Budget, Economic Reform Acts

LD1402214495 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1851 GMT 14 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Stepanakert, Feb 14 (Interfax)—The Supreme Soviet of the self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic passed the government-proposed program of economic reforms in the republic, the 1995 budget and privatization and denationalization acts.

NKR President Robert Kocharyan told parliament that meaningful economic reforms and an appropriate legal framework for it were essential. He said that the changes had to reflect the situation of no war, no peace in the republic.

NKR Prime Minister Leonard Petrosyan said that the government program of staged reforms will make it possible to pursue an active economic policy leading to market relations.

Georgia

Shevardnadze Begins Official Visit to UK

LD1502085095 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0751 GMT 15 Feb 95

[By ITAR-TASS Correspondent Nikolay Pakhomov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] London February 15—Georgian head of state Eduard Shevardnadze, who arrived in London on Tuesday, begins his official visit here today.

The programme of the visit includes a meeting with Queen Elizabeth the Second in Buckingham Palace and talks with Prime Minister John Major at Downing Street 10.

Also scheduled is the ceremony of laying wreaths at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Westminster Abbey, visiting the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development and dinner given by the British Government in honour of the guest.

The British newspaper "TIMES" says that the visit of Georgian leader will emphasize Britain's support for Georgian independence and territorial integrity as well as political and economic reforms in Georgia.

During the negotiations, the two sides are expected to discuss a wide range of questions, including bilateral relations in economics and other fields and to sign a number of important documents such as joint declaration on friendship and cooperation, an agreement on protection of investments and others.

They will also discuss the situation in Bosnia, the Chechen conflict, and plans of NATO expansion.

Experts To Study Georgia-Abkhazia Confederation Proposal

LD1402135695 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1238 GMT 14 Feb 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Anatoliy Yurkin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow February 14 TASS—A group of experts will meet in Moscow on Wednesday to work out further proposals for the settlement of the Georgia-Abkhazia conflict.

Abkhazia's envoy to Russia Igor Akhba told ITAR-TASS today that the experts will focus on the character of future relations between Georgia and Abkhazia, which appears to be the key stumbling block in talks between the conflicting sides.

As concerns Abkhazia's position, it was made clear in the statement on the political settlement of the conflict dated April 4, 1994 and signed in Moscow in the presence of U.N. Secretary-General Butros Butros-Ghali and other officials of the United Nations, the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Russian Federation, Abkhazia and Georgia, Akhba said.

In the course of subsequent talks brokered by the United Nations, the CSCE (now OSCE) and the Russian Federation it was recognised that relations between Abkhazia and Georgia should be built as between equal states in keeping with principles of international law.

This approach was confirmed during the recent round of talks in Geneva (from February 7-9), where U.N. officials proposed a formula of a union on a confederation basis. The proposal provides for the delegation of powers and the establishment of a joint command in case of danger to any part of the confederation.

Experts are due to examine all aspects of future relations between Georgia and Abkhazia. Documents prepared by them will then be considered and signed by delegations from Georgia and Abkhazia.

According to Akhba, experts are bracing for a hard job as their mission is made difficult by Georgian officials who pursued their own political ends in recent statements misinterpreting earlier accords.

Question on 'Equal Status' Arises

MM1402142795 Moscow TRUD in Russian 14 Feb 95 p 5

[Report by Igor Chernov: "Nothing Sensational Took Place. Abkhazia and Georgia Continue To Argue"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Sochi—"We did not talk about any kind of federal relations with Georgia," S. Dzhindzholiya, leader of the Abkhaz delegation and speaker of the parliament of the Republic of Abkhazia, informed your TRUD correspondent. Last Sunday he returned from Geneva where the latest round of negotiations on problems of a political settlement for the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict took place.

Immediately after the meeting in Geneva had finished, news agencies disseminated worldwide the statement by the head of the Georgian delegation, D. Ioseliani, declaring that the Abkhaz representatives had agreed it was essential for Georgia to have a federal system. This caused a sensation inasmuch as the alleged Abkhaz agreement to federal relations with Tbilisi would signal the Abkhaz side's abandonment of the idea of forming its own sovereign state and recognition of the fact that the territory from the Inguri River to the Psou River is an integral part of Georgia. So does it emerge that Abkhaz policy has swung through 180 degrees?

It became clear that nothing of the kind had happened. Either Ioseliani had been too hasty with his conclusions or the journalists had gotten their facts mixed up. The Georgian side really had prepared a draft of some agreement referring to a federal system in Georgia and to Abkhazia's receiving very wide-ranging rights as a component of this federation. "It would have more powers than the Russian Federation's components," a member of the Georgian delegation, L. Aleksidze, said in an interview to Radio Liberty. However, the Abkhaz side insisted on continuing discussion of the draft of another document formulated during previous rounds of the negotiations and which was to have been examined by experts from the sides, the United Nations, and the CSCE in December of last year. The meeting of experts did not take place owing to the Georgian side's refusal to

talk about anything at all with Abkhazians who had adopted a new constitution and proclaimed the sovereignty of their republic.

Now the meeting of experts to discuss that draft from last year is fixed for 15-16 February in Moscow. In spite of the fact that nothing was signed last week in Geneva, the leader of the Abkhaz delegation, S. Dzhindzholiya, considers the last round of negotiations to have been productive. Most likely because Abkhazia is, so to speak, standing by its interests for the moment and the dialogue on the problems of settling the conflict is proceeding in an acceptable direction for them.

So the draft document which the experts are to discuss in the next few days in Moscow is, in the words of S. Dzhindzholiya, a development of the "Statement on Measures for a Political Settlement of the Georgian-Abkhaz Conflict" signed by the two sides 4 April 1994. I will quote two points from this "statement": Point 6. "Abkhazia has its own constitution and legislation, and the appropriate symbols of statehood: an anthem, crest, and flag"; and Point 8. "...proposals to revive state-legal relationships will be produced." What is meant is, of course, relations between Georgia and Abkhazia. But you have to conclude that the development of the given form of words in the draft submitted for the experts' discussion means the new document containing a point on the equal status [ravno-subyektnost] of Georgia and Abkhazia and the building of relations between them as equal components. Possibly in the form of a confederation.

The next round of negotiations between the Georgian and Abkhaz delegations on problems of settling the conflict has been fixed for March. It is not yet known what questions will be discussed. There are great doubts that the experts, if indeed they gather, will confirm a draft document containing such a concept as the "equal status" of Georgia and Abkhazia. Judging by the latest statements by the sides' leaders, their positions have not changed. But any agreement resolving the main question in the dispute—Abkhazia's status—is simply impossible without mutual concessions.

Abkhazian Parliament in Exile Rejects Confederation

LD1402160395 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1256 GMT 14 Feb 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Tengiz Pachkoria]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow February 14 TASS—The Supreme Soviet of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia with its seat in Tbilisi today rejected the proposal for a confederation of Georgia and Abkhazia because it would set off a process of legal dismantling of a single Georgian state whose territorial integrity is recognised by the entire world community including Russia.

The Georgian "Parliament of Abkhazia", which had to flee the conflict zone in September 1993 and has since been functioning in Tbilisi, said in a statement that

Abkhazia as part of the single Georgian state would enjoy all the rights necessary for the economic, politic and cultural development of the region with due account of the interests and traditions of the Abkhaz and Georgian peoples, as well as of the entire multinational population of Abkhazia.

The Supreme Soviet of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia said the return of refugees to Abkhazia must take place as soon as possible regardless of any political or other problems.

Sigua Discusses Abortive March on Abkhazia

AU1502082495 Tbilisi SAKARTVELO in Georgian
24-27 Jan 95 pp 1, 2, 6, 7

[Interview with Tengiz Sigua, co-leader of the National-Liberation Front, former prime minister, by Vakhtang Komakhidze; place and date not given: "Tengiz Sigua: 'Eduard Shevardnadze Was Simply Afraid... This Is Political Blackmail'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It has almost become the rule here for the official mass media to let the accuser have his say and not the accused. Therefore, the population is unable to have complete information on questions of interest. The action taken by the "National-Liberation Front" [NLF] has become the most interesting and most talked-about topic in recent days.

It was not possible to get in touch with the principal accused for the simple reason that Batoni [Georgian polite form of address] Tengiz Kitovani has been taken to prison.

We tried to contact Batoni Tengiz Sigua as the most prominent person in these events.

We called on him at home and he kindly spoke at length by lamplight.

Here is the text of what we recorded.

[Komakhidze] Batono Tengiz, how much preparation was made and when was it decided to take this action that has aroused such a fuss among the leadership and in the mass media?

[Sigua] Preparations for the action did not last long as the basis for it was laid by a letter received from the Committee of Georgian Refugees (I personally have not seen this letter, but such a letter was received by the NLF's leadership) in which, as I was told, it was stated: Proceeding from your rules that you are concerned about Georgia's territorial integrity, we ask you to help us, if you can. What was meant was that those refugees located in eastern Georgia who so wished were to travel to western Georgia and create a united army and, provided that the state decided upon the use of forceful methods to restore Georgia's territorial integrity, they, together with forces from the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Security Service, would participate in the restoration of the country's territorial integrity.

I personally received information about this action on 12 January. This took place in the NLF office where discussion centered on dispatching 500-600 men, as planned, to western Georgia, specifically Senaki, the next day. I requested that an official statement be made by the press center and such a statement was made.

The column was to set off for western Georgia, naturally unarmed, on 13 January, at 1000-1100. However, that day, at approximately 1230, when I reached Pasteri Street, I encountered far more people than had been expected—more than 1,400, as I was told. They were refugees from eastern Georgia—the Kakheti region, Tbilisi, and Tsqneti. In the main, they were those people who, in their time, had defended Abkhazia and subsequently had been forced to leave it. I know very well that they had all been warned not to take weapons with them. A peace march was to be organized so that a base could be set up there in Senaki and, as I have already mentioned, if the state would adopt a decision on the use of force in Abkhazia and provide the people's army with weapons, this army would be ready to fight. The interest, after all, came from their side. They are fighting to return home, to stand on their own earth.

Early on 13 January, when I arrived at the NLF office, Batoni Jimi Mikeladze, first deputy minister of internal affairs, and Batoni Demur Mikadze, the city police chief, were there. They were speaking with Batoni Tengiz Kitovani. I did not take part in this conversation as there were representatives of the mass media there, including from Russian television's "Vesti," the REUTERS agency, and so forth, and I, so to speak, got involved in talking to the press. Of course, I finally approached them and heard Mikeladze say that he was now going to the authorities and would give a final answer in one hour's time. Shortly after he left, Batoni Avtandil Ioseliani, first deputy chief of the Security Service, arrived. I had already had a serious conversation with him (we had been on our own) that had lasted about half an hour. He had already known about this action on 12 January as he had spoken about it on the phone with Tengiz Kitovani. He asked me what legal and political basis this action had. I replied that, in the first place, there was the address at the session of the Georgian Parliament in December where such an important statement was put on record: The Georgian side reserves itself the complete moral and legal right to use all methods in its fight to restore Georgia's territorial integrity. I remember very well that there were 150 deputies present at that session and the entire 150 voted in favor of this address, including Head of State Eduard Shevardnadze.

Second: During the visit of UN Secretary General Butrus-Ghali to Georgia, he met with the leaders of the Committee of Abkhazian Refugees and a number of Georgian deputies and there was a fairly detailed discussion about the problem of the settlement of the Abkhazian conflict. The committee's leaders thanked Batoni Butrus-Ghali that 10 resolutions had been adopted on the Abkhazian conflict in the Security Council, of which eight

directly mentioned Georgia's territorial integrity, the inviolability of its borders, and its sovereignty. However, they also expressed fairly serious grievances to him concerning the fact that all this had remained on paper and no real advances had been made. It was also stated that, if no end could be seen to the peace talks, the Georgia side would reserve itself the right to restore its territorial integrity by forceful methods. Batoni Butrus-Ghali replied that he would not advise Georgia, at this stage, to use force as the quadripartite negotiations would shortly be resuming in Geneva; he meant those involving international organizations, specifically the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] and the UN and, in addition, a summit meeting was planned between Georgia, Russia, and Abkhazia with the participation of Butrus-Ghali. He said that, if these measures were unable to bring the desired results, only then could one speak about using other methods. About 10 days ago, Batoni Butrus-Ghali's statement was disseminated in the form of an official document in the UN in which he directly says: An attempt, which has lasted for one year, has been unable to bring a result. It has not been possible to make any progress and he is unable to see any prospects in the near future for a settlement to the problem and the negotiations have, to all intents and purposes, reached a deadlock.

Third: The action that Russia has taken in Chechnya clearly shows that, if Russia has the right to carry out actions involving force on the territory of Chechnya against Dudayev's illegal formations, the Georgian leadership should have the same right to implement measures, let us say, first the application of political and diplomatic pressure and then force in order to ask the same of Ardzinba and the separatists—disarm! You have the right to form a police force but not military formations. Previously, Russia's approach to this problem was different. They used to say that armed formations exist and are a fact and we should get used to this. However, this question has now already been exposed and, if we take President Yeltsin's decree and change two words—instead of Russia and Chechnya we insert Georgia and Abkhazia—it turns out that Georgia is asking Abkhazia to disarm the illegal military formations. However, the unfortunate thing is that the Georgian authorities are not implementing any such legal or other measures or pressure and the legal and political basis for our action lay only in the fact that a course of action should have been taken by means of popular diplomacy against the separatists and the authorities should have adopted a slightly more radical stance. There was no talk of introducing military units and starting a war right now.

It should also be said that December has passed, half of January as well, and the Abkhazian question has not been raised at a session of Parliament. One can already see an attempt to get the people to forget about this problem as has happened with the Tskhinvali problem. Everyone probably remembers that a treaty was signed in Dagomys in June 1992 as a result of which Batoni Shevardnadze assured me that all the refugees would

return to Tskhinvali before the beginning of 1993. However, two and a half years later, not a single family has returned to Tskhinvali, which leads one to suspect that the authorities are trying to let time pass so that the people will slowly forget about this problem.

There exists one other problem: It has, to all intents and purposes, almost been withheld from Parliament, but at the negotiations in Geneva that broke down, a proposal was made by the OSCE and the UN, in the form of an official document, that the Abkhazian side should increase the quota of returning refugees to up to 3,000 a month. Let us now calculate: There are 250,000 refugees and this process can be drawn out over seven to eight years. This would virtually mean that Georgia would lose Abkhazia as it is natural that, during this period, there would be a significant change in the demographic situation in Abkhazia and people would also no longer feel the desire to return there. Since 17 November, not a single refugee has been repatriated to Abkhazia. Up to now, only 102 families have returned. There used to exist special forms for refugees wishing to return that were sent by the Abkhazian side; it has now completely stopped supplying these. That is to say, the process has reached an impasse.

[Komakhidze] In connection with the national-liberation or Tbilisi-Senaki action, the view was disseminated by representatives of the authorities and the mass media that the column that was heading westward had weapons, which means that the action did not intend to apply only political pressure.

[Sigua] The action bore a political character. However, the authorities want to call it a military one. Only about 30 submachine guns, one machine gun, and several shells were uncovered in this 1,400-strong armada. It is possible they belonged to those who joined the march later. It was announced that people were to be unarmed. It is absurd for 1,400 men to try to take Abkhazia with this number of weapons. The action was aimed only to apply political pressure.

[Komakhidze] Many are talking about the rules of the NLF and the fact that its registration was denied.

[Sigua] Specialists from the Ministry of Justice made a whole number of corrections to our rules and they were returned to us. We accepted all the corrections and sent them off a second time. Further corrections were made, which were likewise accepted by us and, at the third attempt, the board ratified the rules. The Ministry of Justice issued a registration certificate under the number 1739. Following this, the organization gathered together fairly powerful forces. A whole number of social organizations joined it. I find it hard to give a precise figure but approximately 120,000-130,000 persons became members of the NLF. Naturally, all of these have been registered. An active start was made on forming regional branches. It seems Batoni Shevardnadze took fright and I am convinced he gave instructions to the Ministry of Justice to abolish this organization. The following letter

was written by the justice minister himself to the chairman of the Republic of Georgia Supreme Court:

To M. Ugrekhelidze, chairman of the Republic of Georgia Supreme Court

On 24 October 1994, in accordance with Decree No. 19/1, the registration board of the Republic of Georgia Ministry of Justice registered the rules of the "National-Liberation Front," a public association of citizens whose main aim, as laid down in the rules, is to preserve Georgia's territorial integrity and strengthen the sovereignty of the state by means of peaceful popular diplomacy.

In spite of the fact that this organization should be governed by Republic of Georgia existing legislation and its own rules, it has violated the latter in its activities and, to all intents and purposes, has become a base for the formation of illegal armed groups, which is confirmed in official documents handed over to the Ministry of Justice by the Republic of Georgia Procurator's Office and the State Security Service. Specifically: On 14 November 1994, criminal proceedings were instigated by the State Security Service against NLF members Lomashvili, Bekurishvili, and others who, with the aim of joining the aforementioned association, on 8-9 November 1994 created an illegal armed formation comprising 11 persons in Mtskheta rayon, acquired a variety of firearms, and illegally took possession of a home for invalid children in the village of Dzegvi.

On 11 November 1994, a certain N. Adeishvili was arrested in Tbilisi by Interior Ministry personnel who, following a search of his apartment, confiscated a large quantity of firearms and combat equipment, including a rocket launcher, submachine guns, hand grenades, anti-tank mines, and so forth. N. Adeishvili explained that T. Kitovani was forming a volunteer regiment at 7 Pasteri Street, Tbilisi to send to Abkhazia and he had decided to go to this address with the weapons and combat equipment. Proceeding from this, the activities of the NLF contradict Point 2, Part 3, Article 3 of the Republic of Georgia Law on Public Associations of Citizens; accordingly, the Ministry of Justice, as a registered body, is submitting a written proposal to the Republic of Georgia Supreme Court that the NLF be abolished.

At the same time, we request that you examine whether this matter should be brought to court.

[Signed] Minister T. Ninidze

Enclosed: Thirty-eight pages; one videocassette

[Sigua] These people are not members of our front. This incident involving a certain Adeishvili is absolutely ridiculous. Someone decided to join us with all his weapons in tow and, as a result, the front is being outlawed. On the basis of these two examples, it is being said that the front is setting up a military formation. This incident involving Adeishvili is indeed surprising. He apparently stated that he fought in Abkhazia and, if a war were to break out again, he would go off once more

to fight. It is unclear what links he should have with us. If Shevardnadze were to go, he would follow him as well. When asked whether he had been or was a member of the NLF, he gave a negative reply. He said that he would simply follow Kitovani if the latter went off to war. How can one accuse an organization when a crime is committed by people who do not belong to it? Having found nothing more than these two false facts, the minister is petitioning the Supreme Court and demanding that the organization be abolished.

[Komakhidze] What grounds should Shevardnadze have for stating that Kitovani was planning to set up camp in Senaki and create a new hotbed of civil war?

[Sigua] This is sheer provocation. Who is supposed to unleash a civil war? Those in the column were, in the main, refugees from Abkhazia. This is absolute fiction. If it is a matter of civil war, what forces are involved? So, this is absolute fiction, political blackmail.

If Ioseliani had said on the morning of 13 January that they would block the road and we would not be able to proceed, would this column have left? The column was to have left at 1100, but two hours passed. We were waiting for an answer. As we did not get one, the column set off. Everything was announced in advance. Shevardnadze knew everything. Was there, after all, any opposition offered? When they blocked the road and said there were armed men ahead, the column turned back. This was a preplanned action and political blackmail against the front and its leaders aimed at denigrating this political organization.

[Komakhidze] So, this is one of the links in the chain that should encircle the national movement?

[Sigua] Undoubtedly. Incidentally, the attempt to blow up the NLF building two weeks ago is another fact that is being covered up. Explosives were found there.

[Komakhidze] The name Pistun has been given a lot of publicity. It has been said that he is a Russian agent.

[Sigua] From where has this idea come? He is a journalist from the Krasnodar area. Shevardnadze apparently said that he was carrying a document identifying him as a representative of Yeltsin.

[Komakhidze] If I am not mistaken, it was said that he was passing himself off as Yeltsin's representative.

[Sigua] No, he had this document but I don't know whether it was a fake or not. This is being investigated now. I met him on several occasions but he never said that he was Yeltsin's representative. I know him as a journalist. He is the editor of KUBANSKIY KURYER and a television journalist. As he told me, he was to have made a television film about Abkhazia and asked for our help. If he was indeed Yeltsin's representative and had some other assignments, I know nothing about this.

[Komakhidze] Batono Tengiz, where were you planning to billet these 1,400 men? Where were they going to live and how were they going to be fed?

[Sigua] Apart from one week's bread rations, these men had also taken with them dry provisions. Most of them were refugees who are living here on humanitarian aid. If they were receiving this aid in Kakheti, Tbilisi, or Tsqneti, it was possible to redistribute it elsewhere. These people were living at the state's expense: they would receive their own food on the spot. I was not there but, as far as I know, everything had been arranged regarding their stay.

[Komakhidze] Why should criminal proceedings have been brought against Kitovani on 14 January? If we take account of those facts on which basis the Ministry of Justice demanded your organization's abolition, proceedings should probably have been brought against Kitovani earlier.

[Sigua] I agree with you. Proceedings should have been instigated if such facts existed, but what was the motive behind their instigation? They arrested and confiscated weapons from a certain Adeishvili who has never said that he belonged to the front. I repeat: He said that he had fought in Abkhazia, that he had weapons, and that if anyone was going off to fight there, he would join them. Therefore, we can put the question like this: Had Shevardnadze gone there, he would have followed, had [Defense Minister] Nadibaidze gone, he would likewise have accompanied him and proceedings are being instigated against Kitovani because a certain Adeishvili said that he was creating a military formation? This is a lie.

[Komakhidze] Against this background, what is expected to happen in Parliament? What are you expecting from the deputies and the majority?

[Sigua] I am nevertheless convinced that common sense will prevail among the deputies when this question is raised in Parliament and the Procurator's Office will demand that Kitovani's immunity as a deputy be lifted. There will be a serious discussion and I am sure that common sense will prevail. There is indeed a lot that has to be said. For example: To begin with, Tengiz Kitovani was suspected under Article 238—the creation of an illegal armed formation. It seems they themselves doubted that he could be accused under this article and so they came up with another article: Some two to three months ago, information was spread that Kitovani had insulted the Communications Minister Pridon Injia. This is an interesting story! During those difficult days when Kitovani was camped at the Tbilisi Sea, the idea arose of setting up an alternative television channel. This subsequently became possible. Special equipment was ordered and this was set up at the Tbilisi Sea; it played quite a big role at that time. Injia took part in delivering this equipment and installing it. In winter, when it was freezing, he himself climbed up the travelling crane where the equipment was installed. He was responsible for maintaining this television equipment. When everything was over, Kitovani left his equipment with Injia for safekeeping. Not long ago, Kitovani phoned Injia and said that he had the idea of setting up a television channel and asked that the equipment be returned to him. It was not returned. Some think

that he hired out this equipment and the mast to a commercial television company. I don't know everything connected with this question, but it is a fact that Pridon Injia refused to return this equipment to Kitovani. Kitovani, who was enraged by this, went to see him and whether he insulted him verbally or in some other way I don't know.... In short, there was an unpleasant exchange of words between them. Two months ago, Shevardnadze instructed the Security Service and the Procurator's Office to investigate this fact. This question was soon hushed up, but they have now remembered it and, since it was doubtful that he could be prosecuted according to Article 238, they thought that perhaps they could manage to arrest him according to this article.

One other point is significant: A deputy can be arrested only if he has been caught red-handed at the scene of a serious crime, namely theft, armed robbery, or murder; if there are facts [incriminating him] there, he can be arrested without permission from Parliament. What happened two or three months ago provides insufficient grounds for a deputy's arrest. Therefore, they used Article 238 and, if nothing comes of this, they will use the Injia case in Parliament.

[Komakhidze] In an interview given to the "Kavkasia" television company, Batoni Vakhtang Rcheulishvili [deputy speaker of Parliament], speaking about the preparations for a civil war in Senaki, insulted Kitovani by saying: "You remember what kind of war you unleashed here?" Batoni Rcheulishvili indeed meant the Tbilisi war [December 1991-January 1992], although the head of state, in his time, has called this a popular revolution, which, I believe, Batoni Vakhtang Rcheulishvili has never disputed. Can you comment upon this fact? Can one expect such an accusation to be leveled against Kitovani?

[Sigua] Did Rcheulishvili not applaud that war? Isn't he occupying his seat [as deputy speaker] as a result of that war? Shevardnadze has said many times that this was a popular uprising, a revolution, and so forth.

[Komakhidze] Batono Tengiz, all roads probably lead to Abkhazia. Is not the question of our being prepared or unprepared for the war the reason for this opposition? Let us perhaps begin with this. Were we ready for war when we first entered Abkhazia? Our entry has seemingly been criticized....

[Sigua] We cannot say that we were unprepared.

First of all, one cannot say that we were unleashing a war by going into Abkhazia. We were transferring Georgian military formations onto Abkhazian territory in order to protect the railroad on this territory. May I remind you that, prior to this, 12 billion rubles worth of goods had been seized along this railroad.

[Komakhidze] However, Ardzinba [Abkhazian leader] stated on so-called "Abkhazian independence day" that the Georgians were planning to protect the railroad, but why were tanks necessary for this?

[Sigua] Everyone remembers the signing of the first peace document in Moscow on 3 September as a result of which a commission set to work. It included railroad and highway specialists. They engaged 6,000 men along with their equipment. This number was necessary to protect the line from the Psou River to Zugdidi and all the constructions along it, specifically bridges, tunnels, aqueducts, and so forth. I was the Georgian chairman of this commission and this figure made me think: Did we really have so many people?

[Komakhidze] You stated that we cannot say that we were unprepared. Following the tragedy in Gagra, Tengiz Kitovani stated that the Russians were firing their shells right down the barrels of our tanks.... Were relations with Russia determined prior to our entering Abkhazia?

[Sigua] I don't know to what extent it is possible to say the following: The Russian military command that was then in Abkhazia gave a guarantee that they would not interfere in anything. Furthermore, they themselves assured us that we would be able to reach the Psou within five days.

However, on the third day, the head of state gave the following command: No one is to set foot on the other side of the Gumista [river]! To all intents and purposes, Abkhazia was lost at that point. I will tell you more. The Abkhazian epic started in Tskhinvali. You probably remember that Tskhinvali was completely surrounded. Tatishvili had entered the town center. That day, the order came from Tbilisi to raise the siege! I heard about this from people in the Intelligence Service. They were alarmed and Qarqarishvili was furious: "What a time to raise the siege! The men will revolt. Tskhinvali has almost been taken." Very soon nothing made sense. Qarqarishvili carried out the order and raised the siege. However, a second plan was ignored. It concerned the following: As soon as Qarqarishvili had taken Tskhinvali, of the 1,200 men engaged in the Tskhinvali conflict, 200 were to stay there. The Georgian police were to enter Tskhinvali and restore Georgian jurisdiction. On the basis of the remaining 1,000, Georgian battalions were to be formed in Gali, Ochamchire, Tqvarcheli, Gulripshi, and so forth—from Gali to Gagra. Only the Sukhumi battalion comprising 250 men was formed. Had it been supplemented by those 1,000 men, Ardzinba would not have succeeded in anything at all. However, the opposite happened. Later, out of necessity, those 250 men were sent to the Tskhinvali region. This was the beginning of the Abkhazian tragedy.

I asked the head of state the following question in Parliament: Why was the siege of Tskhinvali raised? He replied that he had been afraid lest anything should have happened to the helicopter regiment there. The commander of the helicopter regiment spent two days in my office and requested just one thing: If any military operation needed to be conducted near the regiment's base, no shells should be fired on its territory for, if any servicemen were to be wounded, Moscow would be up in arms. However, to all intents and purposes, he himself realized that it was no longer necessary to conduct any

military operation there as there were only 50 fighters left in the town and they were already prepared to surrender. They had been trying to contact Qarqarishvili or Kitovani in order to hand in their weapons and had been searching for someone to escort them to the [Roka] tunnel. After that, the situation in Tskhinvali became more acute and it became necessary to bring in the Sukhumi battalion, which finally untied Ardzinba's hands. An offensive was launched against the Georgian police; they went on strike and beat up the interior minister who was flown to Tbilisi to be operated upon, and so forth. On 14 August [1992], when the war in Abkhazia began, as I told you, the Russian side gave us a guarantee that they would not interfere for five days. Neither the regiment in Sukhumi nor the 345th Airborne Assault Brigade stationed at the lighthouse in Gudauta were to object to this, so to speak. They told us that we could proceed as far as the Psou and then the victor could dictate his terms. I repeat five days; after that, a reaction from the Russian Parliament was expected. Yet, on the third day came the order: No one is to set foot on the other side of the Gumista!

[Komakhidze] Following what you have just recounted, how do you view your future relations with the head of state?

[Sigua] Let us speak frankly. I believe that he has given up on Abkhazia. He wants to play the role of the dove of peace and preserve his image. Let us recall his first promise following the signing of the Dagomys treaty, that all refugees will return to Tskhinvali before January 1992. Not a single family has returned there.

On 12 February last year, negotiations began on the return of refugees to Abkhazia. A total of 102 families have gone back. Don't you think this is an attempt by the authorities to slowly hush up this question? Remember what the press—your newspaper and SHANSI—reported recently: Let's not forget Abkhazia. This subject was always the first item of news on television. Today, it has been relegated to third or fourth spot.

An attempt should surely be made to hold a closed session of the heads of the power structures where there should be a serious discussion on whether the peace talks hold any prospects.

[Komakhidze] Do you think this is an anti-war policy that is being conducted or...?

[Sigua] Let us raise the following question: Who is saying that we should start a war right now? One can feel that a very good background has been created against which political pressure can be applied on the separatists. Russia's action in Chechnya has given us a free hand. Why doesn't the head of state use this? This is one reason for not convening Parliament. He feels that sharp statements will be delivered there. With the passage of time, we are losing our positions. Would you sign an agreement that stipulates that the process of the return of the

refugees should continue for 10 years? However, following the signing of the agreement of 4 April and the Sochi agreement, on which basis heavy equipment was removed from Abkhazia, Shevardnadze has possibly agreed to this.

[Komakhidze] Batono Tengiz, how much danger is there of war starting in Abkhazia given the fighting in Chechnya?

[Sigua] Clearly the fear exists. There is a danger of war breaking out throughout the Caucasus. The point is that, before all states take such a step, a thorough political analysis should be made of the expected consequences. However, there is one danger here too. There is a very big force in the northern Caucasus; not only in Chechnya but also elsewhere in the northern Caucasus, Jordan, Syria, and so forth. If this force goes to Abkhazia, it will be finally lost.

[Komakhidze] How is the process of the formation of the Georgian Army proceeding?

[Sigua] Let me just give you some figures: In the 1994 budget, 4 percent was allocated for military expenditure whereas 4.8-5.0 percent went on the Government. However, in the 1995 budget, upon our insistence, this has risen from 5 to 15 percent, although this figure is still much higher in a whole number of countries.

[Komakhidze] Batono Tengiz, at a time when terrorist acts and murders are being committed, are you not afraid of taking risky steps?

[Sigua] The feeling of fear should not oppress a man. If it is question of fear, a person should not engage in serious matters. Therefore, let us not talk of fear.

Journalists, Press Protest Against Police 'Persecution'

AU1402192695 Tbilisi REZONANSI in Georgian
9-10 Feb 95 p 1

[Address "To the Republic of Georgia Parliament, Georgian Head of State, Georgian Cabinet of Ministers, Georgian Committee for Interethnic Relations and Protection of Human Rights, State Embassies Accredited to Georgia, UN Mission in Georgia, Tbilisi City Administration" from named journalist organizations and newspapers; place and date not given]

[FBIS Translated Text] Proceeding from the Charter of Human Rights recognized by the world community, the principles underlying the free dissemination of information, and the Georgian Law on the Press, we, Georgian journalists and organizations of journalists, inform you that newspaper distributors have been persecuted and oppressed and newspapers have been confiscated for already one week now; furthermore, there have been several acts of distributors having been beaten up. There was also one case of a distributor having been temporarily imprisoned. Representatives of the Tbilisi police state that

they are proceeding according to the Tbilisi City Administration Decision of 1 September 1993 "On the Restriction of External Trade." As press distribution is being restricted not only in Tbilisi but also in the country's rayons, it is to be supposed that the local administrative boards have been given a single set of appropriate instructions from the Cabinet of Ministers or the head of state. We strongly protest on account of these concrete facts of the restriction of human rights and the dissemination of information by the country's administration and demand: There be an immediate halt to the persecution of press distributors by the police; the Committee for Interethnic Relations and the Protection of Human Rights studies and gives an appropriate assessment of this antidemocratic process in Georgia; the appropriate bodies adopt a normative act so that such a thing will not be repeated. Otherwise, Georgia's free journalists and journalist organizations will resort to more severe forms of protest.

[Signed] The "Free Press" Association
The Federation of Georgian Journalists
The Society of Georgian Journalists

DRONI
REZONANSI
7 DGHE
MIMOKHILVELI
AKHALGAZRDA IVERIELI
IVERIA EKSPRESI
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PORUMI
SARBIELI
KARTULI PEKHBURTI
SAKARTVELO
SARANGI
KARTVELI ERI

Coal Industry 'Crisis' Forces Miners in Tqibuli To Strike

AU1502104995 Tbilisi REZONANSI in Georgian
7-8 Feb 95 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Tqibuli Miners on Strike"]

[FBIS Translated Text] At the demand of the striking miners, Kutaisi Mayor Temur Shashiashvili visited Tqibuli and met with the strikers. This was the first visit by the newly appointed head of state's plenipotentiary in the Imereti region to one of the rayons there. As it was pointed out at the meeting, Tqibuli's population and miners are living in extreme need. The railroad is paralyzed, transport in the city is not functioning, bread is being baked two or three times a week and is of such bad quality that it is virtually unfit for consumption. The miners have still not received their pay for November and December. As can be seen, electricity is the only luxury that the locals can enjoy and this is being procured independently. Following the meeting with the miners, Temur Shashiashvili met with the heads of the "Saknakshiri" [Georgian Coal] Department and the city's administrative board. The main question under discussion was the elaboration of concrete

measures that will bring this branch out of the crisis in the near future. As "Saknakshiri" Department Director Aleksandre Bochorishvili pointed out, this necessitates the concentration of special mining equipment and conveyers at one of the mines, but their acquisition is practically impossible at this stage. Miners do not have basic tools for their labor, working clothes, or even soap. Communications have broken down. No less important is the consumer problem. Previously, Tqibuli supplied Russian cities, but now, with the exception of the Rustavi metallurgical plant (which buys a tiny fraction of the coal but, to this day, has unpaid debts), no one buys coal from it. Cadres policy needs to be reviewed as well. There are 3,200 people employed in the "Saknakshiri" Department. However, only very few of these are involved in production. For example, out of 110 miners at one pit, eight have remained. The situation is the same everywhere else.

Yet, the city has great potential regarding resources: There is tea, granite, timber, and jet deposits. To this one can add many previously big enterprises such as those that used to produce transformers, [word indistinct] spirit, and so forth. Such riches are, to all intents and purposes, remaining unused and the city is living in poverty. Shashiashvili promised Tqibulians that the bread and transport problem would be sorted out in the

next few days. Miners would be paid. He outlined several specific measures to bring this branch, which is so important for Georgia, out of the crisis. Tqibulians are hoping that, this time at least, they will not be let down.

Oil Company Offer Accords With Wish To Bypass Russia

MM1402115195 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 14 Feb 95 First Edition p 7

[Report from ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, ITAR-TASS roundup under the "Foreign News" rubric: "Via Georgia, Bypassing Russia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A high-powered delegation from the transnational consortium British Petroleum has arrived in Georgia with a business proposal to organize the shipment of Azerbaijani oil along the Baku-Tbilisi-Batumi route and beyond across the Black Sea.

Although the republic's leadership has refrained so far from giving a clear answer to the world oil magnates' initiative, their proposal fully accords with Eduard Shevardnadze's idea of creating a new transcontinental route from Europe to Asia which would run via Georgia bypassing the existing routes through Russia.

Estonia

Meri Comments on NATO, EU Aspirations in Swiss Interview

WS1502102595 Tallinn BNS in English 1826 GMT 14 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tallinn, Feb 14, BNS—Both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union are of very great importance for Estonia, President Lennart Meri said Tuesday [14 February] in an interview to the Swiss newspaper HEURES.

The president emphasized that admission of a new member into the Atlantic alliance was primarily a political decision and entry into the European trading bloc, an economic one.

"Europe must take the risk," Meri said. "It is obvious that Kazakhstan, for example, will not become a NATO member. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, on the other hand, are part of Europe."

With regard to joining NATO, Estonia's priorities at present are building up its army and tightening its eastern border, Meri said.

In answer to a question about the war in Chechnya, the president said the bombing of the Chechen capital, Grozny, reminded him about the bombing of Dresden.

"I was surprised by the impotence and passivity of international organizations in a situation that cannot be called civil war," Meri noted.

The president reaffirmed that Estonia's Russian residents had as many rights as all aliens in Switzerland. "Russians do not mention human rights when they drop bombs on their own citizens," he underscored.

In Meri's words, Russian politicians seek to use accusations of human rights abuses as an argument toward having Estonia reincorporated in Russia. "This presents a problem for Estonia, but also for Europe in case Russia should wish to restore its colonial empire," he said.

The president stressed in the interview that before the Russian occupation Estonia was a homogeneous state with Estonians making up 90 percent of its population.

Estonia wants to build friendly relations with Russia, Meri said, "but alas, they are possible only between democratic states." "That is why we follow with great interest how political decisions are made in Russia."

Presidential Office Issues Baltic Borders Warning

LD1402202295 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1922 GMT 14 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tallinn, Feb 14 (INTERFAX)—Estonia has warned Latvia of its possible restriction of the regime on the bilateral border.

The Estonian presidential office made an official statement saying that the Estonian migration and border departments were concerned over Latvia's recent steps to facilitate crossing its borders with Russia, Lithuania and Belarus.

"Such practices do not allow to speak of creating a single visa space in the Baltic states. The differences in border regimes make restricting the border regime between Latvia and Estonia a pressing need," the statement said.

The statement followed a number of telephone conversations between the three Baltic presidents—Guntis Ulmanis, Algirdas Brazauskas, and Lennart Meri. The document stipulated that the presidents paid much attention to widening mutual cooperation and closer integration with the European Union [EU]. They agreed that various tactics could be used while negotiating with the EU, but their stance on national security must be common. The top priority will be to strengthen the borders to comply with the EU requirements.

The three presidents agreed to hold the next meeting of the Presidents' Council in Tallinn this autumn.

Interference in Russian Affairs Denied

LD1402161295 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1521 GMT 14 Feb 95

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature: Reports by our diplomatic correspondents Aleksandr Korzun, Igor Porshnev, Yevgeniy Terekhov and others]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tallinn, Feb 14 (INTERFAX)—Vello Saatpalu, chairman of Estonian parliament's Foreign Relations Commission, denied allegations, made by Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev, that Tallinn interferes in Russian internal affairs.

He said that if Kozyrev is displeased with what the Estonian parliament did, he must likewise be displeased with the behavior of Russia's own State Duma. The Estonian parliament passed a resolution "On the Chechen People's Right to Self-Determination."

Saatpalu said that the State Duma had repeatedly called on the federal authorities to end hostilities in Chechnya immediately and start negotiations. "If our Russian counterparts are free to regard the war in Chechnya as pointless, we, too, can criticize actions inconsistent with the OCSE code," he said. Estonia's stand is aimed at ending the destruction of people, not at destroying Russia or worsening the already complicated relations with Moscow, he noted. If the people of Chechnya want self-determination, they have an internationally-recognized right to it," Saatpalu said.

Saatpalu argued that Estonia does not interfere in Russia's affairs and respects its territorial integrity and the Estonian-Russian Treaty of 1991 on the basic principles underlying the bilateral relations.

He explained that aiding one of the warring parties would amount to interference while Estonia would never fall that low.

Latvia

Baltic Premiers Agree on Cooperation Program

LD1402163195 Tallinn Estonian Television Network
in Estonian 1900 GMT 13 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The prime ministers of the three Baltic states met in Riga today and agreed on an action plan for the Baltic Council of Ministers for this year. They also adopted a resolution on the Via Baltica [Tallinn-Warsaw highway project] and the Baltic customs union, which is to be set up by 1 January 1998.

Estonian Prime Minister Andres Tarand, Latvian Prime Minister Maris Gailis, and Lithuanian Prime Minister Adolfas Slezevicius decided to develop cooperation in areas of defense and protection of the environment and to move toward harmonization of laws.

The prime ministers set up four new committees, on information and technology, culture, customs, and border defense. Their resolution states that the development of the Via Baltica has prime importance for Baltic cooperation.

The meeting did not conclude an agreement on agriculture. As of 1 July, it will be Lithuania's turn to chair the Baltic Council of Ministers. A Lithuanian Government spokesman said that it is very likely that the council's office will be moved from Riga to Vilnius.

Fail To Reach Mutual Trade Agreement

LD1402225395 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in Lithuanian
2200 GMT 14 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Baltic prime ministers have failed to reach an agreement on mutual trade in agricultural products in Riga. A Baltic News Service correspondent has been told by Latvian Prime Minister Maris Gailis that a resolution on mutual trade in agricultural products had not been sufficiently coordinated.

Greatest disagreements have arisen during the tripartite meeting of the prime ministers on export tariffs of agricultural products which are fixed in Lithuania and Latvia but not in Estonia. Latvia was proposing to introduce mutual trade quotas with zero export tariffs for a majority of agricultural products. The Estonian delegation, on its part, was proposing to give up export tariffs in mutual trade completely. Latvia did not agree with this proposal. "We have a different system and endeavors to protect our agricultural producers", said Maris Gailis.

The Latvian prime minister added that the committee of the Baltic Council of Ministers would draw up this document that later would be signed by the ambassadors of the Baltic states.

The prime ministers of the Baltic states adopted in Riga three resolutions on Monday: on the work of the Baltic

Council of Ministers in 1995, on the Via Baltica road, and on a customs union of the Baltic states.

Foreign Minister Refuses Comment on MP's Case in U.S.

WS1502112995 Tallinn BNS in English 1351 GMT
14 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Riga, Feb 14, BNS—Latvian Foreign Minister Valdis Birkavs did not make any comment Monday [13 February] to BNS on documents received from the U.S. late last week on a conflict between Latvian MP Zigurds Tomins and a U.S. citizen.

Birkavs simply noted that the documents gave a precise description of the incident and said that the media could learn the contents of these documents in the U.S.

Birkavs confirmed that the documents provide new facts on the incident, but refused to make any comment on them. He noted that it was within the competence of the court to find out what had really happened.

Birkavs thinks that the Foreign Ministry has done all possible to ensure and protect the rights and legal interests of Zigurds Tomins as a Latvian citizen and Saeima (parliament) deputy.

The documents on Tomins' arrest were submitted by Birkavs on Monday to the office of the State President, the Saeima Presidium and the Saeima Mandate and Applications Committee. They were received from U.S. authorities and the Latvian Embassy to the U.S. at the end of last week. Birkavs agrees that the Foreign Ministry should protect Tomins's rights, but does not hold it responsible for revealing the contents of the documents.

As reported, Tomins was detained by U.S. authorities Feb. 5 in a Washington hotel but was later set free. Tomins claims that he was attacked.

Lithuania

Prime Minister Dismisses Rumors of Currency Devaluation

LD1502113495

[FBIS Editorial Report] Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian at 0830 GMT on 15 February broadcasts a 15-minute report: "The IMF mission concluded a visit to Lithuania last week. It is known that a statement has been submitted to the press by Adelbert Knobel, head of the IMF mission, concerning a possible devaluation of the litas because of continuous speculations on this issue by various politicians that are appearing in the press and because unfounded ideas about alleged depreciation of the litas and the necessity to devalue it are being disseminated," Lithuanian Prime Minister Adolfas Slezevicius said speaking live on Lithuanian radio in a regular Wednesday prime minister's interview.

Elucidating further on the issue the prime minister said that "together with the bank of Lithuania we have prepared a joint statement in which once again we want to reassure all the people in Lithuania that there is no cause for concern both for the economic subjects and the banks. The question of revoking the law on the credibility of the litas is not under discussion in Lithuania, nor is the issue of litas devaluation."

In defining the main tasks of the government for the current year, the prime minister said that "the main objective is to achieve a more rapid growth of real income. According to our point of view and that of the foreign specialists who visit us we have managed to halt the economic slump."

The prime minister's interview today is on the eve of the 77th anniversary of Lithuania's independence, which is celebrated on 16 February. Answering the question whether Lithuania would be capable of defending its independence now that it has been won back with such difficulty, the prime minister said that "much still has to be done in order to strengthen our Armed Forces. The government and the parliament have decided to increase the military budget, although regretfully the allotted funds are not actually sufficiently delivered because of difficulties in the implementation of the state budget...we must do everything in order that our independence...is preserved."

Norway Supports Lithuania's Integration in EU, NATO

LD1402230395 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in Lithuanian 2200 GMT 14 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Norway supports Lithuania's integration in the EU and its aims to join NATO.

Lithuanian Foreign Minister Povilas Gylys, who is visiting Norway, met yesterday with Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland, Foreign Minister Bjoern Tore Godal, and members of the foreign affairs committee of the Norwegian Parliament.

The Lithuanian and Norwegian foreign ministers signed agreements on mutual assistance in customs administration, on an effective information system on nuclear accidents, and on exchanging information about nuclear objects.

Views were exchanged during the meetings on the attitude of the sides to the European integration processes and NATO expansion, the events in Russia, and cooperation between the Nordic and Baltic countries.

The Lithuanian Foreign Ministry announced that the Norwegian representatives had stressed that although Norway rejected EU membership in a referendum, it is interested in Lithuania's integration in the EU and supports the earliest possible signing of European agreements.

Speaking of the expansion of NATO, the foreign ministers agreed that NATO should not hastily classify countries according to their readiness or possibilities to become NATO members. In the view of the ministers, equal conditions should be created to all potential candidate countries to join transatlantic defense systems.

Brazauskas Denies Discrimination Against Poles

LD1402135495 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1105 GMT 14 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Lithuanian President Algirdas Brazauskas has said that Poles in Lithuania enjoy equal rights with other citizens and they are not discriminated against, as some Polish activists in Lithuania claim.

[Reporter Andrzej Klubinski] In an interview granted to me today prior to his official visit to Poland on 17 and 18 February, Algirdas Brazauskas said:

[Begin Brazauskas recording in Lithuanian with super-imposed Polish report] I think that discrimination is an inappropriate word here. It cannot be used regarding conditions of the Polish minority in Lithuania. I do not know of any fact where the term discrimination applies.

The Polish-Lithuanian treaty provides for further improvement of conditions for the Poles in Lithuania and for the Lithuanians in Poland on the basis of equal rights.

Talking about the treaty itself, President Brazauskas expressed the view that implementation of the decisions included in this document have been proceeding too slowly. He said that concrete and detailed executive acts should be prepared and signed as soon as possible. They should cover trade cooperation, legal assistance, and many other interministerial agreements. Cooperation between Polish and Lithuanian economic structures should be intensified as well.

According to the Lithuanian president, both sides do not yet fully appreciate the advantages of mutual economic cooperation between Lithuania and Poland. The visit to Poland by President Brazauskas should provide the opportunity for exchange of views on this issue. He expressed the hope that his talks with leading personalities from Polish political life will give an impulse to contacts between both countries. [end recording]

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